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Abstract
Aïssaoui, Rachida, Ph.D. The University of Memphis, August 2013. Resources,
power, and fields in institutional change and reproduction. Major Professor: John M.
Amis

While institutional theory constitutes a useful lens to explain how change
happens, some of its key concepts, such as power, resources, and fields, are more often
assumed than directly investigated. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation was to
examine these three concepts during processes of institutional change and reproduction. I
did so by analyzing the dynamics of change in two school systems, Memphis City
Schools and Shelby County Schools, located in Shelby County, Tennessee. These two
school systems had been maintained separate from the mid-1850s until 2010 when they
began a highly contentious merger process.
The first study examined the relationship between resources and change, and the
role of rules in this relationship. I identified four rules that need to be effected for change
to happen, and showed how these rules form the basis of a processual model of change.
In so doing, I was able to expand Giddens‟ structuration theory by teasing out the roles
played by resources and rules in the production of change, and by showing how resources
and rules interact to produce particular outcomes.
The second study examined the ways in which fields are structured, and explored
the particular dynamics that foster homogeneity and heterogeneity in actors‟ behaviors. I
found that actors‟ understanding of the field varied along six dimensions. These
dimensions were interpreted based on the actor‟s perceived position in the field. As a
result, actors‟ reactions to ongoing events varied too. This paper highlights why and how
responses to institutional pressures vary across fields.
v

In the third study, I examined the interactions between episodic and systemic
power in the production of change, and showed how those interactions relate to actors‟
institutional logics. This study suggests that at the intra-organizational meso-level of
fields, the ways actors use power are consistent with their espoused institutional logics.
However, paradoxically, at the inter-organizational macro-level, actors‟ behaviors do not
necessarily conform to their logics. This work thus sheds light on the role of power in
institutional change, and theorizes a link between power and institutional logics. I further
uncovered some micro-processes that allow a new logic to become dominant.

Key words: institutional change, institutional reproduction, power, resources,
institutional field, institutional logics, agency versus structure, embedded agency,
imprinting
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Institutional theory has gained a prominent place in research on organizational
change (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002), and in the study of organizations in general
(Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2003; Scott, 2005). This is because institutional theory is able
to explain that organizations are not merely “rational” actors (Meyer & Rowan, 1977),
but rather, they are influenced by existing rules, norms, and routines, which once
established, serve as authoritative guidelines for social behaviors (Scott, 1995). In fact,
institutional theory is attentive to the processes through which actors (individuals, groups,
organizations) establish those rules, norms, and routines, and how the latter, in turn,
shape actors‟ behaviors, most notably by sanctioning deviance to rules (Selznick, 1949;
Zucker, 1977). Thus, institutional theory is interested in the iterative relationship between
actors and rules – how actors create rules, and how those rules shape actors‟ behaviors,
and thus provides key insights that were crucially missing in rational models of
organizational and social behaviors.
However, key variables central to institutional analyses, including resources,
power, and institutional fields (Clegg, 2010; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Suddaby, 2010;
Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012), remain under-theorized. My work addresses each
of these. First, resources, which are argued to be determinant in bringing about change,
are more often assumed than explained (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Zajac & Westphal,
2004). This often creates a view of resources as a property, a thing that some individuals
or organizations possess. A propertial approach to resources is untenable, though, as it
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fails to explain how change can be driven by under-resourced actors, that is, the very
actors that are more likely to be willing to disrupt an existing institutional order
(Hensmans, 2003; Leblebici et al., 1991).
Second, while the concept of a field has been the object of various definitions
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1991; Scott &
Meyer, 1983), these definitions are more helpful in understanding organizational
homogeneity and institutional stability (Sewell, 1992) than for explaining how
organizations that apparently pertain to the same field respond to institutional pressures in
divergent ways (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Greenwood, Diaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; Kraatz &
Block, 2008). If membership to a field means the sharing of a common structure of
meanings, which in turn will encourage actors to adopt homogenous forms and behaviors
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1983), it becomes important to understand
what, in the ways fields are structured, creates heterogeneity in actors‟ reactions to
institutional pressures.
Finally, institutional analyses are also, either explicitly or implicitly, studies of
power (Lawrence, 2008). Whether power stems from structure that shapes organizational
or social behaviors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995), or from agentic processes
that aim at transforming structure (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; DiMaggio,
1988; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004), much work is still needed to clarify the ways
in which power relates to actors or institutions, and more importantly, how those
dynamics ultimately produce change (Lawrence, Namrata, & Morris, 2012).
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This work aims, then, at addressing three major questions that, together, seek to
advance our understanding of institutional change and reproduction (see Table 1). First, I
examine how the relationship between actors, their resources, and institutions can provide
actors with a basis for power as they seek to alter or maintain existing institutional
arrangements (Chapter 2). Here, I ask: How do resources facilitate change, and what is
the role of institutional rules in this relationship? Second, I address the question: What
are the elements of a field, and what factors lead to homogeneity or heterogeneity in a
field? (Chapter 3) Third, I attend to the relationships between episodic and systemic
power in the reconfiguration and stabilization of fields, and I explore the context within
which institutional logics evolve to produce such outcomes (Chapter 4).
The complexity of institutional change research may stem from the fact that its
key elements – institutions, resources, power, actors, and environments – are all dynamic
elements (Clegg, 1989; Selznick, 1949; Sewell, 1992, 2005). Yet, these elements are
rarely approached as simultaneously dynamic features working in concert (Fligstein &
McAdam, 2012); rather some are left unexplained (Hwang & Colyvas, 2011; Lounsbury
& Ventresca, 2003; Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006; Willmott, 2011).
Consistent with Berger and Luckmann‟s (1967) insight that reality is socially
constructed, my studies systematically start with an analysis of how the variables
I examine were socially constructed. For instance, rather than investigating the effects of
actors‟ positional power, questions of how those actors got such positions in the first
place, and how these positions relate to the overarching institutional framework are
examined. Ultimately, such an approach should allow me to shed light on the various
strategies utilized by both those who have an interest in maintaining current institutional
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arrangements, and those who feel disadvantaged by current institutional arrangements
and seek to alter the social order so that it benefits them.
This work is thus organized around three main chapters, each addressing a
specific research question (see Table 1). In fact, my research setting is particularly suited
to carry out an examination of the dynamics of power, resources, and institutional fields,
and more explicitly to examine the role of each of these variables in institutional change
or reproduction. In the US, it is the responsibility of the county administration to provide
schooling for all of its resident children. Shelby County, however, has maintained the
existence of two separate school systems since 1868, when Shelby County Schools (SCS)
was created to offer a system of public education to the residents living outside of the
City of Memphis. Indeed, Memphis already had established Memphis City Schools
(MCS), a system of free schools, but this was limited to the children living within the
City limits. At that time, Memphis contained predominantly white, middle-class
inhabitants whereas rural Shelby County consisted of lower income, mostly African
American residents.
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Table 1
Map of the Dissertation
Paper 1

Paper 2

Title

When resources facilitate change: An
institutional empowerment perspective

The homogeneity and heterogeneity of
fields

Power and institutional logics in
institutional change

Main research
question(s)

How do resources facilitate change,
and what is the role of rules in this
relationship?

What are the main elements of a field?
What are the factors creating
homogeneity or heterogeneity in a
field?

What are the interactions between
episodic and systemic power in the
reconfiguration or stabilization of
fields? How do these interactions relate
to existing institutional logics?

Major elements
of the paper

Resources
Rules

Institutional field
Homogeneity and heterogeneity

Episodic and systemic power
Institutional logics

Expected
contributions

Providing a model of the ways
resources are socially constructed
As a result, highlighting the strategies
available for institutional change

Understanding how fields are
configured by examining what actors
react to, and uncovering the factors
that create homogeneity and
heterogeneity in their reactions

Understanding the interplay of episodic
and systemic power in institutional
change and the role of institutional
logics in this process

Methods

Comparative historical analysis:
- Historical embedded case study
- Narrative analysis
- Temporal bracketing

Interpretive case study:
- Timeline of major events
- Narrative analysis

Interpretive case study:
- Identification of episodic and
systemic power
- Examination of changes in logics

Data

Organizations’ annual reports
Press articles
Historical essays and academic articles
Legal and other official documents

Semi-structured interviews
Observations of meetings
Video and audio recordings of meetings
Newspaper coverage

Semi-structured interviews
Observations of meetings
Minutes of meetings and other
documents
TV broadcast and press releases
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Paper 3

From this point on, MCS and SCS have remained separated along divisions that,
at first glance, are geographic. However, the co-existence of these two separate school
systems is grounded in deeper and more resilient institutional processes. Such processes
were particularly revealed in December 2010 when MCS decided to surrender its charter,
and thus force a merger with SCS. This decision was made within a particular context as
MCS was experiencing financial difficulties, which could have potentially been
aggravated without such action. A significant portion of MCS revenues came from
property taxes that were collected throughout the whole County to be then redistributed
to MCS and SCS on the basis of the number of students they housed.
With the November 2010 mid-term elections, the Republicans gained the majority
in the Tennessee House and Senate for the first time since the end of the Civil War. This
change in the political environment was welcome by SCS leaders – who were
predominantly Republicans – as they had sought for decades to obtain permanent
separation from MCS, most notably through gaining Special School District (SSD) status.
However, a ban on the creation of SSDs constrained SCS‟ projects, something that SCS
leaders hoped would rapidly change with this political change. Memphis City Schools‟
leaders, concerned that such a separation would potentially cut them off from the
suburban property tax base, almost immediately after the mid-term elections surrendered
the charter that maintained their existence, thus forcing a consolidation of MCS and SCS.
The taxes collected in the suburban areas were indeed crucial for the survival of
MCS, a school system composed of a student population that was 89% economically
disadvantaged and 83% African American; by contrast, SCS served a population that was
37% economically disadvantaged, and 37% African American. Furthermore, with a
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growing impoverishment in the City, the City property tax base was shrinking, making it
unsustainable for Memphis to maintain its level of educational services without the
continued financial support of the suburbs.
My research revolves primarily around this key event: the consolidation of MCS
and SCS. However, in order to gain a keen understanding of the ongoing change process,
I found important to examine the historical underpinnings of the current situation.
Furthermore, exploring the history of MCS and SCS allowed me to address my first
research question as I have access to data tracing the evolution of Shelby County‟s
institutional field since its inception in the 1840s. This historical analysis provides
important insights into the relationship between resources and change, and the role of
institutional rules in this relationship. I develop a model of institutional empowerment
showing how actors in Memphis City Schools and Shelby County Schools succeeded or
failed in gaining or maintaining their power position by elaborating on four specific
stages. These four stages explicate the specific role played by resources and rules in the
production of radical change.
In Chapter 3, I show how MCS and SCS stakeholders had respectively divergent
and homogenous reactions to a major transformation – the consolidation of MCS and
SCS – that was initiated in December 2010. The context is thus particularly suited to
examine why actors react the way do, and to reconcile competing views regarding
whether field membership is more likely to be associated with homogeneous or
heterogeneous behaviors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood et al., 2010; Kraatz &
Block, 2008). This work proposes two main factors determining whether actors‟ reactions
will likely diverge or converge. Most precisely, I show that actors‟ understandings of
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their position in the field, as well the way in which they recall the history of their
organization play a critical role in the way they make sense of ongoing events.
Chapter 4 examines the interactions between episodic and systemic power (Clegg,
1989; Lawrence, 2008), and how these interactions relate to existing institutional logics
(Thornton et al., 2012). As the consolidation was replete of actions and counter-actions
aimed at either realizing or preventing this change project, I am able to examine the role
of episodic and systemic power in supporting shifts in logics. Most specifically, I show
how the interactions between episodic and systemic power vary, and the way these
interactions relate to existing institutional logics vary depending on the field level at
which the interaction unfolds.

8

Chapter 2
When Resources Facilitate Change: An Institutional Empowerment Perspective

What is the role of resources in the effecting of institutional change? This
question is a fundamental one for organizational and social theorists since resources are
commonly argued to be essential to bringing about change (Battilana et al., 2009;
Lawrence, 1999), and yet, this assumption creates a major tension. Societies tend to be
built around structures of inequalities, endowing certain actors with more resources than
others (Abrutyn & Turner, 2011; Bourdieu, 1977; Clegg, 1989; Lamont & Molnar, 2002).
This creates a situation where disadvantaged actors usually have more interest than their
advantaged counterparts in initiating change projects to gain access to similar privileges
(Hensmans, 2003; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011;
Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; Marti & Mair, 2009). However, by definition,
disadvantaged actors do not possess the resources necessary to engage in such projects.
Despite this, change happens even when it is initiated by under-resourced actors
(Leblebici et al., 1991; Marti & Mair, 2009). Conversely, those who benefit from existing
institutional arrangements do have access to resources, but because of their privileged
position, are much more likely to favor the status quo (Kanter, 1993; Khavul, Chavez, &
Bruton, 2013). Even when endowed with resources though, actors are not always able to
realize change (Khavul et al., 2013). Thus, the assumption that the relationship between
resources and change is causal and positive is problematic. Consequently, our
understanding of the process of institutional change is incomplete.
To develop insight into the role of resources in effecting change, I adopt an
institutional perspective. Institutional theorists have traditionally focused on the deeper
9

and more resilient aspects of social structure, with the processes by which structures,
rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social life
(Scott, 1995). Institutional change, from this perspective, occurs when actors develop
new rules (Battilana, 2006; Garud & Karnøe, 2001). Referred to as the “determinants of
institutional systems themselves” (Scott, 1987, p. 508), rules are taken-for-granted beliefs
and assumptions that have the force of law (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Starbuck, 1976),
governing the ways that societies operate (Sharfman, 1994). Therefore, rules, and the
ways in which they become established and contested, are central to understanding
stability and change.
Rules also shape the ways in which resources, commonly defined as the inputs
used by actors as they seek to achieve their goals (Oliver, 1997), are secured and utilized.
Resources co-evolve with rules as they are subject to “formations and transformations by
motivated actors” (Clegg, 1989; Giddens, 1984; Lawrence, 1999, p. 167). Resources
then, just as the rules that define them, are subject to a multiplicity of meanings (Sewell,
1992). From this perspective, actors may find ways to effect change through their
“capacity to reinterpret and mobilize an array of resources in terms of cultural schemas
other than those that initially constituted that array” (Sewell, 1992, p. 19). In this respect,
stability and change emanate from ongoing negotiations between interested actors.
However, the role of rules in the relationship between resources and change remains
more assumed than explained (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011).
I explore the relationship between rules and resources, and the effect of this
relationship on change, through a comparative analysis of three cases that developed in
the same institutional context: the evolution of the educational field in Shelby County,
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Tennessee, from the mid-1850s when public schools were first created in Memphis, to
2010, the initiation of a process of consolidation of the two school systems in the County.
The insights from these cases allow me to proffer three substantive theoretical
contributions.
First, I identify four rules that determine if, and how, institutional change will be
realized. In uncovering these rules, I am able to unveil the missing links between actors‟
ability to mobilize resources, and their ability to use those resources to realize change
(Kaghan & Lounsbury, 2011). Second, I offer a model of institutional empowerment that
explains the role of resources in institutional change while avoiding the tension created
by the co-constructed nature of rules and resources (Lizardo, 2010). Finally, I provide
new insights into the role of legitimacy during institutional change (Zimmerman & Zeitz,
2002).
Rules, Resources, and Institutional Change
The Role of Resources in Institutional Change
Studies examining how institutional change occurs have stressed the importance
of resources (Battilana et al., 2009; Dorado, 2005; Seo & Creed, 2002; Sherer & Lee,
2002). Lawrence (1999) argued that resource distribution, along with the nature of the
institutional context, was essential to developing institutional change. As the role of
resources in institutional change has gained prominence, organizational theorists have
turned to social movement theory to understand how actors mobilize resources (Clemens
& Minkoff, 2004; Fligtein & McAdam, 2012; Jenkins, 1983; Soule, 2012; Zald &
McCarthy, 1987). While these studies shed light on the role of resources in institutional
change, various problems have gone unaddressed. First, resources are more often
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assumed than explained (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). Given the
widely acknowledged view among organizational (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959), social
(Freeman, 1979; Jenkins, 1982; Rogers, 1974), and institutional theorists (Clegg, 1989;
Sewell, 1992) that resources can take on a variety of forms, it is surprising that little
attention has been given to explaining how they facilitate change.
Second, if resources are as positively correlated with change as assumed, it
becomes difficult to explain change apart from that which is initiated by existing power
holders (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003; Sherer & Lee,
2002). Thus, explaining change by under-resourced actors is particularly problematic.
This is well illustrated by the dearth of studies explaining change from under-resourced
actors [Leblebici et al. (1991) and Marti and Mair (2004) are notable exceptions]. While
social movement theorists have paid more attention to this issue, their explanation of how
disadvantaged actors realize change has a major limitation with their contention that
disadvantaged actors gain access to resources by mobilizing support from members
outside of the field (Johnson, 2000). As a result, endogenous institutional change
becomes difficult to explain.
I contend that a solution to these problems lies in the very tenet of institutional
theory which views reality as a social construction (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), and thus
is concerned with understanding how actors negotiate what constitutes reality (Lawrence,
1999; Olsen, 2008). This social constructed nature of reality is argued to stem from an
iterative process which develops as actors create institutions which in turn shape their
beliefs and behaviors (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Institutions constitute the set of rules
and standards that are devised as actors seek to solve social problems (DiMaggio, 1988).
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As such, institutional theory draws our attention to the relationship between rules and
resources, and thus offers the opportunity to first develop a more elaborated view of the
relationship between resources and change, and second, overcome the shortcomings of a
disembedded view of resources (Kaghan & Lounsbury, 2011; Meyer, 2006). Indeed,
given the polysemic nature of resources (Sewell, 1992, pp. 18-19), studies examining
how resources affect change must attend to the context within which these resources are
deployed (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Kaghan & Lounsbury, 2011; Meyer, 2006; Zajac &
Westphal, 2004).
Rules and Resources in Institutional Change
The role that resources play in the effecting of institutional change has gained
increased attention as institutional theorists have begun to focus on agentic processes,
that is, the role that actors play in institutionalization processes. This shift in attention,
developed under the umbrella of institutional entrepreneurship, was primarily aimed at
compensating for the overly deterministic approach of early institutional accounts of
change which neglected the role of actors in change processes (DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire
et al., 2004). “Institutional entrepreneurship represents the activities of actors who have
an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create
new institutions or to transform existing ones” (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997;
Maguire et al., 2004, p. 657; Rao et al., 2000).
Despite the clear focus on the importance of resources, the institutional
entrepreneurship perspective perpetuates two major problems. First, it has been criticized
for portraying actors as hypermuscular heroes (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Powell &
Colyvas, 2008), capable of disembedding themselves from existing institutional
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arrangements (Beckert, 1999). Second, this problem also extends to resources which, as
mentioned earlier, cannot be merely assumed. Resources need contextualizing if we are
to better explain observed inconsistencies. In sum, institutional entrepreneurship tends to
perpetuate the longstanding problem inherent in institutional accounts: the agency versus
structure problem (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire 2007; Leca & Naccache, 2006).
Garud et al. (2007) argued that a solution to this conundrum lies in restoring
works that combine structure and agency, most notably Giddens‟ (1984) structuration
theory or Bourdieu‟s (1977) notion of habitus. I contend that Giddens‟ (1979, 1984) work
offers the opportunity to further examine the roles of institutions in the relationship
between resources and change. Giddens (1984) views resources as tied to rules, and
argues that they are both “recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems”
(p. 377). Thus, social structures are both and simultaneously rules and resources. This is
because resources are only activated through rules, and rules can only be observed in
practice on resources. Given the mutually constitutive nature of rules and resources, rules
then become equated with resources (Giddens, 1984).
This dualistic approach of rules as resources creates major challenges in our
understanding of institutionalization processes. First, if rules and resources are both
constitutive of social structures, explaining change becomes extremely challenging
(Albano, Masino, & Maggi, 2010; Lizardo, 2010; Sewell, 1992; Thompson, 1989;
Whittington, 1992). Second, as Thompson (1989) noted, “Giddens‟s proposal to conceive
of structure in terms of rules and resources is of questionable value, for it is a proposal
which generates more confusion than it dispels” (p. 62). This is largely because both rules
and resources are vaguely defined, and thus difficult to conceptualize and empirically
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examine (Archer, 1982; Jessop, 1989; Pozzebon & Pinsonneault 2005). Further, in
viewing rules and resources as virtual, Giddens “neglects the direct role of economic
capacities in the exercise of […] power” (Jessop, 189, p. 120), that is, the material aspect
of resources (Archer, 1982; Clegg, 1989; Lizardo, 2010; Thompson, 1989). The third
problem in Giddens‟ theorizing is the conception of time. Giddens‟ insistence on the
simultaneous and recursive transformative capacity of rules and resources (Archer, 1982,
p. 477; Gregory, 1989) is problematic because if Giddens‟ theory is to explicate
processes of institutionalization, it requires a better formulation of temporality without
which, as Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, and Van de Ven (2013) contend, no process can
be explained. In sum, disentangling how rules and resources are linked, and how they
separately act to effect change is essential to inform our understanding of how
institutional change takes place. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to address these
shortcomings by offering a process model of institutional change that highlights the
interaction between rules and resources.
Methods
I examine the evolution of the educational field in Shelby County from the mid1850s to 2010. Although the County administration is responsible in the US for providing
schooling for all of its resident children, Shelby County, Tennessee, has maintained two
separate school systems since 1868. I trace the ways in which three groups, Memphis
City Schools (MCS), Shelby County Schools (SCS), and African American activists
sought to establish preferable institutional arrangements.
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Data Collection
My primary data source consisted of annual reports (AR) produced by each school
district. Popular press articles were used as a secondary source of data to provide
additional insight, particularly in years when those reports were unavailable. I thus
analyzed 208 reports, and about 500 newspaper articles. I also drew upon historical
essays, academic articles, and legal and other official documents to further extend my
database. I provide a detail of these data in Table 2. Annual school reports are
particularly suited to study the interaction of organizations with their environment as they
are prepared by those with greatest understanding of the day-to-day working of the
organization (Dirsmith & Covaleski, 1983). However, they also present various biases
which rendered necessary the triangulation of school representatives‟ views through the
use of the other data.
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Table 2
Data Inventory
Data type

Quantity

Years

40

1852-1988

1

1899

102

1868-2010

Tennessee Department of Education

39

1968-1990

Shelby County Schools

8

1864-1870

Freedmen’s Bureau

11

1900-1914

Conference for Education in the South

2

1915-1916

The Handbook of Private Schools

5

1910-1957

Education in Memphis and Shelby County

Newspaper articles

447

1845-2011

Ray Holt Collection

Historical essays

15

1500s-2002

Historical essays published between 1888

Annual reports

Other reports

Original data source
Memphis City Schools
City of Memphis

and 2012

Data Analysis
This analysis consisted of three major steps. In the first step, I applied a historical
embedded case-study design (Washington, Forman, Suddaby, & Ventresca, 2005; Yin,
2003) as a strategy to achieve two main goals. First, as I was interested in describing the
evolution of the educational field in Shelby County, this approach was particularly
appropriate. More importantly, the embedded case study approach allowed me to
integrate multiple sources of evidence, quantitative and qualitative, and thus to contribute
to the validity of the research by means of triangulation (Yin, 2003). Triangulating my
findings through the use of multiple sources was particularly important as I started
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uncovering some inconsistencies in the ways historical records were presented
(Washington & Ventresca, 2008).
In the first step of my analysis, I primarily used historical essays and academic
articles to identify pivotal events during the 150 years covered by this study. This
analysis allowed me to identify three main stories of interest. First, MCS provided an
illustration of a successful change achieved in the absence of resources. Second, the
African American community stood as a case whereby despite gaining access to
resources, actors were unable to bring about change. Finally, SCS offered an opportunity
to examine how, despite radical changes in the environment, the suburban, predominantly
white middle-class, community was able to maintain segregative practices.
The second step involved investigating how the interplay between rules and
resources, and various contextual factors, influenced the outcomes identified in the first
step, namely, successful change, failed change, and reproduction. I began the analysis by
identifying relevant concepts in the data and grouping them into categories (open coding)
to reveal first-order codes (Van Maanen, 1979). First, I was interested in identifying key
actors, resources, and how the absence or presence of such resources influenced change.
Further, I sought to understand how the institutional context affected this relationship.
Next, I engaged in axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to uncover relationships among
these first-order codes. I continued until no new higher-order themes and relationships
emerged. I present these constructs and representative quotations in Table 3.
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Table 3
Representative Quotes and Events
Theme 1: Getting critical resources
Legitimizing needs for
critical resources

The education and moral training which these children would receive in our schools, together with the
influence which would be exercised over their habits and character by association on equal terms with
more favored youth, might make all the difference to them and to society, between a life of degradation
and crime, and one of usefulness and respectability. (MCS-1848a)
The records of our courts show that crime is an important feature in our progress. To what can we safely
resort for its correction and suppression but to education – education in its most enlarged and
comprehensive sense – such as refines, ennobles, and exalts our whole moral and intellectual nature. As a
general principle, ignorance may be regarded as the root of crime, vice, of civil and social degradation.
(MCS-1856a)

Finding sponsors to
gain access to critical
resources

The organization of free schools for the universal education of the people, has, by Divine favor, been
effected in Tennessee. … The state was to levy a tax largely for school purposes, to be distributed pro rata
among the school children of localities complying with the law. (TN-1868a)

Accumulating critical
resources

The present exposure of the great mass of youthful subjects, in the most uncomfortable and
unwholesome school-rooms, by which they are often too much exposed to the colds of winter and the
heats of summer, without sufficient ventilation for the insurance of healthy respiration. (MCS-1855a)
At times I have been led to exclaim, what crimes have our children and teachers been guilty of that they
must be confined, winter and summer, in such dilapidated, rickety, uncouth, slovenly houses, not more
comfortable than the stables in which your cattle are sheltered. (MCS-1865a)
(table continues)
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Table 3
Representative Quotes and Events (continued)
Theme 2: Getting competitive resources
Mimicking the leading
organization

Our High Schools have been generally under the control of able, skillful, and efficient teachers; but they
have not received their due proportion of encouragement. I attribute this, in some degree, to the
multiplication of an improved order of private schools. (MCS-1856b)
In this connection allow me to recommend that the next session be of eight months duration, beginning
on the first of September, contemporaneous with the private schools of the city. (MCS-1868a)

Legitimizing needs for
competitive resources

When we shall have secured our own exhibition hall, with suitable accommodations for both pupils and
people, these weekly re-unions will become a prominent feature in the City Schools, and attract the
attention of citizens and strangers. (MCS-1855b)

Findings sponsors to
gain access to
competitive resources

By the liberal aid of the Mayor and Board of Aldermen, Memphis will soon have its school houses which
will favorably compare with those of the best in the country. (MCS-1865b)

Accumulating
competitive resources

[The high school] was established to add the branches necessary to fit the county child for entrance to the
State University. (SCS-1907a)

Blocking access to
resources to
illegitimate actors

Unhappy with the local white teachers who often appeared only to have reluctantly replaced their
departing missionary predecessors, the assembled blacks asked that every effort be made to find African
Americans to serve as principals and teachers at the system’s black schools. Among other things, the
petition stated: Resolved, that in view of the fact that white teachers in our schools have failed so utterly
for the last two years, and as we believe that their educational training is calculated to render them unfit
for positions in our schools, therefore, we would most respectfully ask that the service of those be
dispensed with. Resolved, that in view of the fact that we are prescribed by law to separate schools for
our children upon the presumption of “inferiority,” we respectfully ask that we have the benefit in full,
and that every teacher from principal down be elected from the prescribed class.
(Memphis_Daily_Appeal-1873)
(table continues)
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Table 3
Representative Quotes and Events (continued)
Theme 2: Getting competitive resources (continued)
Blocking access to
resources to
illegitimate actors
(continued)

Six new schools were constructed over the decade from 1889 and 1899, one for blacks and five for
whites. Despite the racial imbalance of this effort in a city that was more than one-third black, this was
still an impressive accomplishment … As time passed, however, racial discrepancies became increasingly
obvious. When audited in 1943, it was found that the five white schools had spent an average of $131,000
on land, buildings, additions, and equipment. Virginia Avenue, the black school, came in at $32,000.
(Audit_of_Board_of_Education-1943)

Theme 3: Introducing new standards
Questioning the
legitimacy of
traditional standards

There is no such thing as perfection in an educational system, since standards by which systems are
judged vary widely and change rapidly. (SCS-1957a)

Showing how the
actor’s resources are
better

The motives for the support of the Public School, drawn from facts fully demonstrated by reason and
experiment, are various: first, it is clearly right; secondly, public education is best, being uniformly more
thorough and systematic; thirdly, it is furnished at less cost, costing on an average less than fifty per cent.
as much as by other systems; fourthly, it is more universal. (MCS-1875a)

Theme 4: Creating a new category of actors
Cancelling traditional
category of actors

The great leaven in man’s struggle for the best condition of existence, in his strife for the necessities,
comforts, luxuries and ambitions of life, is the growth of sympathy based on education, which has to a
greater or less extent permeated every strata of the social unit. (MCS-1898a)

Setting new criteria for
categorizing actors

While the agencies required for the development of a modern municipality are rapidly increasing, both in
number and complexity, there are a few elementary factors by which the real progress of a people may
be measured. These factors may be broadly classified as protective and cultural. (MCS-1907a)
(table continues)
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Table 3
Representative Quotes and Events (continued)
Theme 5: Who gets to be an active member of the field?
Legitimizing the actor’s
membership

The people of Memphis will, in spite of the present opposition, be enabled to boast of the most liberal
and least expensive system of public instruction of any city in our country. (MCS-1855d)

Theme 6: Who gets to assume leadership in the field?
Demonstrating actor’s
ability to do better
than the leader

It will be seen that the public schools have very materially reduced the cost of tuition in private schools,
and the extent to which they have monopolized the educational enterprises of the county. (SCS-1878a)

Theme 7: Which resources are defined as valuable?
Getting the actor’s
resources to become
the standard

These organizations [student clubs] are required to meet definite standards of excellence and are under
the leadership of faculty sponsors. (SCS-1957b)
While academic success is the top priority, a dynamic extracurricular program is provided to give students
the opportunity to excel. (SCS-1985a)
The challenge faced by any school system – providing a learning environment for the broad mass of
students who fall into the amorphous category of normal learning ability *…+ Accepting individual
differences among teachers as well as among students, administrators of the Shelby County School
System encourage individualized procedures within this fundamental pattern of instruction *…+ At several
schools, for example, special organizations to foster advanced learning in science have been formed; they
attract both the more advanced students in scientific subjects and members of the community whose
interest is in that direction. (SCS-1957c)
(table continues)
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Table 3
Representative Quotes and Events (continued)
Theme 8: How are resources to be distributed?
Normalizing a new way
of allocating resources

A municipality deserves no special credit for the efficient exercise of those functions of government which
are merely protective. … The departments of police, fire and sanitation are primarily protective and
essentially selfish. … The real life of a community is to be measured by its power to develop and maintain
those cultural agencies which are themselves constructive rather than negatively protective. (MCS-1907b)

Theme 9: Regulative environment
Regulations changing
who gets to be an
active member

1868 Tennessee Common Schools Law requiring each county to establish and fund a system of public
schools wherever such a system had not yet been established

Regulations changing
how resources are to
be distributed

1972-75 Court-ordered busing plans aimed at desegregating Memphis City Schools

Difficulties in enforcing
regulations

Some delay is experienced in consequence to the tardiness with which the Board of Mayor and Aldermen
are executing the requirements which the law makes of them, to “at once take such steps as will effect
the object desired, in order that the Schools may be more perfectly classified and established.” (MCS1855c)
(table continues)
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Table 3
Representative Quotes and Events (continued)
Theme 10: Normative/cognitive environment
Norms of membership

While the free school system was at first looked upon askance, as a most odious measure, it is now
everywhere recognized as a popular necessity. (SCS-1868a)

Norms about leading
institution

There is a vague and undefined prejudice in some minds against all free schools. Regarding them as
merely elementary in their character – as cheap and economical establishments – intended only for those
who are comparatively destitute of the means of education, they not only withhold from them all active
aid and countenance, but absolutely discourage their advancements. (MCS-1856c)

Norms about valuable
resources

In making necessary expenditures the Board has kept steadily in view the interests of the public that
furnishes the means to maintain the schools, and to use the utmost economy consistent with that
standard of efficiency. (MCS-1892a)

Norms about resource
allocation

I trust the day is not far distant before industrial training and domestic science can be taught in our negro
High School effectively, for, in my opinion, education of this character would be far more beneficial to the
negro race than any other character of educational training. (MCS-1907c)
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To develop this analysis, I primarily focused on school annual reports which
allowed me to gain insights from MCS‟ and SCS‟ representatives. There were no annual
reports specifically for the African American community. Thus, I inferred the role that
resources played in supporting their change project first by building on MCS and SCS
annual reports. However, given the inherent biases associated with those reports, I also
complemented this analysis with other reports, such as the Freedmen‟s Bureau reports,
and the Conference for Education in the South reports. Written by actors external to, and
yet directly acquainted with, the school systems in Shelby County, these reports added to
my understanding of how education was delivered to the African American community.
Popular press articles were particularly useful at this stage to increase the validity of my
findings. Figure 1 provides a representation of my inductive analysis, showing how
I moved from the data presented in Table 3 to identifying second-order processes through
which institutional change unfolds.
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Figure 1. Data Structure
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I note that as it became apparent that school representatives were referring to two
different types of resources, I re-analyzed the data based on this finding to better
understand the role that each type of resources played in the change processes. Therefore,
I refer to critical resources as those without which the school systems could not function,
namely, students, teachers, buildings, educational material, and the organizational
structure. I refer to competitive resources as those without which the school systems
could still function. This typology is particularly consistent with Pfeffer and Salancik‟s
(1978) view of resources, and Santos and Eisenhardt‟s (2009) empirical examination of
how access to these two types of resources allowed institutional entrepreneurs to create a
new institutional field.
The third step of this analysis consisted of performing a temporal bracketing of
the data. Indeed, I identified that the emerging processes unfolded in a sequential fashion,
forming four main stages in the process of institutional empowerment. Temporal
bracketing thus allowed me to organize a substantial mass of longitudinal data and
breaking it down into more homogenous blocks within which processes have a degree of
unity (Langley, 1999, p. 703). Furthermore, given my interest in disentangling the
relationship between rules and resources, temporal bracketing is particularly suited to
achieve this goal. Langley (1999) proposes the temporal bracketing strategy as a direct
reference to Giddens‟ structuration theory, as it allows the decomposition of data into
successive periods, which in turn reveals the dialectical influences of individuals and
structures.
A condition for the application of this analytic strategy is that there are clear break
points in the temporal data that enable the constitution of comparative units of analysis
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(Langley et al., 2013). The four emerging phases were determined as follows. In phase 1,
the actor strived to gain access to critical resources and remained in this phase until the
actor secured a stable membership of the field. In phase 2, the actor strived to gain access
to competitive resources and remained in this phase until the actor was perceived by the
community as assuming a leadership position. In phase 3, the actor strived to change the
standards by which resources were evaluated and remained in this phase until the
standard(s) promoted by the actor became institutionalized, that is, until the new
standard(s) were accepted by the community as the one(s) by which resources were to be
defined. Finally, in phase 4, the actor strived to change the category of actors, and thus to
alter the way in which resources were distributed. These phases would of course
sometimes overlap, as is apparent in the narrative. The evolution of MCS, SCS, and the
African American community throughout these phases is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Timelines of Three Actors’ Institutional Empowerment Processes
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Ensuring Trustworthiness
To ensure that my analyses met Lincoln and Guba‟s (1985) criteria for
trustworthiness, I worked back and forth between the data and the emerging theory. The
credibility of my findings was ensured through four main strategies. My immersion in the
field as part of a broader study of school district consolidation allowed me to challenge
and assess my findings, both within the research team and with those involved in Shelby
County education. In addition to immersion in the field, debriefing sessions, and peer
scrutiny, a fourth strategy consisted of triangulating my findings through the use of
multiple sources. In so doing, I was able “to check out certain bits of information across
informants” (Van Maanen, 1979, p. 548), as well as to ensure the dependability and
confirmability of my findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Although the phenomena described in this study will resonate to many readers as
being similar, and thus transferable, to the development of other school systems in the
US, it is worth noting that Shelby County is characterized by its unique demographics.
Historically a trading center for cotton, the County has traditionally hosted a substantial
and increasing African American population. Referring to the development of schools in
Memphis, Kiel (2008) noted that:
Memphis is unique in the degree to which racially-identifiable school systems
survived the desegregation litigation. The City schools were never consolidated,
leaving two public school systems – one largely white, the other largely black, in
a single metropolitan area. Private schools, created to accommodate the massive
white flight of the mid-70s, provide an affordable permanent alternative to the city
schools: by 1990, Memphis private schools were found to be the most segregated
in the nation. (p. 263)
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Three Case Studies
Memphis City Schools: Educating the Poor
Phase 1: 1848-1856. Prior to the first Memphis public schools being opened in
1848 through the efforts of Colonel J.W.A. Pettit, an alderman of the City of Memphis,
education was only provided to the City‟s wealthier residents through private schools.
Pettit, concerned with providing access to the poor children of the City, sought to
convince Memphis government officials that a system of “free schools” would be to the
advantage of the City by reducing deviant behaviors (MCS-1848a; MCS-1856a). This
was particularly resonant in a City that strove to become a major trade center, and yet
was constrained by a growing criminality (Young, 1912). Pettit, however, could only start
with opening one school as, obtaining no funds from the City, he had to use his own
resources.
Four years later, the City was persuaded to fund the establishment of a system of
free schools for the White residents of the City – slavery acted as de facto exclusion
policy for African Americans. These funds, however, were not only barely sufficient to
provide students with adequate teachers, buildings, and supplies (MCS-1855a), but as the
public schools depended strictly on the whim of the City officials, MCS sometimes had
difficulties getting the City to comply with its engagements (MCS-1855c).
A new page opened in MCS‟ history when, in 1856, the City schools were
incorporated by a state law: “By a recent act of the State Legislature, the Board of
Visitors have been incorporated and placed on a more independent footing than
previously” (MCS AR 1856). However, the challenges associated with promoting the
need to provide free schools were aggravated by the fact that public schools were
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compared to private schools. Such a comparison was difficult to sustain for MCS as
private schools were much better funded, and thus provided the best option for those able
to access them.
It is a common, but certainly a great mistake, to suppose that free schools are
necessarily of an inferior quality to private schools. If proper attention be given
them, in their organization and management, they may and ought to be made the
best and most efficient, as well as the least expensive of all the schools in our
country, and to serve as models for every private enterprise. (MCS AR, 1852)
Phase 2: 1856-1880. In 1856, MCS engaged in a concerted process aimed at
becoming comparable to private schools, primarily by reproducing what had made the
private schools successful (MCS-1856b; MCS-1868a). It then became important to
provide more than the basic rudiments of an education. Memphis City Schools sought to
increase its access to resources by convincing City officials that anything that could
improve the public schools would benefit the City too (MCS-1855b; MCS-1865b).
However, obtaining suitable buildings, better-skilled teachers, and a curriculum
comparable to that offered in private schools was difficult in a context where education
was considered to be a privilege for the wealthy. The City‟s residents and officials may
have agreed to provide some resources to MCS, but they were not ready to support them
to the same levels as private schools (MCS-1856c). The City‟s public schools had thus to
educate their students with very limited and unsuitable resources (MCS-1865a).
However, in 1868 the State intervened with the passage of the Common Schools
Law, requiring each county to establish and fund a system of public schools. This ensured
that MCS‟ access to funds would no longer be solely dependent upon the whim of City
officials as the funds allocated to the public schools were now consisting of taxes
collected both from the whole County, and from the City. This allowed MCS to improve
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the quality of its schools, and by the same token, the perception that the public had of
these schools. As a local newspaper would attest:
The public schools of Memphis are a blessing to every inhabitant of the city
without exception, and in sustaining all of them, every parent, guardian and taxpayer has reason to feel that he is supporting the only public institution of the city
of Memphis of its commercial importance. (Memphis Daily Appeal, Jan 5, 1879)
Such changes saw MCS become not only a worthy educational option, but also
the most favored by the community as evidenced by the number of children in
attendance. While private schools had long hosted more children than the public schools,
by 1865, 1,576 were attending MCS compared to 1,076 who were opting for private
institutions (MCS AR, 1865); this trend would continue such that by 1883 MCS was
educating 5,143 students while 2,390 attended private schools (TN AR, 1884).
Memphis City Schools‟ good reputation even spanned the County‟s boundaries to
become recognized by some of the best universities in the country. In 1907, the Acting
Dean of Tulane University noted, in a letter to MCS, “I have examined your course with
care, and am glad to tell you that everything seems to be up to the standard of the best
schools, not only in the South but in the country.”
Phase 3: 1875-1900. To demonstrate its vitality, MCS initially referred to various
traditional standards, such as the number of students enrolled, or those passing
examinations. After the late 1870s, when MCS was finally recognized as a leading
organization in education, it started questioning the legitimacy of existing standards.
In fact, with private school students demonstrating better academic results, MCS
now tried to avoid any such comparison. Rather, it introduced standards that were likely
to not only position MCS as the best option for collective education, but that would also
ensure that private schools could not meet those standards. Indeed, as cost efficiency,
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standardization, and universalism were promoted as the measures on which schools were
to be evaluated (MCS-1875a), private schools, notable for their high costs, and which
were, by definition, exclusive rather than universal, were unable to compete.
As these arguments were gaining acceptance among the larger public, it was now
private schools‟ turn to have to promote their worth. As evidenced by the following
1915 report, private schools had been challenged for a while by those now established
standards:
Educators have been asking themselves whether or not the private schools have
any reason for being. […] The pedagogical departments of the universities
manifest a tendency to look down upon the private schools as mere moneymaking institutions of little vital important in a great democracy. (The Handbook
of Private Schools, 1915, p. xx)
Phase 4: 1900-1920. Public schools, however, had been tainted with the stigma of
educating a poor population (MCS-1856c). Memphis City Schools‟ leaders were aware
that promoting free schools for the poor may harm the effectiveness of their project.
The social effect of this feature is to break down, in a great degree, the artificial
barriers of society, to elevate the humbler orders, and to check and restrain the
arrogant and despotic spirit of the higher. […] Our educational systems should be
based upon this principle of equality. There should be such an intermingling of
classes as would tend to preserve, strengthen and perpetuate this bond of social,
intellectual, and political sympathy. (MCS AR, 1856)
The elevation of the character of our public schools should be the chief aim of
all connected with them. They should be good enough for the richest, and the
most cultivated of our citizens should feel that all the branches are so taught that
it is to their advantage to give them their support and patronage. (MCS AR,
1868)
Thus, as soon as MCS was established as a worthy option for educating children
and built on new standards to strengthen this perception, it engaged in a process of “decategorization” whereby the initial category of rich versus poor would be gradually
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replaced by one grounded in provision of social welfare (MCS-1907a). The reality
remained unchanged: private schools were still attending to the wealthier children; but
now, public schools too could satisfy this population (MCS-1898a).
This new category of social welfare was instrumental for MCS when it challenged
the way in which the City budget was distributed. The main source of funding available
to MCS consisted of the taxes collected by the County, and redistributed to MCS and
SCS based proportionally on their respective number of students. The MCS Charter
provided for a Memphis City tax to also contribute to its funding. However, when these
additional funds were becoming insufficient to sustain its growth, MCS tried to obtain an
increasing portion of the City budget by presenting arguments that those services
concerned with improving the collective well being of the City warranted greater
investment (MCS-1907a; MCS-1907b). In 1899, the fire and police departments received
the largest proportions of the City budget (City of Memphis AR, 1899). By 1920, MCS
was receiving a greater amount of funding from the City budget than any other public
service. In 1921, the public schools were monopolizing almost 60% of the taxes collected
by the City (The Commercial Appeal, May 20, 1922).
1920-2010. This new institutional order remained unchallenged until 1964 when
the Civil Right Movements (CRMs) initiated legal actions against MCS for its failure to
provide equal educational opportunities to its African American population. This was the
point when the story of MCS overlapped with the story of African Americans in Shelby
County (see Figure 2). With a substantial, and growing, African American population,
and the CRMs accumulating victories in the City as African Americans were gaining
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political power, MCS‟ and African American activists‟ stories then became one and the
same.
African Americans: Striving for Educational Equality
Phase 1: 1863-1868. The first schools developed to educate African Americans
date back to 1863 when the Civil War was about to end, resulting in the abolition of
slavery. Before then, the principal means of education for slave or free black children
were the church-sponsored Sabbath Schools, but they were prohibited by City ordinances
(Bond & Sherman, 2003, p. 40). During the Civil War, missionaries, organized under the
banner of the Freedmen Bureau, were sent from the North of the US to the Southern
occupied areas to take care of educating former slaves who had been long deprived from
education.
This enterprise would meet great success as, by 1865, more than 4,000 African
American children were attending the Freedmen schools (Freedmen Report, 1866),
compared to only 2,500 white pupils enrolled in MCS (MCS AR, 1866). The Freedmen
Bureau, however, faced significant challenges in carrying out its mission. In a South that
was adamantly opposed to abolishing slavery, and viewed the Northern intervention as a
threat to the southern culture and institutions, the Freedmen schools were perceived as a
symbol of this ongoing conflict between Southerners and Northerners.
The Rev. L.H. Cobb, who was educated at Dartmouth college, and who has had
considerable experience as a teacher in some of the best New England schools,
has the special duty of organizing and systematizing the colored schools under
Col. Eaton‟s direction, and we sincerely hope that our other schools may not be
shamed by comparison. (Memphis Daily Bulletin, Oct 29, 1864)
Such conflicts culminated in the worst race riot in Memphis‟ history (Kiel, 2008;
Wright, 2000) when, in 1866, white citizens, frustrated from being defeated and occupied
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by the Union army, which was primarily composed of freed blacks, expressed their anger
by killing, robbing, and raping African Americans. The Freedmen‟s schools were also
destroyed one after the other. The violence was such that the missionaries left the area,
closing those schools that had not been already destroyed.
With the end of slavery, and the 1868 Tennessee Common Schools Law, African
American students regained access to schools. The Common Schools Law mandated that
public education be available for all the children, regardless of their racial background. In
1867, the MCS Charter stated: “Be it further enacted, that no one shall be admitted as a
free pupil in said City Schools except the children of white persons residing within the
limits of said city” (MCS AR, 1868). With the enacting of the Common Schools Law,
and the right of education for African American children becoming akin to that of white
children, MCS had to modify its charter to comply with these new dispositions, and thus
replaced the words “the children of white persons” with “the children of persons who are
bona fide residents” (MCS AR, 1869).
Another disposition included in the Common Schools Law was, as mentioned
earlier, that each county had to establish and fund a system of public schools wherever
such a system had not yet been established. Before 1868, only the City had such a
system; the rural, poorer, areas outside of the City limits had no public schools. To
comply with these new dispositions, the county created SCS which was to attend to the
residents living outside the City.
Phase 1: 1868-1964. In both MCS and SCS, though, and despite being afforded
the right to a public education, African Americans were continually provided with lesser
resources (Memphis_Daily_Appeal-1873; Audit_of_Board_of_Education-1943). This
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difference in resource allocation was also reinforced by the 1876 Jim Crow laws which
mandated de jure racial segregation in all public facilities in Southern states, with a
“separate but equal” status for African Americans. The 1896 Supreme Court decision in
Plessy v. Ferguson enshrined “separate but equal.” Homer Adolph Plessy, who was
seven-eighths Caucasian, was arrested for sitting in a “whites only” car of a Louisiana
train. Plessy built the case that “separate but equal” was in violation of the
14th Amendment, which guarantees the same rights to all citizens. The Court rejected
Plessy‟s arguments, contending that the law in place in Louisiana did not imply that
African Americans were inferior to White Americans, but rather separated the two races
as a matter of public policy. Segregation in the South thus remained for about a century
until the CRMs started to challenge this institutional order.
Phase 4: 1964-1979. The CRMs led to the establishment of laws that altered the
idea that black Americans could not equally access all of the services that American
society had to offer. Most notably, the landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka Supreme Court decision set the premise that separate schools were inherently
unequal, and hence unconstitutional. Civil rights activists in Shelby County joined this
movement, filing desegregation suits against MCS in 1964 with Northcross v. Education
of Memphis City, and against SCS in 1966, with Robinson and U.S. v. Shelby County
Board of Education. In 1964, the ratio of White to African American students in MCS
was 50:50; in 1966, this ratio was 70:30 for SCS (Figure 3). Pressures to change the way
resources were distributed were therefore stronger in the City where the African
American population was becoming predominant, compared to the rest of the County
where the opposite demographic trend was developing (Figure 3). Furthermore, Memphis
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became a focal point for the CRMs, both locally and nationally, with Dr. Martin Luther
King‟s assassination in Memphis, on April 4th, 1968 (Kiel, 2008; Wright, 2000).
In fact, pressures for desegregation were so strong in Memphis that Judge McRae,
in charge of the litigation against MCS, perceived it necessary to enforce a radical way of
ensuring that separate schools would not be maintained. In 1972, McRae ordered a series
of dispositions aimed at busing thousands of African American students from their allblack schools to the all-white schools, and thousands of White students from their allwhite schools to the all-black schools, thus attempting to redistribute students in such a
way that there would no longer be all-black or all-white schools.
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Figure 3. Racial Composition in Memphis City Schools and Shelby County Schools, 1868-2000
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The busing order was so vehemently opposed by many White Memphians that
MCS experienced the most dramatic demographic change in its history. A phenomenon,
commonly called „white flight,‟ developed almost overnight, with the majority of the
White residents either moving out of the City, or moving their children to private schools.
In 1965, there were 131,637 students attending MCS, among which 50.3% were White,
and 49.8% African American (MCS AR, 1965). While the City was anticipating a growth
in its population (Report on Schools and Parks, 1957), this figure actually decreased to
119,806 in 1973, 68% of whom were African Americans. By 2010, fewer than 100,000
students were being educated by MCS; 85% of these were African Americans. Further,
prior to the busing order, 12% of White students in Memphis attended private schools; in
1975 this figure rose to 30%, and by 2000, it was at 75%. In 2000, Memphis had the
widest disparity in the State between African and White Americans attending private
schools (Branston, 2004).
Furthermore, the City of Memphis, being a center for cotton production, had
traditionally housed a substantial African American population. This situation could,
theoretically, have been utilized by African Americans to leverage political power, and
thus develop educational opportunities for their children. However, while African
Americans had been granted the right to vote as early as 1870 with the 15th Amendment
to the Constitution, White Americans had continually used legislative and political
maneuvers to deny African Americans this right (Wright, 2000).
First, disfranchisement and political machines prevented the election of black
political figures and diluted the black vote. Also, Whites used economic and
physical intimidation to „keep blacks in their place.‟ In the majority of Southern
and some Northern cities, blacks could neither vote nor elect representation after
the Reconstruction years. (Wright, 2000, p. 1)
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The CRMs were instrumental in addressing this issue as they pushed for the
passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act that outlawed discriminatory voting practices
against African Americans. However, despite this and other desegregation laws, it was
only in 1979, when the City schools were 75% African American, that the first African
American superintendent was elected. The school board had four African American
members, out of nine members.
Phase 2: 1979-2010. In 2010, MCS still had an African American superintendent,
and the board was now composed of seven African Americans and two White Americans,
making the board an almost perfect racial representation of the student body it served.
I note though that as the various Civil Rights dispositions offered African Americans in
the City of Memphis the opportunity to gain authority over educational issues through
democratic representation as the City was becoming predominantly African American
(Figure 3), MCS also saw the availability of needed resources diminish dramatically. This
was, in large part, an outcome of the City becoming increasingly poor as the White
population continued to decline. Exacerbating this situation was a series of expensive
infrastructure investments made by MCS in the 1960s when the City population was still
increasing. Upkeep of these facilities thus aggravated MCS‟ financial situation. Willie
Herenton, the first African American elected MCS Superintendent, remained positive in
his first annual report:
Despite the challenges of declining enrollment, inflation, and declining revenue,
our school system has maintained financial solvency. … During the past year, the
administration and the Board of Commissioners worked cooperatively toward
restoring full confidence in the Memphis City Schools. (MCS AR, 1980)
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In 1983, Herenton noted, “With adequate resources, competent management and
growing community support, our school system will continue to move forward” (MCS
AR, 1983). In fact, neither adequate resources nor community support could be had.
Indeed, community support was lessening as MCS‟ reputation was declining. This was
primarily because MCS had now to deal with increased social problems characteristic of
a predominantly poor student population, and because the media – and members of the
public – were now comparing MCS to its more economically-advantaged neighbor, SCS.
Further, as the City became poorer, the taxes collected in the City to support MCS
continued to diminish until in 2009, when the City decided to stop paying its allotment to
MCS‟ upkeep.
Shelby County Schools: Maintaining Segregative Practices
Phase 1: 1868. Contrary to the struggles experienced by MCS, the creation of
SCS, despite some initial opposition (SCS-1868a), was relatively non-problematic.
Indeed, creating a viable public school system was now a State requirement (TN-1868a).
In several of [the districts], no school directors had been elected or appointed. The
greatest difficulty had been encountered in obtaining any persons willing to serve
in that capacity … Had it not been for the provision of the law empowering the
Superintendent to appoint where, through apathy and indifference, if not outright
hostility to free schools, the election of directors was had, the organization of the
county would have been impossible. Every civil district is now completely
organized with Boards of Directors. (SCS AR, 1868)
Phase 2: 1868-1878. Given that the rural areas of Shelby County were
predominantly poor, private schools were not as numerous as in the City. In 1875, there
were 558 students attending 13 private schools for a school-age population of 21,468.
In 1865, Memphis had a student population of 2,652 White students (African Americans
were excluded from the statistics), 1,076 of which were attending private institutions. In
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the absence of any effective competitor, SCS quickly became the leader in its educational
field (SCS-1878a).
This lack of competition also resulted in SCS providing an education limited to
conforming to State requirements. By contrast, MCS, concerned with providing the same
educational services as private schools, developed its first high schools in 1856
(MCS AR, 1856), that is, only eight years after its creation. It took SCS 40 years to
establish high schools (SCS-1907a).
Phase 3: 1954-1985. The standards used by SCS to measure education were
primarily dictated by the State superintendent. As those measures evolved, so did SCS,
which followed the State‟s standards rather than tried to challenge them. It was only in
the mid-1950s that SCS introduced new standards, initially by questioning the use of the
State‟s standards (SCS-1957a). This change in behavior coincided with a radical change
in the student population: in 1940, SCS was composed of 40% White students, and 60%
African American students; by 1954, that figure had reversed, the ratio becoming 60:40
(Figure 3).
From this point on, SCS pursued a strategy of altering existing standards,
positioning itself as the “Leader in educational excellence.” Essentially, SCS provided
advanced programs in each high school (SCS AR, 1985), and got educational excellence
to become a standard by which public schools were evaluated (SCS-1957b; SCS-1985a).
Phase 4: 1965-1990. Shelby County Schools, predominantly funded by the taxes
collected by County residents, did not have to alter the way in which funds were
allocated. Rather, akin to MCS (MCS-1907c; Memphis_Daily_Appeal-1873;
Audit_of_Board_of_ Education-1943), it built on the segregative context to distribute its
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best resources to the white schools until this behavior was challenged by the CRMs. It
was only then that SCS was instrumental in developing a new form of segregation.
As the CRMs gained momentum in Shelby County, the real-estate development
that was already under way in the suburbs, as elsewhere in the United States, was
dramatically accelerated as White City residents fled to the suburbs. Though under
desegregation litigation, SCS was not affected by the busing order. Therefore, building
on the practice of neighborhood schools, a form of residential segregation could be
maintained, which offered a significant way out for the White residents of the City who,
unwilling to have their children educated with African Americans, opted for the suburban
schools (Kiel, 2008; Pohlmann, 2008; Wright, 2000). While the African American
student population of SCS was 40% in 1960, this number fell to 16% in 1992. A similar
but inverse trend occurred within MCS where Whites constituted 58% of the overall
student population in 1960, but fell to a low 19% in 1992 (Figure 3).
Furthermore, although the judge in charge of the desegregation litigation against
SCS took a less radical path than Judge McRae, this state of affairs did not escape Civil
Rights activists who maintained their efforts to desegregate schools in the suburbs. It was
only in 2007, though, that SCS was released from the grip of the federal court‟s direct
supervision.
Epilogue
With the US midterm elections of November 2010, the Republicans took control,
for the first time since Reconstruction, of both the State and the Senate (Amis &
Aïssaoui, 2013). This was thus an opportunity for suburban, predominantly Republican,
leaders to obtain what they had sought for decades, a permanent separation of the two
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school systems. In response, fearing a loss of access to the wealthier, and more stable,
suburban funding base, the MCS Board voted to renounce to its charter, forcing a
consolidation of the two schools systems. This resulted in Shelby County having to take
full responsibility for funding and running schools previously controlled by MCS, and led
to a new phase in public education in the region.
A Model of Institutional Empowerment
These three cases illuminate the relationship between rules and resources during
processes of institutional change. By drawing on my findings from each case, I induced a
process model, presented in Figure 4.
According to my model, institutional empowerment, the process through which
actors draw on existing rules and are subsequently able to alter them, is a complex
process that unfolds over an extended period of time. This theory of institutional
empowerment suggests that actors are able to realize institutional change by elaborating
on four institutional processes, represented by the unshaded rectangles, which, once
developed, act to redefine the rules of the field represented by the shaded rectangles.
I distinguish institutional processes from institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006)
in that they refer to a set of related actions which, once realized, have the notable effect
of altering existing rules, but are not necessarily carried out with this particular aim.
Institutional rules refer to norms and beliefs which govern the ways in which a field
operates (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Sharfman, 1994; Starbucks, 1976).
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Figure 4. A Process Model of Institutional Empowerment
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My model suggests that radical institutional change consists of the complete
alteration of existing rules. As the relationships between institutional processes and
changes in rules emerged as being mutually constitutive in my data, I present these eight
themes in related pairs. These four processes and associated changes in rules occur in a
sequential fashion, and interact with two recurrent themes shown in ovals and
representing key components of the institutional framework, namely the regulative and
the cognitive/normative.
Themes 1 & 5: Getting Critical Resources & Changing Who Gets to Be an Active
Member of the Field
The first step in the process of institutional empowerment is for the actor to secure
a position as an active member of the field, which requires the acquisition of critical
resources. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) indicated, “Criticality of the resource measures the
organization‟s ability to continue functioning in the absence of the resource” (p. 46).
I note that the three groups of actors were already members of the field by default: MCS
and SCS centered for those students who could not afford access to education, and
African Americans belonged to a group that was excluded from participation in
education. However, without critical resources, their membership of the field was entirely
passive. It was only when they were able to secure their access to critical resources that
these groups were able to „activate‟ their membership, thus changing „Who gets to be an
active member of the field?‟
Lawrence (1999) proposed that “An organization‟s ability to affect the
membership rules of an organizational field is positively associated with its control of
institutional information and the degree to which it is perceived as a leading organization
in the field” (p. 172). My work indicates these two conditions need not be satisfied for
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members to initiate changes in existing rules. Rather, becoming a member is a necessary
condition to act upon institutional arrangements, but not sufficient for radical change to
occur. This situation was particularly salient as, even when it had been able to accumulate
critical resources in the early 1850s, MCS was still constrained in its activities by the
deeply engrained belief that poor children could not benefit from being educated (MCS1856c).
Further, MCS had, at this stage, to gain the legitimacy necessary to attain the
sponsorship of the City leaders (MCS-1848a; MCS-1855d). Most notably, MCS
contested the rule whereby only the wealthier residents could receive an education,
noting that such a situation was a key constraint to the City‟s successful growth (MCS1856a). African Americans and SCS gained access to resources through a different
process. As public education was gaining acceptance in the broad environment, these two
groups became active members through regulatory processes when the State made public
schools for all mandatory.
Themes 2 & 6: Getting Competitive Resources & Changing Who Gets to Assume
Leadership in the Field
The second step consists of acquiring those resources that make the actor
preeminent in its field. This is illustrated in my work when MCS became a legitimate
rival to private schools, and ultimately was accepted as the leader in the educational field
(Memphis Daily Appeal, Jan 5, 1879). Gaining access to such resources is often very
difficult, as MCS found:
It was never presumed in the establishment of free schools that they should
become [an avenue to] a system of colleges or universities. […] The original idea
of common schools never included the higher branches and ornamental
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accomplishments sought by the few for pleasure or profit. (Memphis Public
Ledger, 1881, Jan 12)
Indeed, while MCS‟ access to critical resources was achieved in a relatively short
period of time, it took the organization much more time (Figure 2) to gain legitimacy and
thus start to accumulate those resources, such as adequate buildings or high school
programs, that would allow MCS to compete with private schools. This competition with
private schools was pivotal in MCS‟ efforts to change the institutional order. With the
general public comparing MCS to private schools, MCS was forced to demonstrate
similar levels of performance. For instance, private schools were the only path towards
accessing higher education institutions. Developing high schools thus became a goal for
MCS (MCS-1856b), something that SCS did not establish until later in the process,
probably because it had no competition (SCS-1907a).
At this stage, actors‟ positions are in flux, but radical change has still not
occurred. The relative positions of actors in a field have been widely acknowledged as a
key element of institutional change (Battilana, 2006; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Clegg,
1989; Lawrence et al., 2012). However, the importance of this is more often assumed
than explained (Battilana et al., 2009). A privileged social position, argued Bourdieu
(1986), allows actors to establish “the laws whereby the different types of capital change
into one another” (p. 242). A rather counter-intuitive finding emerges from my analysis.
While MCS took a leadership position in the educational field as early as 1880 (Figure 2),
its ability to alter the existing institutional order was constrained by the rules
institutionalized when education was provided exclusively by private schools. Thus, it
was the private school system that configured the field by determining „which resources
are defined as valuable‟ and „how resources are to be distributed.‟
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I note, though, that gaining a leadership position is crucial for actors‟ ability to
engage in the subsequent steps towards institutional empowerment. African Americans,
whose access to superior resources was consistently blocked (Memphis_Daily_Appeal1873; Audit_of_Board_ of_Education-1943), never had the opportunity to establish a
leadership position. This may explain their subsequent failure to bring about
desegregation.
Themes 3 & 7: Introducing New Standards & Changing Which Resources are
Defined as Valuable
The third step in the process of institutional empowerment consists of introducing
new standards to evaluate the resources possessed by actors. This step, when carried out
successfully, leads to an alteration of the definition of what constitutes valuable
resources. Here, actors seek to get the field to value the resources they have in
abundance, and, in conjunction with this, they redefine the terms of competition.
As long as MCS was constrained into using existing standards to evaluate its
worth, it was challenged into providing the same level of educational quality as that
which private schools offered. By acting upon the re-definition of new standards, MCS
was able to design standards that would define what it did best, namely providing a
service for the improvement of collective welfare, as the most valuable resource in the
field. The contestation over the meaning of resources is well illustrated in the rhetorical
battle involving MCS‟ arguments that a good education is that which is democraticallyoriented (MCS-1875a) and the private schools‟ response that an exclusive education was
most valuable:
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We shall find that it is their very individualism which makes the private schools of
interest to those parents who use proper discrimination in selecting a school for
their children. (The Handbook of Private Schools, 1915, p. xiii)
Shelby County Schools elaborated on a similar process when desegregation
dispositions were introduced in order to reallocate resources to White and African
American students equally. With public education being traditionally promoted for its
democratic value, and the White population gradually becoming a minority across the
whole County, White Americans foresaw the end of segregative practices, which had
been key to their position of advantage, as a major threat to their position.
[Educational] privilege had been constructed historically on the basis of racial
oppression, and this was not going to be easily remedied by even a Supreme Court
decision. The Brown decision was made and largely ignored, especially in the
South where segregation had been the law of the land. It took many subsequent
court battles, a civil rights movement, and years of concerted efforts to end legal
racial segregation in the schools. All of this was required because there was
active, and all too often violent, opposition by whites who understood that their
position in society was based in a system of racial superiority. (Noblit & Mendez,
2008, p. 1)
Therefore, to be able to maintain their position of power, the White-dominated
SCS also began to renegotiate the meaning of resources. The universalistic appeal of
public education was questioned and gradually replaced by a more exclusive approach to
education whereby now, each student was to be viewed as being endowed with individual
talents that were to be encouraged by individualized programs (SCS-1957c).
Furthermore, SCS widely promoted the idea that the neighborhood school should
be “the center of community activities” (SCS AR, 1957). Building on this argument and
the idea that schools should offer specific, differentiated, programs, as opposed to the
earlier universal, standardized, approach, it became easier for SCS to maintain
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segregrative practices. As the African American suburban residents were more likely to
live in the least costly areas, SCS could offer the best programs to selected schools. This
strategy did not escape the judge in charge of SCS desegregation litigation who pointed
out, on various occasions, that residential segregation could not be utilized as a means to
maintain segregative practices.
In 1985, the United States objected to the [SCS] Board‟s plan to expand the 93%
white Lucy Elementary. For several years, the Board had been using portable
classrooms at Lucy, accommodating 150 students. The Board proposed building
new classrooms at Lucy to accommodate 600 students, even though three
neighboring schools, 36%, 27%, and 18.5% black, had more that 600 empty
desks. To justify the plan, the Board claimed it was responding to parents‟
demands, fostering “community pride” and preserving “community identity.” The
court reviewed the Board‟s decision and found that the impact of the construction
at Lucy on desegregation and alternative methods of accommodating the
overcrowding by using neighboring schools had “never actually been considered
by the Board.” The court denied the request to expand Lucy, reminding the Board
of its “continuing duty to eliminate all vestiges of the dual system and to refrain
from taking decisions which serve to reestablish the dual system.” (Robinson v.
SCS Board of Educ., 2007)
Finally, SCS introduced parental involvement to offset the idea that material
resources such as money and buildings were adequate measures of the quality of a
school. Such an argument had attractive features. First, SCS could not compete with
MCS on the basis of its buildings. The buildings in the suburbs followed a basic
architectural design whereas MCS, when it hosted the wealthier residents of the County,
had traditionally sought to erect monuments: “The building should be so architecturally
constructed and the grounds so platted and beautified as to make the whole an ornament
to the city” (MCS AR, 1906). Indeed, many of the older schools in the City retain an
architectural prominence not matched by their more recent or suburban counterparts.
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Therefore, when the demographic shift occurred that saw African Americans moving to
the City, and White Americans to the suburbs, the latter inherited school buildings that
could not match those in the City.
Second, as SCS received fewer funds per student than MCS, institutionalizing
parental involvement as a measure of educational quality was instrumental. Indeed, with
a majority of poor schools, where a disproportionate number of students were raised in
single parent families, MCS could not demonstrate the same level of parental
involvement as SCS.
Those stereotypes are well known: Memphis City Schools are terrible, populated
by poor children who can't learn and who mostly live in female-led households,
where the mothers don't get involved in their children's education. Shelby County
Schools are wonderful, populated by high-achieving students from two-parent,
involved families. (Kenya Bradshaw in The Commercial Appeal, 2011, Feb 6)
These three features – individualized curriculum, neighborhood schools, and parental
involvement – formed part of a broader concept referred to as “educational excellence”
and on which schools were now to be evaluated.
Themes 4 & 8: Creating a New Category of Actors & Changing How Resources Are
to Be Distributed
The fourth step consists of creating a new category of actors, a key phase towards
radically altering the way in which resources are distributed. As power consists of
influencing the allocation of resources (Bourdieu, 1986; Lawrence, 1999; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978), this rule became crucial in providing actors with the ability to realize
institutional change.
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Memphis City Schools, initially created to provide the poor with the same
educational services as the wealthier residents (MCS-1848a), had also been profoundly
stigmatized (MCS-1856c). Its leaders were aware that for education to be fundamentally
equal, MCS had to strive to overcome the “artificial barriers” (MCS AR, 1856) which
institutionalized educational inequalities in the first place. Having successfully negotiated
the first three steps, MCS was now in a position to alter the way in which actors were
categorized, and thus to develop an institutional order whereby education was not
allocated on the basis of social stratification anymore. The alteration of such a rule did
not occur without contestation on the part of private schools which notably benefitted
from traditional institutional arrangements:
The public day school can never accomplish the best results with the student who
lives in an antagonistic or uncultured home. […] Many children of the rich have
owed their salvation to the boarding school of simple life and high ideals. (The
Handbook of Private Schools, 1915, p. xxi)
Shelby County Schools elaborated on the same process to counteract the CRMs‟
efforts. As racial segregation was outlawed, a trend towards categorizing actors was
developing contiguous to the demographic changes illustrated in Figure 3. Indeed, the
development of costly housing had the direct effect of creating a new category of actors:
those who could afford to live in the suburbs versus those who could not. This category
has remained since then as schools are commonly identified, in Shelby County and
nationally, as being urban or suburban. However, given the then strong correlation
between race and socio-economic status, categorizing actors based on their being urban
or suburban became an effective means toward maintaining segregative practices while
complying with a legal environment which had become intolerant of racial segregation.
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Theme 9: The Regulative Environment
The actors portrayed in this work moved through the four phases described above
in essentially a sequential fashion. As these unfolded, they intersected with two themes
reflecting key elements of the institutional framework: the regulative and the
normative/cognitive environments. Scott (1995) highlighted these three forms of
institutional pressures, but given the often blurry boundaries between normative and
cognitive pressures, I followed Zimmerman and Zeitz‟ (2002) approach to combine them
into a single theme.
Regulative pressures were intersecting with two major rules of memberships:
„Who gets to be an active member of the field?‟ and „How are resources to be
distributed?‟ However, actors often faced difficulties in getting these regulations
implemented. For instance, although Memphis officials had agreed to provide funds for
the public schools, they often resisted complying with this agreement (MCS-1855c).
Similarly, although SCS became a member of the field with the 1868 State mandate, it
could not immediately find employees willing to help in the organization of its schools
(SCS AR, 1868). African Americans were also challenged when trying to get compliance
with regulations. First, both the Reconstruction Act of 1867, which ended the black
codes, and the 15th Amendment to the Constitution of 1870, which granted African
Americans political rights, had little effect on legitimizing African Americans‟ status as
equal citizens. Second, the court-ordered busing was received so negatively by White
residents that few of them remained in the City‟s public schools. These examples share a
common denominator: when regulations were implemented, they were lacking any
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normative/cognitive pressures to reinforce them. As such, they were wholly ineffective at
realizing change.
Theme 10: The Normative/Cognitive Environment
Normative/cognitive changes take longer than regulatory changes to become
established. For instance, MCS had to fight against the widespread beliefs that only the
wealthier could be educated, and that private schools were qualitatively superior to public
schools (MCS AR, 1852). These two norms took, respectively, 8 and 24 years to alter
(Figure 2). Ultimately, it was the very foundation of these norms that MCS challenged as
it worked towards establishing new standards (MCS-1875a; MCS-1892a), and
institutionalizing a new category of actors that would change the way in which resources
were distributed. These two processes took MCS about 25 and 20 years respectively
(Figure 2).
My findings stress the criticality of the normative/cognitive environment in
sustaining institutional change projects. As desegregation was implemented in Memphis
in 1972, resource allocation was fundamentally altered. First, White students could no
longer be advantaged over African Americans, as they were during the Jim Crow era.
Further, the African American student population had grown to the extent of becoming
the majority (Figure 3). As such, the desegregation court orders created a situation in
which more resources were distributed to the African American students than to the
White students. Furthermore, African Americans, with the effective enactment of voting
rights, were now gaining seats on the MCS board, and were thus empowered to decide
upon how those resources would be utilized.
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However, with the „white flight,‟ African Americans were left with the power to
allocate existing resources, but they were unable to gain a leadership position in the field.
Whites in the City favored the private schools, and SCS was now building on educational
excellence to differentiate itself from the City schools. This situation created a paradox:
while African Americans‟ initial purpose was to alter a segregated institutional order by
more fairly redistributing resources, part of this goal was realized as the resources
available in Memphis were now almost all distributed to African Americans – African
American students constituted about 80% of MCS student population in 1976.
Nevertheless, this did not allow them to bring about desegregation. Rather, left with a
student body which was primarily poor and had long suffered from receiving only
inferior educational services, MCS was now relegated to being a substandard educational
system (Kenya Bradshaw in The Commercial Appeal, 2011, Feb 6). Consequently, my
findings suggest that the altering of this rule may be ineffective if it is solely supported by
the regulative environment.
Summary of Findings
This study suggests that beyond their ability to mobilize resources in order to
carry out change projects (Battilana et al., 2009; DiMaggio, 1988; Lawrence, 1999;
Maguire et al., 2004), actors‟ ability to use those resources to subsequently act upon
existing rules may constitute a major strategy to achieve this goal. I found that change
occurs through four major steps. In the first two steps, which I term „playing the game,‟
actors are primarily concerned with accessing the resources that first allow them to
become active members of the field, and then to compete on fair grounds with the leading
member of the field. As such, resources become the focal point of members‟ struggles,
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which is consistent with Bourdieu‟s (1975, 1977, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992)
view that institutional fields are “arenas of struggles” in which actors compete over
scarce resources. However, I found that resource acquisition is only part of the overall
process of radical change. Indeed, the last two steps towards radical change consisted of
„reconfiguring the game,‟ a key requirement to overcome the structures of domination in
place. I use this terminology in accordance with Levy and Egan‟s (2003) argument that,
“As in a game of chess, power lies not just in the playing pieces, but in the configuration
of forces” (p. 807), a view that is particularly consistent with my findings.
As such, while the two first steps are essentially concerned with resources, the last
two steps consist of acting upon existing rules. Giddens (1979, 1984) highlighted the
importance of the iterative relationship between rules and resources in institutionalization
processes. However, Giddens‟ theory has been widely criticized for its failure to explicate
the distinct role played by rules and resources in these processes (Archer, 1982; Clegg,
1989). My model suggests that while rules and resources iteratively shape each other, this
process follows a specific sequence. In the first two steps, resources predominate; they
constitute a key constraint in actors‟ projects as without such resources, actors are unable
to participate in the field‟s struggles (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). However, as actors
accumulate those resources, they inherently alter two rules – „Who gets to be an active
member of the field?‟ and „Who gets to assume leadership in the field?‟ With the next
two steps, I identify the reverse relationship. Here, actors are concerned with changing
two rules – the standard on which resources are to be evaluated, and the category of
actors. As they change these rules, the very meaning of resources and the way they are to
be allocated are altered.
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Discussion and Conclusion
I introduced this work by arguing that the common assumption about the
relationship between resources and institutional change needs to be revisited in order to
be more consistent with what we observe in the world. Most notably, I stressed that the
core assumption that resources are needed to bring about change cannot explain how
under-resourced actors can realize change, and how, conversely, even with resources,
change does not necessarily occur. I argued that using an institutional lens may help to
unveil the role of rules in this relationship, and thus to explain these inconsistencies. My
work makes three major contributions to the institutional literature.
First, I identify four rules that need to be effected for institutional change to occur.
Rules are important building blocks of institutions (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000). They
are at the core of our understanding of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Zucker, 1977),
determining not only what resources are (Olsen, 2008; Sewell, 1992; Stryker, 1994), but
also which actors are able to use them (Lawrence, 1999, 2004). As such, by attending to
the role of rules, we can provide a more elaborated view of the relationship between
resources and change, one that is grounded in the context within which change unfolds.
However, two main issues have thus far prevented institutional theory from delivering
this promise. I address these here.
The ways in which new rules emerge and become established remains
understudied (Colyvas & Maroulis, 2012; Lawrence, 2004). This has limited our
understanding of the role of rules in the relationship between resources and change.
Furthermore, while institutional entrepreneurship has emerged as a useful lens for
examining the ways in which actors may draw on resources to effect change, studies
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building on this approach have been criticized for their unproblematic consideration of
resources (Kaghan & Lounsbury, 2011; Meyer, 2006). Indeed, if resources are not
explained, the risk is that those resources identified to be crucial in bringing change in
one context may be considered to have the same effect in another context. Such a view is
inconsistent with the main tenet of institutional theory that resources are socially
constructed, that is, their meaning is shaped by the specific institutional context within
which they are enacted (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Clegg, 1989; Sewell, 1992; Zajac &
Westphal, 2004).
My work addresses these two main shortcomings by clarifying how rules contour
the relationship between resources and change. I am thus able to explain why the
relationship between resources and change is not as necessarily positively correlated as
previously assumed. My findings indicate that uncovering Who gets to be an active
member of a field?, Who gets to assume leadership in the field?, Which resources are
defined as valuable?, and How are resources to be distributed? determine the ways that
resources influence institutional change. I find that it is only when actors are able to
attend to these four rules that the resources they succeed in mobilizing have the potential
to produce change. For example, actors with MCS, despite lacking the resources that
existing theory would predict as a critical requirement for change to occur, were able to
fundamentally change the way in which education was delivered, providing education to
the poor, traditionally excluded, population. Similarly, SCS was able to maintain a
segregated order by attending to the same four rules. Conversely, African Americans‟
project to desegregate schools has failed because actors have been consistently unable to
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assume leadership positions in the field, and define their resources, most notably a
substantial demographic representation, as the most valuable.
Therefore, my study not only sheds light on how rules emerge and become
contested, but it also identifies which rules play a crucial role during the change process.
I thus complement existing institutional entrepreneurship perspectives by, first,
highlighting the two rules that must be effected for actors to leverage existing resources –
„Who gets to be an active member of a field,‟ and „Who gets to assume leadership in the
field.‟ I further contribute to institutional entrepreneurship explanations by uncovering
the two rules that allow those with access to resources to create new institutions or
transform existing ones – „Which resources are defined as valuable,‟ and „How resources
are to be distributed.‟ In sum, I provide the link that is missing between actors‟ ability to
leverage resources, and their ability to use those resources to realize institutional change.
Where institutional entrepreneurship focuses on the relationship between resources and
changes in rules, my work extends this position by providing a means to put this
relationship into context by attending to the iterative relationship between rules and
resources. This leads me to my second contribution.
The second contribution I make is to clarify the relationship between resources
and institutional change while avoiding the tension created by the inherent rule-resources
dualism. Olsen (2008) notes that “resources are routinely tied to rules and worldviews,
empowering and constraining actors differently and making them more or less capable of
acting according to behavioral codes” (p. 8). This view is a key element of Giddens‟
(1979, 1984) structuration theory which stresses the iterative relationship between rules
and resources. While an approach of rules and resources as shaping each other in an
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iterative process has the key advantage of situating resources in the context within which
they are utilized, this dualistic approach, as I noted earlier, is problematic in three major
ways. First, if resources are socially constructed by existing rules, and if resources are
needed to change the very rules that provide resources with meaning, it then becomes
difficult to explain how change could possibly take place (Albano et al., 2010; Lizardo,
2010; Sewell, 1992; Whittington, 1992). Second, resources, under this perspective, are
virtual (Lizardo, 2010). Archer (1982), Thompson (1989), Clegg (1989) and Sewell
(2005) are among those critical of this conceptualization that dismisses the material
nature of resources. As Clegg (1989) noted about Giddens‟ view of rules as resources,
“What resources are remains unclear […] it seems as if the apparent distinction between
rules and resources breaks down, since resources as bases for action seem to be
understood only in relation to power in as much as they are realized by rules. Rules have
a distinct immateriality which one would not have thought necessarily characteristic of
resources” (p. 143). A third problem with Giddens‟ approach is its failure to provide a
specific role for rules and resources in the development of change projects (Clegg, 1989).
Archer (1982) notes that Giddens‟ “insistence on the simultaneity of transformative
capacity and chronic recursiveness inhibits any theoretical formulation on the conditions
under which either will predominate.”
My model of institutional empowerment addresses these three criticisms as it
helps to explain the role of resources in change projects while avoiding the tension
created by conflating resources and rules. In fact, while my findings strongly support
Giddens‟ view that rules and resources are highly intertwined, I am also able to
illuminate their distinctiveness, thus avoiding the risk of being unable to explain how
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resources can be used to alter existing rules. This model of institutional empowerment
reveals that rules and resources have specific functions that depend on the stage at which
actors are located in the change process. In sum, I provide an elaborated view of the
processes through which rules and resources are sequentially altered, and mutually
reinforce each other. More importantly, my model responds to Archer‟s (1982)
unaddressed concern for understanding which of the rules and resources predominate,
and when.
The first two steps of the process of institutional empowerment are concerned
with accessing resources, without any attempt to negotiate their meaning, that is, they
consist of playing within the existing rules of the game. Here, the materiality of resources
is made salient as they are objectified by existing rules. This places a major constraint on
actors‟ ability to engage in a change project as they are forced to access critical resources
to become active members, and then competitive resources if they are to gain a
preeminent position in the field. As such, resources predominate, making the main goal
of actors to accumulate as many resources as possible, rather than to fundamentally
threaten the established order. It is only as actors engage in the third step that the
meaning of resources is challenged, thus revealing their immateriality, the process
through which resources are socially constructed. Indeed, this step is concerned with
changing existing resources by negotiating their meaning – establishing new standards to
place more value on those resources possessed in abundance by the actor. This has the
notable effect of reconfiguring the game within which actors will now compete by
changing which resources are valuable, and hence the very terms within which
competition takes place. The fourth step consists of a form of synthesis where the
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“winner” of the game, after getting the field to be organized around the resources it
possesses in abundance over other actors, is now positioned to define how actors are to be
categorized. This last process directly affects the ways in which resources are distributed.
In sum, actors, in the first two steps, are engaged in processes that are primarily
concerned with resources; but they alter rules as they achieve these processes. In the last
two steps, actors are engaged in processes that are primarily concerned with rules; but
they alter the meaning of resources as they achieve these processes. This leads me to my
third contribution.
My third contribution is to provide new insights into the role of legitimacy in
making the relationship between resources and change a positive one. Legitimacy is at
the core of institutional theory, argued to be a key factor in constraining the range of
actors‟ options (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1997).
Concerns for legitimacy motivate actors to adopt existing rules rather than challenge
them (Sherer & Lee, 2002), thus rendering change something of an anomaly. Extant
research has focused on showing how legitimization processes can also be used to
challenge existing rules (Rutherford & Buller, 2006; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Sherer
& Lee, 2002; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). My study contributes to this literature in two
major ways.
My findings suggest that legitimization processes entail levels of efforts that vary
depending on the step actors are engaged in in the process of institutional empowerment.
While legitimization processes were key in the first step, that is, as MCS, SCS, and
African Americans sought to become members of the educational field, such processes
required less effort than in step 2, when they had to gain access to superior resources.
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Once MCS and SCS achieved a leadership position in the field, efforts aimed at
legitimizing their practices decreased. Thus, my work supports the view that legitimacy
should be viewed as a continuous rather than discrete variable, with a legitimacy
threshold, a point “below which the new venture struggles for existence and probably will
perish and above which the new venture can achieve further gains in legitimacy and
resources” (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002, p. 414). My results also reveal that as actors
move along the steps toward institutional empowerment, they must engage in varying
levels of effort as they seek to legitimize their projects. Interestingly then, the more they
need resources, the more actors have to build on legitimization processes; but as actors
gain access to superior resources, and are able to utilize them to become leading actors in
the field, they are less concerned with legitimacy, and rather can focus on developing
new standards over which what is deemed legitimate will be reassessed.
I also shed light on the relationship between the ways in which legitimacy is
acquired, and on how the source of legitimacy affects the relationship between resources
and change. Scott (1995) identified three main sources through which actors can gain
legitimacy. Regulative legitimacy is derived from regulations, rules, standards, and
expectations created by governments, credentialing associations, or professional bodies.
Normative legitimacy is derived from the norms and values of society. Cognitive
legitimacy is derived from addressing “widely held beliefs and taken-for-granted
assumptions that provide a framework for everyday routines” (Scott, 1994, p. 81).
However, it is still unclear whether these three sources have differentiated effects on the
acquisition of legitimacy. Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002, p. 428), adding „industry‟ as a
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fourth source of legitimacy, problematize this by asking “whether all four sources have
equally important effects on resource acquisition.”
My findings respond to this call, and suggest that legitimacy acquired through
regulations is less likely effective than when its sources are normative/cognitive.
Regulative pressures can only help legitimate „Who gets to be an active member in the
field?‟ and „How are resources to be distributed?‟ In fact, my study strongly questions the
effectiveness of regulations as a way to gain legitimacy. For instance, the white flight
following the busing order, as well as the consecutive and permanent attacks geared at an
increasingly African American school board, cast doubt on the fact that African
Americans, as a group, have ever gained legitimacy in the field. Furthermore, there are no
instances in this study where legitimacy over „Who gets to assume a leadership position
in the field?‟ and „Which resources are defined as valuable?‟ are sustained by regulations.
This is particularly problematic because if the purpose of such regulations is to address
social inequalities, policy and lawmakers should be wary of believing that simply passing
regulations is sufficient to bring about institutional change.
Future Research Directions and Limitations
Resources play a central role in institutional change by allowing actors to realize
certain goals. As a result, resources are often equated with power, leading researchers to
often use resources and power interchangeably. This is because resources provide the
basis on which power develops, and in turn, power is commonly defined as the ability to
influence the allocation of resources (Bourdieu, 1986; Burns, 1986; Lawrence, 1999;
Scott, 1987). Bourdieu (1986) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have been instrumental in
sustaining this view by explicating the mechanisms through which resources provide
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power to those who possess them. However, Nienhüser (2008) notes, “The relationship
between securing resources and power has to be clarified. The specification needs
requirements under which the power of certain actors either decrease due to their
discontinued contribution to securing resources and organizational goals, or when actors
„retain their power‟ even with a decreasing contribution” (p. 28).
My work addresses this concern by showing that not only does actors‟ access to
resources not warrantee their ability to produce change, but more importantly, power
matters little if those who possess it have not been able to define the meaning of the
resources on which power is based. I demonstrate that understanding the four rules is a
key requirement not only for resources to form the basis of power, but also for this
mechanism to produce change. However, because my study builds on three cases that
unfolded within the same institutional context, future research could examine the
replicability of my argument to other cases. In particular, I am interested in whether the
institutional context influences the ways in which resources translate into power. This is
particularly important because if access to resources and power are crucial in bringing
about change, changes in who gets to access resources or power may signal that radical
change has taken place when, in fact, such changes hide a process of institutional
reproduction. This leads to a second avenue for future research.
What stands as a radical type of change is indeed often problematic (Fligstein &
McAdam, 2012; Stryker 2004). Amis et al.‟s (2004) work draws our attention to this key
limitation in our approach of organizational change. While we used to think of radical
change on the basis of its pace, argued to be more effective when it develops rapidly
(Miller & Friesen, 1984; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994), Amis and colleagues (2004)
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suggest that “What is important is the sequence in which organization elements are
altered” (p. 35). My work reaches a similar conclusion, and specifies the four rules that
need to be altered for change to take on a radical form. This is particularly important
because some dramatic institutional changes may unduly signal that radical change has
taken place, when in fact those changes have been appropriated by existing power holders
to maintain their position.
Such a phenomenon has been addressed in Dobbin‟s (2009) work on how
organizations were able to divert anti-discrimination regulations in the US to increase
their power (Dobbin, Sutton, Meyer, & Scott, 1993). More recently, Khavul and
colleagues (2013) showed how institutional entrepreneurs initially developed
microfinancing organizations, thus challenging the ways in which banking services were
provided to the poor in Guatemala, but then were outrun by traditional banks. These
studies draw our attention to the fact that some changes may have the appearance of
radical change, but are, in fact, instances of institutional maintenance as they reproduce
the same structures of domination. My study adds to this work by showing that it is
through the alteration of all four rules that change can be defined as radical, and thus
provides a basis on which future research can characterize the nature of change. I thus
address Suddaby‟s (2010) concern that “Any change, however slight is now
„institutional‟ and any change agent is an „institutional entrepreneur‟” (p. 15), by
providing a tool to better define what type of change has taken place.
Further, while the emerging sequence holds for the three cases under study, other
sequences that I have not identified may result in different outcomes. For instance, my
findings suggest that to be able to change the meaning of resources, actors need to
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achieve a leadership position that will, in turn, allow them to introduce new standards.
Déjean et al. (2004) reached a similar conclusion whereby a French rating agency,
ARESE, had to first establish itself as a referent in the field before it could develop new
measurement tools that had the notable effect of sustaining both its legitimacy and power
position. However, future research could investigate whether other sequences are equally
effective at radically transforming the institutional order.
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Chapter 3
The Homogeneity and Heterogeneity of Fields

A major contribution of DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1983) work was its contention
that organization behaviors could be predicted and explained based on membership of a
specific field. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define fields as “those organizations which,
in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life” (p. 148), that is, “a
community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose
participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with other actors
outside of the field” (Scott, 1994b, pp. 207-208). In brief, DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
showed that organizations can be identified by their belonging to specific fields, and that,
as a result of their sharing similar structures of meanings, not only tend to adopt similar
organizational forms, referred to as structural isomorphism, but are also likely to exhibit
similar reactions to institutional pressures.
More recent studies though have challenged this view by stressing that
organizations pertaining to the same field may not be as homogenous as predicted. For
instance, Kraatz and Block (2008) explain that heterogeneity tends to increase as
organizations generally operate simultaneously in multiple fields, and refer to this
phenomenon as institutional pluralism. Other studies establish that under certain
conditions, institutional factors may produce increases in heterogeneity across
organizations within a field (D‟Aunno, Sutton, & Price, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2010;
Schlesinger, 1998). Another theory that challenges DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1983) view
of fields lies in the very definition of institutional fields. Hoffman (1999) suggests that
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fields revolve around an issue, and thus consist of the coming together of even initially
unconnected organizations as they are affected by the same issue.
These two arguments whereby organizations do not behave as homogenously as
initially theorized, and become united with the triggering of an event have received
strong support. However, the predictive power of DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1983)
elaboration of fields is also somewhat lost. Indeed, the key advantage of DiMaggio and
Powell‟s theorizing was to predict organizations‟ behaviors from their membership of a
field, something that becomes highly problematic with an institutional pluralistic
approach (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Similarly, it is difficult to predict organizations‟
behaviors from an issue perspective as the field can only be defined once the event has
emerged (Hoffman, 1999). In fact, Abrahamsson, Englind and Gerdin (2010) even
indicate that organizations‟ reactions to events display too wide of a variation to allow for
any reliable prediction. As Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) also noted that, “not all events are
attended equally,” thus highlighting the challenge associated with predicting
organizations‟ behaviors when using an issue perspective.
While these studies offer rich and compelling arguments as to why organizations
behave in divergent ways, and thus strongly question DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1983)
explanations of organizational homogeneity, I contend that both views can be reconciled
by examining why rather than how actors react the way do. Such reconciliation would
allow maintaining DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1983) insights that field membership is a key
factor for explaining and predicting organizational behaviors, while recognizing that
fields may vary in the extent to which they foster homogeneity or heterogeneity.
Therefore, I am interested in examining what it is that actors seek to protect as their field
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undergoes changes or institutional pressures, and by extension, why they react the way
they do.
To do so, I build on a major transformation that was initiated in 2010 when two
school systems in Shelby County, Tennessee, Shelby County Schools (SCS) and
Memphis City Schools (MCS) initiated a merger. The context is particularly suited to
address my questions as suburbanites were unanimous in opposing the merger, whereas
urban constituents were strongly divided on the issue (Amis & Aïssaoui, 2013).
Furthermore, while the consolidation constitutes the major event of this research, various
other key events have punctuated this change project, which allows me to examine how
reactions to those events varied within and between actors.
In doing so, I contribute to current institutional analyses in four major ways. First,
I uncover the major components that contour the boundaries of a field, or what field
members think they deem protecting. I thus respond to calls for improving our
understanding of fields (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Thornton et al., 2012). Second,
I address Abrahamsson, Englund, and Gerdin‟s (2011) concern that the relationship
between events and actors‟ subsequent reactions is difficult to generalize. Third, I provide
new explanations on why reactions to institutional pressures are likely to be homogenous
or heterogeneous as I identify two key factors that shape actors‟ understandings of
institutional pressures. Among these factors, my work suggests that imprinting, a process
whereby organizations are enduringly influenced by the institutional environment that
shaped their founding, plays a key role in shaping the meaning of institutional pressures. I
thus make a fourth contribution by shedding light on the role of imprinting by showing
how history matters (Jones & Khanna, 2006; Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013).
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Theoretical Background
Reactions to Institutional Pressures
Field theory is still need in need of development. Most notably, the concept of a
field still suffers from major definitional and conceptual issues (Fligstein & McAdam,
2012; Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006; Sewell, 1992; Thornton et al., 2012). This is
problematic because a sound conceptualization of fields is crucial to understand
reproduction and change (Davis & Marquis, 2005; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Sewell,
1992), and has key implications regarding the comparability of organizations (Thornton
et al., 2012).
Machado-da-Silva, Guarido Filho, and Rossoni (2006) provide a review of the
various elements that shape current definitions of fields. They found that fields are
theorized in six different ways, or as 1) the totality of relevant actors, 2) a functionally
specific arena, 3) a center of dialog and discussion, 4) an arena of power and conflict,
5) an institutional sphere of disputed interests, and 6) a structured network of
relationships. Here, I evaluate the most common definitions of fields, namely, Bourdieu‟s
(Bourdieu, 1975, 1977, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), DiMaggio and Powell‟s
(1983) and Hoffman‟s (1999) definitions, which also encapsulate the six elements
identified by Machado-da-Silva et al. (2006).
Bourdieu defined fields as “arenas of struggle” where actors engage in strategies
aimed at gaining access to scarce resources (Bourdieu, 1975, 1977, 1990; Bourdieu &
Wacquant, 1992). While this view has strong resonance in empirical observations (Brint
& Karabel, 1991; Fligtein, 1991, 2001; Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Levy &
Egan, 2003), it is problematic to define fields based on the effects on its members, here
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struggles for domination over resources. Indeed, such a view builds on the assumption
that actors are allowed to engage in struggles, which implies a certain level of agency that
needs to be explained rather than assumed (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Sewell, 1992).
Furthermore, a second assumption is simply that field members are consistently
interacting in a contentious mode. This conception of fields cannot account for theory
that indicates fields can vary in the extent to which its members will reach consensus.
More obviously, the concepts of unified versus fragmented fields (D‟Aunno et al.,
1991; Scott & Meyer, 1983; Strang, 2008) point to the idea that certain fields may have
achieved a certain level of consensus that does not necessarily conform with a view of
fields as “arenas of struggle”. A unified environment refers to that in which organizations
face “a few sets of connected and interlocking constraints (and related opportunities),”
while in a fragmented environment, “the organization faces a variety of disconnected, and
potentially conflicting, constraints and opportunities” (Strang, 2008, p. 159). In other
words, while Bourdieu raised a key feature of institutional fields as being likely to be
characterized by structures of domination, where institutional arrangements will be
protected by dominant actors and contested by disadvantaged ones, much work remains
to be done to assess the extent to which institutional arrangements will be contested, and
most importantly, the reasons lying behind such contestations (Berman, 2006; D‟Aunno
et al., 1991; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Hardy & Maguire, 2008).
A second definition of fields was provided by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who
focus less on the contentiousness of fields and more on the structures of meanings that
unite field members. DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1983) definition of organizational fields as
a collective of organizations sharing common systems of meanings improved our
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understanding of how organizations become homogenous under the influence of
institutional pressures (p. 148). Thus, it also strongly builds on another effect experienced
by field members, namely, the likelihood of homogenous responses to a given
institutional pressure (see also Scott & Meyer, 1983). This argument is particularly
compelling as it stems from the rationale that organizations sharing the same structures of
meanings are also likely to react similarly to any disruption in such structures (Scott,
2008; Selznick, 1949). However, while strong support has been provided for this (Kondra
& Hinings, 1998; Meyer, 1980; Strang & Meyer, 1993), I identify three major caveats in
this conceptualization of fields.
First, the notion of “recognized area of life” is somewhat problematic as little is
said about who is to establish the boundary conditions of inclusion. However, DiMaggio
and Powell (1983) explain such a task falls to the researcher. As indicated by Thornton
and colleagues (2012):
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 148), fields are institutionally defined
and can only be identified on the basis of empirical investigation. This suggests
that a field's boundary is expected to vary by study, empirical investigator, and
method of analysis. In this sense, an organizational field differs from the typical
levels of analysis such as individuals, organizations, and societies and from the
commonly measurable cases of a product market, industry, population of
organizational forms, and a world system of nation states. This characteristic
complicates building theory because it inhibits comparability and accumulation of
findings across studies of organizational fields. (p. 24)
The second problem in DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1983) definition relates to our
ability to predict organizations‟ behaviors based on their membership to a given field.
While this view should be particularly helpful in identifying the boundaries of a field, it
rests on a rather deterministic nature of fields where actors are portrayed as mere
“cultural dopes” (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 68-75; see also: Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006;
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Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Most critically, it rests on the assumption that those actors
share the same understanding of “what is going on” in the field (Friedland & Alford
1991). In fact, there is wide evidence that actors in the same field may have very
divergent ways of reacting to similar pressures (Greenwood et al., 2010; Kraatz & Block,
2008; Oliver, 1991).
Third, both DiMaggio and Powell‟s and Bourdieu‟s views of fields have been
criticized for their inability to explain change (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; McInerney,
2008), thus dismissing the inherent dynamic nature of fields (McInerney, 2008; Meyer et
al., 2005). Hoffman (1999) addresses this lacuna as, rather than focusing on how
institutional pressures affect a specific field, the author builds on a very different premise
whereby fields come into existence under the influence of institutional pressures.
I explain the implications of such a view in the following section.
Fields and Events
Hoffman (1999, p. 364) identifies field membership as based on a central issue
broadly consisting of shocks, jolts, or discontinuities (p. 353). This approach overcomes
several shortcomings inherent to previous definitions. First, it accounts for the dynamic
nature of fields (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Huberty 2008), as “Field formation, is not a
static process; new forms of debate emerge in the wake of triggering events that cause a
reconfiguration of field membership and/or interaction patterns” (Hoffman, 1999, p. 351).
Second, the boundaries of a field are defined from the data rather than imposed by the
researcher (Hoffman, 1999, p. 364).
Studies on the relationship between field evolution and events (Abrahamsson et
al., 2011; Hoffman, 1999; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Sewell,
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1996) have been recently complemented by research attending to how events can create
new fields (Dobusch, Schüler, & Wessel, 2010; Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Lampel &
Meyer, 2008; McInerney, 2008). These studies, carried under the umbrella of field
configuring events (FCE), show that events such as conferences (Garud, 2008),
ceremonies (Anand & Watson, 2004), contests (Rao, 1994), trade fairs, or festivals
(Dobusch et al., 2010) have the potential to define or re-define the boundaries of a field.
Despite the benefit of a perspective that accounts for the dynamic nature of fields,
the view of fields as revolving around issues or events brings new problems to our
conceptualization of fields. First, fields can only be defined a posteriori as their
boundaries are revealed only when the event takes place. Second, this view implies that
members of a field will be identified based on their reactions to the event. As such,
absence of reaction, or the likelihood that the researcher will overlook less vocal actors
(Hoffman, 1999), may ultimately be viewed as absence of membership. More generally,
little is known about why certain events become triggers of change while others do not
(Abrahamsson et al., 2011; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Munir, 2005). This can be
problematic since events “may or may not become disruptive depending on how they are
„constructed‟” (Munir, 2005, p. 96).
In sum, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) tell us that organizations pertaining to the
same field are likely to be similarly affected by given institutional pressures (see also
Scott & Meyer, 1983). Bourdieu‟s (Bourdieu, 1975, 1977, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant,
1992) view of fields situates field members as those engaged in struggles over scarce
resources (see also: Brint & Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 1991). Hoffman (1999) views fields
as bounded by an event that brings together various, sometimes previously unrelated,
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actors as they react to an event. While these positions share a keen attention to actors and
their reactions to existing institutional arrangements or changes therein, it is still unclear
a) why institutional pressures would affect actors in more or less varied ways, b) why
actors would be more or less likely to respond to those pressures in particular ways, and
c) when actors are likely to engage in struggles over existing institutional arrangements.
I seek to address these points here and in so doing advance our understanding of how
institutional fields are constructed, and subsequently change.
Methods
My research is based on the consolidation of two school systems, MCS and SCS,
which was initiated in December 2010. This context is particularly suited to address my
research questions as MCS members have consistently displayed a wide variance in their
reactions, whereas SCS members‟ reactions have been consistent. It becomes therefore
interesting to understand how different actors were influenced into adopting their
positions, and which factors shaped the variance in their reactions.
In 2010, MCS was an urban school system housing about 100,000 students, 83%
of whom were African Americans, and 89% economically-disadvantaged. In comparison,
SCS, a suburban school system, had about 50,000 students, 37% of whom were African
Americans, and 37% economically-disadvantaged. In fact, the median income in
Memphis in 2010 was $32,000 a year, compared to $92,000 in the suburbs.
Data Collection
My primary data source consisted of 52 in-depth interviews with individuals
actively involved in the consolidation process: SCS and MCS members and
administrators, the Transition Planning Commission (TPC) members, a committee in
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charge of developing a plan for the merged school system, the County Commissioners,
the body in charge of the County, State representatives, school principals and teachers,
parents, and other interested actors. I also drew upon observations of TPC, School Board,
and other public meetings, video and audio recordings of meetings that I was unable to
attend in person, newspaper coverage of the merger, Internet blogs, and minutes of SCBE
and TPC meetings (see Table 4).

Table 4
Data Inventory
Data type

Quantity

Period

Original data source

Interviews

52

Apr 2011-Apr 2013

MCS, SCS, and SCBE Board members,
business leaders
City, Suburban, and County political
leaders
Educational administrators
MCS and SCS teachers, principals,
and parents
Members and leaders of grassroots
associations

Press items

1200

Dec 2010 – Apr 2013

Commercial Appeal

Video recordings

58

Dec 2010 – Apr 2013

Recordings of SCBE meetings, and of
interviews of individuals

Audio recordings

48

Oct 2011-Feb

Recordings of TPC, municipalities,
and grassroots associations meetings

Meeting minutes

107

Nov 2010-Apr 2013

MCS, SCS, SCBE, and TPC

300
pages

Jan 2011-Mar 2013

Lead author’s notes of TPC, SCBE and
other public meetings

Field notes
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Data Analysis
The research design is primarily qualitative as I seek to uncover the deeper
structures of meanings and gain a better grasp at the complexity of social phenomena
(Langley, 1999). My analysis consisted of two major steps. In the first step, I developed a
timeline of the major events occurring throughout this major change from MCS charter
surrender, in December 2010, to the passing of a legislation, on April 15th, 2013, allowing
the creation of municipal school districts (MSDs) (see Table 5).
In a second step, I performed a narrative analysis as a means to construct a
detailed story from my data (Chandler, 1977; Langley, 1999). A narrative analysis is
particularly appropriate when the research seeks to understand how actors make sense of
events (Langley, 1999). I began the analysis by identifying relevant concepts in the data
and grouping them into categories (open coding) to reveal first-order codes (Van
Maanen, 1979). Here, I was interested in uncovering actors‟ reactions to the various
events that were occurring during the consolidation process. Next, I engaged in axial
coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to uncover relationships among these first-order codes.
I continued until no new higher-order themes and relationships emerged. I present these
constructs and representative quotations in Table 6. Figure 5 provides a representation of
my inductive analysis, showing how I moved from the data presented in Table 6 to
identifying second-order processes.
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Table 5
Timeline of Events, Dec 2010-Apr 2013
Nov 20, 2010 Republicans win control of the The possibility that SCS can gain special school
Tennessee Senate and House district status is now open
Nov 22, 2010 Resolution from M. Jones to
surrender MCS Charter

The relinquishing of MCS charter would result in
MCS ceasing to exist, and thus in the transfer of
responsibility of the City children onto the County

Dec 20, 2010

MCS Board votes to surrender The responsibility of Memphis students falls onto
the charter
SCS, the County school system, which triggers a
consolidation of MCS and SCS

Feb 9, 2011

The County Commission files a The legal battles between parties start
lawsuit to stop the Norris-Todd
bill

Feb 10, 2011

The Norris-Todd bill is
approved by the Tennessee
Senate and House

This bill sets the terms of the effective merger, and
paves the way for municipalities to have their own
school system

Mar 8, 2011

The referendum in the City
passes

It confirms the validity of the December 20, 2010,
vote from MCS Board to transfer the
administration of MCS schools to SCS

Aug 24, 2011 A Memorandum of
Understanding is designed

First agreement between the parties to set the
terms of the transition period

Sep 21, 2011

First TPC meeting

The Transition Planning Commission (TPC) is
charged with designing a plan for the merged
district

Oct 25, 2011

First SCBE meeting

The unified SCBE Board has its first regular
meeting

Nov, 2011

The building issue is raised

This will become a key issue over which parties will
fight

Aug 31, 2011 A report from Southern
The six suburban municipalities are now actively
Educational Services confirms involved in creating their own school systems
the feasibility of MSDs
Aug 2, 2012

Referenda pass in the
suburban cities

These confirm the suburban residents’ willingness
to set and fund their own school systems

Aug 13, 2012 The County Commission sues
the municipalities

The lawsuit is grounded on the possibility that the
referenda passed in the suburbs are
unconstitutional

Nov 27, 2012 Judge Mays rules that MSDs
are unconstitutional

The efforts from suburban municipalities are
overturned

Apr 15, 2013

This bill is similar to the initial one, but ensures it
will not be repealed for its being unconstitutional

The new Norris-Todd bill is
approved by the State
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Table 6
Representative Quotes and Events
Theme 1: Resources
How the event affects
resource allocation

The interviewee: We should be fair to all the children, and not, one part of our county children’s prosper
while we let another section of our children be oppressed, and hurt them. We should be fair to all the
children …. The interviewer: Be oppressed in what way? The interviewee: Well, not giving them
opportunities, not giving them chances.(SCS Board member_res)

How the event affects
access to resources

What went on in Memphis was a defensive maneuver against potential state law that would have allowed
Shelby County to become its own special school district, and in doing so, would have probably captured the
tax revenue. (SCBE Board member_res)
Merely bringing these two [school systems] together is not gonna raise academic achievement, just the
mere act of doing it. …. I still contend that if we would have allowed this to happen, and we would have had
to do this, that’s your budget, your financial plan, being affected, and therefore your academic plan would
suffer. (MCS Board member_res)
A special school district and a municipal, I think are somewhat different, and I probably need to look at the
laws a little bit more because what I see, from a municipal district standpoint, I still see one to where in a
municipal scenario everybody is still contributing to one pot for education. So the way that I see a
municipal is that if I live in Collierville, I still pay for an education tax rate, and that’s for the benefit of all
children, but I also have to pay an additional tax if I want to operate my own from a municipal standpoint,
which I think is separate. …. the way that I see a special, a special can separate those two pots for education
and just have one for that special school district, and that subtracts from the overall county school district.
(MCS Board member_res2)

Theme 2: Agency
What existing options
are

Once our board, the people who pushed ahead the charter surrender, once they got together and realized,
hey, this is a possibility for them now, and we gotta stop them. (MCS Board member_age)
There are laws already on the books… I didn't invent the damn law! (MCS Board member_age2)
(table continues)
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Table 6
Representative Quotes and Events (continued)
Theme 2: Agency (continued)
What other
alternatives are

I’m speaking particularly of the lawsuit allowing the municipalities to have their vote on whether or not
they can form school districts. In other words, I would rather see that resolved out of court with both the
parties that are claiming racial discrimination, and those that feel like they’re not having their right of selfdetermination, to sit in a room and say, “Ok, what are the real beef?”, you know, and get at the core issues.
It’s sort of like, ….there are certain things that are called unresolved conflicts, and one reason they’re called
unresolved is, you put them in a little compartment and never dealt with them. (SCBE Board member_age)
I was, and I am, and I will forever be, against consolidation through surrendering the charter. That’s how we
got here. We are here because the Memphis City Schools board surrendered the charter of Memphis City
Schools in an attempt to force the consolidation, the merger, onto the county. And I always, my position
was always, “No, that’s not how to do it. If you want to merge, if you want to consolidate, then come to the
table with the people from the county and do what grown folks do, negotiate it. You give up something.
They give up something. You present your best case. They present their best case. You keep your identity.
They keep their identity. And you do what is best for all the children.” That has always been my position,
and it has never changed. Now, what happened was what we have now: confusion, complete and utter
chaos, and confusion. (MCS Board member_age3)

How agency is
constrained

If the municipalities don’t end up with their school districts, you’re gonna see lawsuits. If they do end up
with their own school districts, you’re gonna see lawsuits. Because there’s a segment of the school board,
and other folks, who think that by giving them their own school districts, then it’s segregation. (SCBE Board
member_age2)
Courtrooms right now, of course, the county commission’s trying to block the right to vote. (SCS Board
member_age)
(table continues)
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Table 6
Representative Quotes and Events (continued)
Theme 2: Agency (continued)
How agency is
constrained
(continued)

Commercial Appeal, December 1, 2011: Unified school board member Martavius Jones wants to make sure
the school board has a plan to deal with municipal or special districts in the market for school buildings. …
"All taxpayers have paid for these school buildings, not just taxpayers living inside the district where the
school may be located," Jones said. "Some think only Bartlett taxpayers have paid for a school. That is not
true." The push by Jones sets the stage for the latest debate over schools. (CA_423)
Interviewer: So in other words, they have no choice right now? Interviewee: They don’t. Because, you can’t
start a special school district without the buildings. (MCS Board member_bui)
David Reaves’ blog, July 19, 2012: To squash a community’s desire to form an MSD, they hold buildings
hostage as the ransom for staying in the district. (Reaves_19)
The new chairman of the Shelby County Commission, Mike Ritz, working with another commissioner, Steve
Mulroy, decided that they would push forward to …. enact a county wide one half-cent sales tax increase.
This is in absolute repudiation of the vote of the county commission back in the spring. .... When
approached by the suburban community, asked whether or not they would be pursuing, as is their right, a
half-cent sales tax increase, the county commission said they would not do that. (SCS Board member_age2)
David Reaves’ blog, August 28, 2012: Was it deceptive? I would say deceptive but brilliant. By waiting on
the large suburban blocks to vote on this ahead of time, the county commission basically removed the most
obstinate part of the voting block. The vote on this county referendum will be all of Shelby County except
for those who have already voted and passed an ordinance. Mainly the cities above will be left out.
(Reaves_21)
(table continues)
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Table 6
Representative Quotes and Events (continued)
Theme 2: Agency (continued)
How the scope of
agency can be
increased

We were without question in active communication with Curry Todd and Mark Norris. … In fact, those of us
who are in elected official capacity of the suburban part of Shelby County, we have a very close relationship
with our suburban mayors. We have a very close relationship with the vast majority of those
representatives and senators who represent that area. (SCS Board member_age3)
Our board actively fought this. ... We, the suburban members who were not given a voice in this process,
actively fought it. The efforts, of course, were made in the legislature to at least have the opportunity to
extend the suburban voice in this process, through Norris-Todd. (SCS Board member_age4)

Theme 3: Power
How power affects the
issue

This was a forced merger. It wasn’t really consolidation vote. Since nobody in the county got to vote. They
didn’t vote to consolidate. We just voted to give up our charter, and forcing merger. (MCS Board
member_pow)
It’s all about control. Voting is all about power. Every relationship is all about power, and it’s who is going
to control it, ok? If you look at the board, just look at the board, look at how the board, there are twentythree of us on the board, you can predict how every vote’s gonna go. Yeah you can predict it. You know you
can. (MCS Board member_pow2)
Commercial Appeal, February 9, 2011: Pickler said the charter surrender is a power grab. “It’s about … in
my opinion, an opportunity to achieve through what I call a hostile surrender, the takeover of one of the
finest school systems in the country and replace it with a board that has a legacy of failure.” (CA_186)
(table continues)
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Table 6
Representative Quotes and Events (continued)
Theme 3: Power (continued)
How power affects the
issue (continued)

People who have wealth have the power. In this community, wealth is equated with power. And they use
that power any way they want to. They use that power to influence the legislators to get laws created to
allow them to do what they want to do. Shelby County Schools, the original Shelby County Schools, wanted
special school district status. We interfered with that by surrendering our charter, but then the law was
created, after the fact, that if our system, special school district, surrenders its charter, then these things
will happen. And the last of these things will happen, the last one to be mentioned, was that … the ban on
special school districts would be lifted in this part of the state, and municipality schools would become
legal. Now, you tell me poor people got that done? So, that’s the power, the power to influence even the
creation of law. (MCS Board member_pow3)
It’s the powers that be in Memphis that surrendered their charter and abandoned their kids, but they want
to come and run ours. …. The same people that sat on the Memphis City board that ran it into the ground
and gave up still think they should be a part of the process. If you’re taken over by a company, all those
people are let go. But those people want to run the ship, and they’ve already proven that they can’t. So,
that’s my biggest issue. (SCS Board member_pow)

How the event affects
power positions

There is an awful lot of folks who believe, in Shelby County, that the people in suburban Shelby County
have really lost the most, that their voice and their influence, while is still is in place because we are able to
negotiate, has been far diminished. (SCS Board member_pow2)
It is a legitimate worry as to who’s on the school board. Now, because Memphis is the largest district, and
… we’re operating by law under one man one vote, representative government and so forth, it is
reasonable to say, “Okay. Well then Memphis will have more representatives than the county.” (TPC
member_pow)
It seems like they’ve turned in their charter, but now, they’re in control of our schools for some reason
instead of trying to model like the school system that did work. (Suburban parent_pow)

(table continues)
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Table 6
Representative Quotes and Events (continued)
Theme 4: Identity
How identities affect
the event

They think Memphians are all bad, and bad parents, and killing each other; and the easterners, they think
the easterners are all snobby. And so, it’s been two populations evolving. (TPC member_ide)
They fool themselves, and they know that they are, but they fool themselves into believing that they are an
excellent school system. And they know that’s not true, but because they have, you know, the people in
Memphis, the people in this county have believed it, because it’s been said so many times, they want to
protect that image. While they are not protecting a truth about academic excellence, if the community can
constantly think they’re great, and the city schools are horrible, then that’s an interest to protect. (MCS
member_ide)
Well, I mean, the African American community, you have a lot of one parent households, and a lot of that’s
due to crime, killing. You know, that’s a cultural thing. You see what I’m saying? The African Americans and
even the Hispanics, you don’t see that as much in the Hispanic community. Hispanic communities, I’ve
noticed, have been real, super, tight knit families, you know. Family means a lot to the Hispanic population,
you know. Kind of the same way with the Orientals and with the White Americans. And, all this money
that’s been pumped in down here to Memphis, for the kids, they’ve never used that money what I call
wisely. Like I said, it goes to all these extravagant things here. That’s the reason why we don’t want to
merge. (Suburban political leader_ide)
Because we have a great school system, ok. Triple A rated every year. How do you take a hundred and eight
thousand kids, put them on forty thousand kids, take a bad system with a hundred and eight, a good
system with forty, put them all together and come up with a good system? Cultural, culturally, they’re
completely different. (Suburban political leader_ide2)

How the event affects
identities

Kriner Cash in his presentation to the transition planning committee, three weeks ago, said that the new
school system would basically reflect Memphis City Schools. … That was basically, you know, the
ramifications of everything that we were saying. (SCS Board member_ide)

(table continues)
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Table 6
Representative Quotes and Events (continued)
Theme 4: Identity (continued)
How the event affects
identities (continued)

People want, they’re scared that by opening up, that automatically standards are gonna decrease, the
success of the district is gonna decrease just by bringing the Memphians. So again, it goes back to “We have
to protect what our brand, our people, our part of, our schools, and we want you to improve too, we just
want you to do it over there, and you figure out how to do it, and let us keep the things our way.” (SCBE
Board member_ide)

Theme 5: Practices and philosophies
How practices and
philosophies affect the
event

I’m worried about that. …. I know that the city schools, their special ed[ucation] program is much larger,
and they have more students. My kids always went to county schools. So, I’m not really sure what the
city…, I’ve heard they have more to offer than the county schools. So, my hope is that they keep everything
and offer it to all the students. (Suburban parent_pra)

How the event affects
practices and
philosophies

If you look at Shelby County, I think historically, we have been, I mean we’re smaller, you know. I think
we’re, if you look at our central office administration, we’re leaner. Our philosophy has been to put as
much of our resources into the classroom with children as we possibly can. And I think that if you were to
look at average class size across the two districts, that there’s a difference there. I know at the high school
level there is, just in my conversations with principals from Shelby County and then from Memphis City, I
know that there’s a difference there. And so I think that that’s something that we’ve gotta look at and
wrestle with and come to some common terms. (SCS Board member_pra)

(table continues)
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Table 6
Representative Quotes and Events (continued)
Theme 6: “What it is that we do”
How “what it is that
we do” affects the
event

Once again, this isn’t about what’s in the best interests of the kids; it’s about trying to get the board to help
a political agenda to hurt, to punish the suburbs because they had the audacity to want to have the right of
self-determination and the right to have, you know, control of the futures of their children. (SCS Board
member_wha)
Neither group wants to feel like the other one is in control, or that they got their way, so we have to try to
find, and realistically, that people feel like they both got something, but nobody got everything. And that’s
really how you reach true compromise. But if the focus is on the achievement of the kids, then I think a lot
of that other stuff dissipates. (SCBE Board member_wha)

How the event affects
“what it is that we do”

My hope is you have a whole new group of leaders emerging, either elected or appointed educators, that
don’t look at it that way, and look at what’s good for the common good. (SCBE Board member_wha2)

Theme 7: Imprints
The past I refer to

I can’t dismiss that social aspect of this work. I cannot dismiss, and I saw the similarities between the Civil
Rights Movements. And people say education was the new civil rights issue. And I’m like, I don’t know why
they keep saying the new “1954 Brown.” I mean, what do you think? The education was then a civil rights
issue. So now people saying “Oh, this is the new”. But, again, it’s, what we’re now chasing is the cultural
shift, right? So it was one thing with Brown, we had to change, chase it because the legal parameters set up
desegregated system, you know. Well now, culturally we just have… (MCS Board member_crm)

How the past affects
the event

Faith in Memphis, LaSimba Gray, March 3, 2011: When I first heard that the Memphis City School Board
was considering surrendering its charter, I thought it was a joke or merely a political chess move. Then
more and more I realized that this was a serious tragedy about to take place; I was in shock and disbelief. I
sent an e-mail to members of the Memphis City School Board. I pointed out the history of the Memphis City
Schools and how African Americans had struggled to get representation on the school board to have a say
in the education of our children. I reminded the board members of the historic contributions of so many
people in the struggle for civil rights and the fact that these people did not give up. (Faith_crm)
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Figure 5. Data Structure
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Ensuring Trustworthiness
To ensure that my analyses met Lincoln and Guba‟s (1985) criteria for
trustworthiness, I worked back and forth between the data and the emerging theory. The
credibility of my findings was ensured through four main strategies. My immersion in the
field allowed me to challenge and assess my findings, both within the research team and
with those involved in Shelby County education. In addition to immersion in the field,
debriefing sessions, and peer scrutiny were employed. A fourth strategy consisted of
triangulating my findings through the use of multiple sources in order to ensure the
dependability and confirmability of my findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Findings
The Actors and Their Interests
On November 22, 2010, Martavius Jones, a member of MCS Board, brought a
resolution to his Board, asking for the relinquishing of the Charter that established MCS.
Jones‟ initiative followed the US midterm elections that, on November 10, 2010, placed
the Republicans in power in both the Tennessee State and House. Such a situation had
been unseen since the end of the Civil War. Therefore, while Memphis, which is
predominantly Democrat, used to benefit from the favors of a Democrat-ruled State,
Jones foresaw in this new political landscape a major threat to the organization of MCS.
Indeed, the predominantly Republican suburban leaders had been seeking special school
district (SSD) status for SCS for decades, but were constrained by a ban that prohibited
the creation of new SSDs and that Democrats were always unwilling to lift. With the
Republicans now politically empowered, the “dream of special school district status for
Shelby County schools” was finally about to become reality (County Commissioner).
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On the one hand, SSD status would have allowed SCS to permanently separate
from MCS. To maintain their level of funding, large cities need to attract new residents
that will bring with them an additional financial flow in the form of taxes. When growth
cannot be achieved through positive migration flows, cities sometimes resort to a process
known as annexation. As such, they diminish the geographic limits of the territories
outside of the City to augment those of the City. Being able to freeze the geographic
boundaries was a key issue for SCS‟ organization as it had often been disturbed by the
City annexing territories in the suburbs. According to David Pickler, Chairman of SCS,
fixing the boundaries of SCS and MCS:
would eliminate the possibility of city and county school consolidation. [Pickler]
said setting permanent boundaries would create greater stability in neighborhoods,
eliminate migration due to the threat of city annexation and allow both boards to
be more effective with long-term planning. (Commercial Appeal, November 30,
2010)
Another potential effect of gaining SSD status, that was apparently much feared
by some members of the MCS Board, was that SCS could be granted taxing authority,
that is, it could raise taxes that would be used to fund suburban schools exclusively.
Pickler, the Chairman of SCS, argued that he and his Board had no intention of seeking
taxing authority.
The intent of Shelby County Schools has never been to move forward with any
plan that would be detrimental to the children of Memphis. … We feel that it is
unfortunate that, in our pursuit of Special School District status, Shelby County
Schools has been unjustly portrayed as an uncaring system. Shelby County
Schools would never pursue any plan that would place Memphis City Schools in
jeopardy and understands that would not be in the best interest of the children in
our community. (SCS Board Meeting Minutes, December 16, 2010)
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On the other hand, some members of MCS foresaw two major problems if SCS
were to gain SSD status. First, and despite Pickler‟s assurances, the possibility of gaining
taxing authority existed, and that could have implied that taxes collected outside of the
City limits would no longer be accessible to MCS (MCS Board member_res2; SCBE
Board member_res). The second problem was one of civil rights. Some actors were
motivated to consolidate, arguing that a permanent separation of MCS and SCS would
create a system of “haves and have nots” that would potentially result in two segregated
school systems with MCS, predominantly black and poor, and SCS whiter and richer
(Towns, Feb 9, 2011; MCS Board member_crm; SCBE Board member_age2; SCS Board
member_res).
While SCS Board members were unanimous in opposing consolidation, a
different scenario unfolded among MCS members. The resolution to surrender the charter
passed, but the votes were strongly divided with five members voting in favor, and four
against. The four members opposing consolidation were primarily concerned with three
issues. First, some members were in favor of a less aggressive way of protecting MCS
funding by negotiating rather than “forcing” consolidation (MCS Board member_pow;
MCS Board member_age3). Second, opponents on the MCS side were concerned by the
fact that MCS had realized major improvements in academic achievement, and were thus
worried that such improvements would be attributed to the consolidated district rather
than to MCS Board.
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My whole concern about this process is just as we‟re getting this whole reform
movement jumpstarted, just as we put in our [new] academies, just as we, we‟re
instituting all these programs, just as we‟re bringing in „pay per performance‟ for
teachers, just as we‟re monitoring teachers‟ ability to raise kids‟ academic
levels… all the stuff that we‟re just putting in, we throw this homunculus
administration into it. So my thinking was “Gosh! What bad timing to try to pull
this off.” (MCS Board member)
The third main argument to oppose consolidation was based on the idea that
African Americans had fought hard to be empowered, and that by surrendering the
charter, they were giving this power back to White Americans, somehow recognizing that
they could not function without them:
We had it, and we said “You take it.” […] Our people believe, typically, that the
white man‟s ice is colder. So, (taking a slave accent) “Mister master, us can run
our schools, but us believe you can run „em better. I know you doesn‟t want us
mister master, but us gonna surrender our charter and us gonna just come sit on
your doorstep mister master, „cause us believe you can do it better than we.” Now
that‟s what it is, and they will never say it, but in effect, that‟s what they‟ve done.
(MCS Board member)
The unanimity among SCS Board members was also reflected among suburban
constituents. From SCS employees to the Mayors of the six cities forming the suburban
areas, up to the State Republican representatives, all were opposed to consolidating with
a system that had gained a reputation for failure (CA_186; Suburban political
leader_ide2). The suburban constituents had various motives to oppose consolidation. A
major argument was that the school district would become too large, and thus
unmanageable. However, SCS already ranked 99th, in terms of enrollment, in a list of
13,629 US school districts (NCES, 2010); Memphis City Schools ranked 22nd. The
consolidated district would become the 14st largest (ASUmag.com, 2010). Maintaining
local control of the schools was the second main motive for opposing consolidation.
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However, this position was somewhat undermined by the opposition to consolidation
even if local control could be assured (Commercial Appeal, February 23, 2012),
something reinforced by my observation of a TPC meeting.
David Pickler asks the mayors: “Would it change your opinion if TPC could come
up with a structure that addresses your concerns, would you consider not going
municipal?” Stan Joyner, Mayor of Collierville, replies “No, because we don‟t
want to lose time waiting for TPC to come up with a plan.” Kenya Bradshaw
insists: “Is there anything that we could include in our plan that would entice you
to be part of the unified system?” Keith McDonald, Mayor of Bartlett and member
of the TPC, replies, “I would never say never, but nothing will change our mind.”
(Field notes, TPC Meeting, Feb 16, 2012)
In fact, it soon became apparent that the main fear for many suburbanites was that they
perceived the quality and reputation of their schools would be diminished by having a
close association with urban schools and their administrators (SCBE Board member_ide;
Suburban political leader_ide; Suburban political leader_ide2; SCS Board member_ide).
The divide among MCS members was also reflected among their constituents.
Most notably, opposition to consolidation came from members of the African American
community who were concerned that their power would be diluted with the consolidation
(Faith_crm). Although the teachers‟ union, Memphis Educational Association (MEA),
claimed that its members opposed consolidation, unionized teachers were actually
divided between those who feared for their jobs, and those who, discontent with the
administration of their schools, were hoping for improved management under SCS. As a
unionized teacher working for MCS explained to us:
When [MCS surrendered its charter], I was, actually a little hopeful. I thought that
Shelby County has a really fine reputation for its ability to administer its policies,
quite a bit of clarity, just hear good things from their administration, so I was
hopeful that through the merger, some of the inconsistencies with our system
would be improved.
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In addition, the City and the County governments, responsible for funding MCS,
were predominantly in favor of consolidating. For the City Council, consolidation
implied the City was removed from its commitment to fund MCS, as provided under
MCS Charter. The County Commission was divided primarily along political lines, but
with a majority of Democrats sitting on the Commission, the votes usually favored the
protection of MCS‟ interests.
MCS and SCS Consolidation Process
This major transformation was punctuated by various key events (see Table 5).
When Martavius Jones brought the resolution to the MCS board on November 22, 2010,
to relinquish MCS charter, there followed a series of actions and counter-actions to either
achieve the goal of consolidating the two school systems or, conversely, to prevent it
from happening.
The charter surrender, voted on by MCS Board, on December 20, 2010, was to be
confirmed by a referendum that was to take place only in the City on March 8, 2011. This
further frustrated the suburbanites who were directly impacted by the consolidation and
yet could not vote (MCS Board member_pow; SCS Board member_pow2). The
referendum asked City residents: “Shall the administration of the Memphis City School
system, a special school district, be transferred to the Shelby County Board of
Education?”
Suburban leaders thus decided that their best option out of this consolidation was
to get the State to intervene, and craft a new law that would stop consolidation (SCS
Board member_age3; SCS Board member_age4). On February 10, 2011, the Norris-Todd
bill was quickly passed, stating that “a comprehensive transition plan shall be developed,
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and the transfer shall take effect at the beginning of the third, full school year
immediately following” the charter surrender referendum. The bill also provided that:
From and after the effective date of the transfer of the administration of the
schools in the special school district to the county board of education, the
restrictions imposed on the creation of municipal school districts, and special
school districts, shall no longer apply in such county. (Amendment No. 1 to
SB0025)
The Norris-Todd bill thus provided the opportunity for suburbanites to maintain
control of their schools by allowing the suburbs to secede from the newly created unified
school district, something previously not permitted under Tennessee law. The reactions
from MCS members varied from those arguing that the Norris-Todd bill could no longer
block MCS‟ access to the suburban tax base (MCS Board member_res2) to those who
considered the bill to be a large step towards re-segregation of the region‟s schools (MCS
Board member_crm; SCBE Board member_age2).
As soon as the bill was presented for vote at the House and the Senate, the County
Commission filed a lawsuit on the grounds that this law was unconstitutional as it would
only apply to Shelby County, and thus contravene the stipulation that new laws cannot be
written for a specific location. Furthermore, the County Commission had another option
if the Judge were to rule the constitutionality of this law: it would file a lawsuit on the
grounds of re-segregation. As a local political leader explained:
[The lawsuit] had two parts to it. One was [appealing against] special legislation
[directed at one locale]…. And then the other is equal protection, or segregation,
re-segregation. We haven‟t argued that yet. That‟s not argued. That‟s been laid
aside. It‟s almost impossible for some of the suburbs to not be totally segregated
systems, because people who live in their communities don‟t look like the city, or
the whole county. That is especially true for Germantown, Collierville, and also,
pretty much for Bartlett. Lakeland and Arlington are almost a hundred percent
white. Millington is the most integrated community.

98

With the referendum overwhelming supporting the merger, the legal maneuvering
became increasingly intense. Samuel Mays‟, the federal judge appointed to oversee the
lawsuits, first action was to decide upon the status of MCS. Given that MCS had
surrendered its charter, the logical path was that the SCS Board would take over the City
schools. Thus, although SCS was reluctant to see its student population triple overnight,
its members were at least assured they would be in control of this consolidated system.
Indeed, what had been voted on was that the MCS administration would be transferred to
SCS, and thus MCS should have legally ceased to exist on the day the City referendum
was taken. However, the Judge saw the issue very differently, and instead, ruled that
given that the student population of this new system was no longer represented by the
members sitting on SCS Board, the Board was unconstitutional. He further ruled that
MCS and SCS would continue to operate until July 1, 2013, the date at which the
consolidation would be completed.
Furthermore, striving to get the parties – MCS, SCS, the City Council, the County
Commission, and the suburban Mayors – to negotiate rather than reverting to legal
proceedings, Mays asked the parties to come back to him with a compromise. To this
end, on August 24, 2011, a Memorandum of Understanding was developed that provided
for the transition process. The parties agreed that during the transition period, the schools
would be run by a unified school board, the Shelby County Board of Education (SCBE),
that would include the seven SCS Board members, the nine MCS Board members, and
seven new members who were to be appointed by the County Commission. In addition,
the TPC was created to conform to the stipulations of the Norris-Todd bill, and develop a
plan for the new unified district.
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The TPC started its work on September 21, 2011. In June 2012, a plan was
finalized and presented to the Commissioner of Education and the School Board. The
SCBE held their first regular meeting on October 25, 2011. The meetings were initially
friendly, somehow like a “honeymoon phase” (MCS Board member; SCS Board
member). However, the dynamics of power had changed and made the decision-making
processes difficult. Indeed, the Board was running with two superintendents, MCS‟ and
SCS‟, instead of one. The SCS and MCS boards had different policies that had now to be
aligned. Most crucially, SCS members became a minority in SCBE, and resented this
situation where MCS members had relinquished their charter and yet, were still in power
with a voting majority (TPC member_pow; Suburban parent_pow; SCS Board
member_pow).
The “honeymoon” phase was short lived, and “the gloves came off,” according to
a Board member (SCS Board member) as soon as November 2011 when the battle over
the transfer of buildings to the MSDs started. If they were to secede from the unified
school district, the six suburban municipalities hoped to obtain free transfer of existing
school buildings. Martavius Jones argued that the buildings should be sold to those
municipalities that wanted to separate. According to him, those buildings had been
funded by the whole community, and thus pertained to the whole community rather than
to specific towns (CA_423).
What they considered a direct attack to their “right to self-determination” (SCS
Board member_wha; SCBE Board member_age) did not stop the suburbanites in their
pursuit for MSDs. They set their own referendum in their respective cities to vote first on
the creation of MSDs, and second, on a sales tax increase to fund those districts. The

100

referenda, held on August 2, 2012 in the six suburban cities, each overwhelmingly
supported breaking away from the unified school district by creating their own MSDs.
However, another obstacle to the suburbanites‟ project came again from the
County Commission. Before initiating the sales tax increase referendum, suburban
leaders first discussed this project with the County Commission to ensure that it had no
intention of taking the same initiative. This was important because as long as only
separate cities were raising a sales tax, the proceeds of such tax could be utilized only in
those cities. However, if the sales tax increase was to be voted throughout the whole
County, the allocation of such revenues would instead be controlled by the County
Commission. The County Commission promised it had no intention of sidetracking
suburbanites‟ efforts (SCS Board member), but did not keep its promise. As a
Councilman Shea Flinn would point:
I find it interesting that the County Commission promised in February that they
would not take this action with the suburban municipalities, but when the city of
Memphis puts it on the ballot they act immediately. (Commercial Appeal, August
13, 2012)
On August 13, 2012, the County Commission voted 7-5 to hold a referendum for
a County-wide sales tax increase. Arguing that they had already passed the sales tax
increase, the County Commission excluded the suburban cities from this referendum,
leaving – again – only Memphis residents with a vote. This unexpected turn of events
infuriated suburbanites who were interpreting this move not only as a new attack on their
independence, but also as another instance in which their voice was rendered mute (SCS
Board member_age2; Reaves_21). Fortunately for suburban residents, the referendum
failed in the City allowing the sales tax to remain within the control of the local City
governments.
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On November 27, 2012, however, Judge Mays ruled that the pursuit of MSDs was
unconstitutional because the Norris-Todd bill – the legislation that lifted the ban on
special and municipal school districts – could apply only to Shelby County. While this
ruling could have been the conclusion of a long battle between opponents and proponents
of the consolidation, suburban leaders did not surrender. Instead, they went back to the
State to discuss their options, most notably to obtain the creation of a bill that this time
would not be repealed on the grounds of its applying to only Shelby County. A bill
allowing the creation of MSDs across the State was signed on April 15, 2013. The
transfer of the buildings on an advantageous basis for the suburban cities, though not
settled at the time of writing, was to be considered by the State legislators too, although
Curry Todd, one of the two sponsors of the bill, claimed that “the bill had no immediate
impact upon the future disposition of school buildings currently owned by Shelby
County” (Memphis Flyer, Apr 15, 2013).
In the next section, I present the various factors that emerged in my data as crucial
for understanding actors‟ reactions to those events. I further analyze how those factors
played a role in shaping those reactions.
Homogeneity and Heterogeneity in a Field
Field Components
Consistent with the view that actors will seek to either maintain or disrupt existing
institutional arrangements (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Scott, 2008; Selznick, 1949),
I sought to identify the antecedents of particular courses of action. Several themes
emerged as main components of a field, or more exactly as the rules that guide the ways
in which those field components are to be understood (see Figure 5): resources (what
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resources are and how they are to be distributed), agency (who the agents are and what
they can and cannot do), power (who has power and why), identity (how actors are
categorized), practices and philosophies (what actors ought to do, how, and why), and
“what it is that we do” (the very purpose of the field). I note that the order in which
I present these themes does not have any specific significance. However, the relevant
emphases accorded to each theme varied according to the position of the actor.
There is widespread agreement that actors fight over scarce resources (Bourdieu
& Wacquant, 1992; Brint & Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 1991). My findings indicate that
resources were the most central issue for the consolidation proponents (SCS Board
member_res; MCS Board member_res; SCBE Board member_res), some even arguing
that consolidation was only about resources:
The fight is not about surrendering their charter. The fight is about how that
money is gonna be split. It‟s about resources. (State Rep. Joe Towns, February 9,
2011 TNReport.com)
In fact, suburban actors did point to the importance of resources too, but their approach to
resources was strikingly different from MCS actors. They tied resources to their
philosophical approach to education. As two opponents of consolidation explained to us,
Our philosophy is that every one of our 51 schools should have the best resources
that we can provide, the best teachers that we can provide, because why in the
world would you send a message to 90 percent of your children that you don‟t
deserve the very best that we have? And so, that‟s a philosophical difference.
(SCS Board member)
The Memphis City Schools, they build fancier schools with big auditoriums, and a
lot more frills in them. … So there is a difference in the view of the value of
money. (Suburban political leader)
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Actors‟ actions and reactions were also concerned with their agency, that is, their
ability to act upon existing arrangements, or, conversely, with how they could constrain
their opponents‟ agency. The original pursuit of SSD status by SCS was a means to
circumvent the effects of future annexations, and to maintain suburbanites‟ ability to
control their schools. Subsequent counter-actions were undertaken aimed at blocking
these efforts. Among these were the Charter surrender (MCS Board member_age),
attempts at discouraging the suburban cities from creating their own MSD with threats
that the cost of the buildings would jeopardize their projects (CA_423;MCS Board
member_bui; Reaves_19), the County Commission‟s decision to hold a referendum for a
sales tax increase as a means to prevent the suburban cities from being the sole benefiters
of the sales tax increase they had voted on (Reaves_21; SCS Board member_age2), and
the various lawsuits aimed at preventing the creation of a SSD or MSDs (SCBE Board
member_age2; SCS Board member_age).
Power, defined here as the ability to influence the allocation of resources
(Lawrence, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), was also a dominant theme (MCS Board
member_pow2). The issue of power, though, was predominantly used by suburbanites
who interpreted the attempt to consolidate as a strategy of MCS to increase their power
(CA_186).
Another theme that emerged as important was identity. This theme was elaborated
on by suburban leaders as they stressed the challenges of merging two systems that were
culturally and socially “too different” (TPC member_ide; Suburban political leader_ide;
Suburban political leader_ide2). On the MCS side, identity was also addressed, but it was
done on two grounds. First, there were those who argued that SCS wanted permanent
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separation from MCS to ensure they would not have to merge with a system that was
predominantly African American and poor, and thus interpreted SCS‟ behaviors from a
discriminative perspective (SCBE Board member_age). As a member of the MCS Board
would indicate:
Freezing the boundaries doesn‟t mean people can‟t move into those boundaries,
but I think they thought somehow that will stop the growth. I mean, because their
numbers are, they are almost majority minority. There are only about 30% African
American, but there‟s a lot of Latino citizens, and so, they are like 46% minority
at this point, but there‟s still only about 35% economically disadvantaged. So
there‟s still majority white, majority middle class.
Others tried to show that SCS and MCS were not as different as widely argued (MCS
member_ide).
Practices and philosophies, that is, “how we ought to do education,” were also a
key concern among my informants. There was widespread concern that practices that had
become established in each district would vanish under the influence of the merger
(SCBE Board member_wha). I note though that this was more an issue for SCS than for
MCS as the former was no longer holding the voting majority necessary to have a strong
influence on SCBE policies and practices (TPC member_pow).
Finally, “What it is that we do” was a recurrent theme, but my data show that this
theme was raised predominantly by members who were new to the unified board, as well
as by the TPC members (SCBE Board member_wha; SCBE Board member_wha2). In
fact, whenever a controversial issue was brought to the TPC, its chairman, Barbara
Prescott, would constantly remind the TPC members that the issue should be viewed
from the lens of “How does that improve education? How does that help the children?”
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(Field notes, TPC meeting, October 27, 2011, January 19, 2012; Commercial Appeal,
October 28, 2011).
While these themes emerged as dominant in my analyses, events were interpreted
differently by different actors depending on the lens they used. For instance, charter
surrender was viewed as an issue of power (CA_186; MCS Board member_pow2),
resources (SCS Board member_res; MCS Board member_res; MCS Board member_res2;
SCBE Board member_res), identity (SCS Board member_ide; TPC member_ide; SCBE
Board member_ide), practices and philosophies (SCS Board member_pra; Suburban
parent_pra), agency (MCS Board member_age; MCS Board member_age2), and “what it
is that we do” (SCS Board member_wha; SCBE Board member_wha). The next section
provides insights into the significance of this observation.
How Actors Make Sense of an Event
My data suggest that there are particular characteristics of the context in which
events unfurl that have the potential to explain how actors make sense of an event. First,
I found that a key aspect of actors‟ understanding of an event stemmed from how they
viewed their position in the field. In a previous paper, I found that the way actors access
resources and use them to alter existing institutional arrangements follows a four-step
sequence of what I termed “institutional empowerment.” In the first stage, actors are
concerned with accessing critical resources; when they do so, they become active
members of the field. In the second stage, actors are concerned with accessing
competitive resources; when they do so, they gain a leadership position in the field. In the
third stage, actors reinforce or alter existing standards used to evaluate resources in order
for the resources they possess in abundance over other actors to become viewed as the
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most valuable. Stage four sees dominant actors changing how actors within a field should
be categorized, something that allows them to control the allocation of resources.
My data suggest that those actors who understood they were in stage four
perceived the events as an identity and a power issue. This is extremely consistent with
my model of institutional empowerment where stage four consist of changing the ways in
which actors are categorized – identity, which affects the ways in which resources are
allocated – power. As a result, once positioned at this stage, actors were concerned with
protecting their position, primarily by defining how identity should be interpreted (SCBE
Board member_ide) – in this case urban versus suburban identities – and power allocated
(TPC member_pow) – which ultimately follows how actors are categorized. A second
group emerged that perceived the events through their understanding that they were still
at the second stage of the process of institutional empowerment. Here, the actors were
primarily concerned with resources (Joe Towns, February 9, 2011; MCS Board
member_res2; SCBE Board member_res).
Finally, as the events developed, and the suburbanites felt they were losing their
influence on proceedings, it is their very membership in the field they perceived was
threatened. They were then effectively moving back to the first stage of the process of
institutional empowerment, and their main concern then became one of agency. Most
notably, suburban actors felt they had “no voice” (SCS Board member_pow2; SCS Board
member_age2; SCS Board member_age4), that they were “disenfranchised” (SCS Board
member).
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While actors‟ understandings of their position in the field help explain how they
made sense of ongoing events, it does not explain why suburbanite‟s reactions were
converging whereas those in the City had competing positions. The next two sections
shed light on this phenomenon.
Factors Shaping Homogeneity
Actors‟ understanding of their position in the process of institutional
empowerment was crucial in shaping the way in which they made sense of events. It also
had implications for whether reactions were homogenous or, conversely, heterogeneous
among specific groups. For example, in attempting to secure SSD status, leaders of SCS
understood events based on a perception that they were positioned at the last stage of
institutional empowerment. This led to a focus on issues that would affect their identity
and power position (SCBE Board member_ide; Suburban political leader_ide; Suburban
political leader_ide2; TPC member_pow).
However, as soon as their actions to realize separate school systems were
overturned – most notably when Judge Mays ruled the creation of MSDs
unconstitutional, and it was becoming clear that they would be absorbed in a merged
system where their power and voice would be diluted, suburbanites then viewed the
events through the lens of “disenfranchised” actors, and their concern became primarily
one of agency (SCS Board members; Suburban political leaders; Suburban parents). In
fact, homogeneity in the suburbs was such that SCS‟ actions and reactions were
sometimes referred to as their association with a single man, David Pickler:
Mr. Clayton expressed his thanks for the time and effort on everyone‟s part and
expressed his displeasure in the references from the media regarding the “Pickler”
plan. This is the Shelby County Board of Education plan. All Board members
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voted on the legislative agenda and support of special school districts, not only
one Board member. (SCS Minutes, Dec 16, 2010, p. 8)
Factors Shaping Heterogeneity
While suburban actors displayed a striking homogeneity in their reactions, those
representing MCS interests were extremely divided. My data show two main processes
that explain this phenomenon. First, actors did not have a consistent understanding of the
stage at which they were located in the process of institutional empowerment. Some
viewed the events from the lens of their being located at stage two; others viewed the
events from the lens of stage four. As a result of these divergent perceptions, the meaning
that events had were also heterogeneous.
Second, while the direction of causality is difficult to ascertain, the role of
imprinting in this relationship, which emerged as a recurrent theme in my data (see
Figure 5), was also central to understanding actors‟ courses of action. Stinchcombe
(1965) introduced the concept of imprinting to organizational research, describing how
organizations take on elements of their founding environment and how these elements
persist well beyond their founding phase.
My data reveal that those actors who understood they were located at the second
stage of institutional empowerment, and were concerned with accessing resources, used
to refer to either the aftermath of the Civil War, or to the segregation era (see Table 7).
During these periods, the main concern for the African American community was to
access the same resources as their White counterparts. Therefore, actors‟ reference to
these epochs is consistent with their emphasis on resources.
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Table 7
Imprints, Actors, and Field Components
Imprints

Stage of
institutional
empowerment

Actors’ Main
Field
Component

Representative Quote

The creation of
MCS

Stage 1

“What it is that
we do”

Memphis getting its charter to offer better schools than the rural areas.
(MCS Board member_cha)

The post-Civil War

Stage 2

Resources

The state of Tennessee should want to be providing the best education
for its citizens compared to any other state in the Union. (MCS Board
member_sla)

The Civil Rights
Movements

Unfinished
Stage 4

Agency-Identity

Damn it! We’re not sitting back listening, taking this same anymore. ….
Again, us being very passive. And, you know, I do have this theory that,
kind of subconsciously, and, and it comes, my parents for certain, you
know, my parents grew up in Jim Crow Memphis, so let me get the
background, and I used to be frustrated by what I saw is that if a white
man said it, then it must be right, believe him. But then when I learnt
more and understood what Jim Crow was, I see why my parents who are
in their seventies think that, but, subconsciously I see that in some of our
leadership too. (MCS Board member_crm)

The Civil Rights
Movements

Failed Stage 4

ResourcesPower

The schools in the ghetto were educating children to be successful, and it
didn’t matter what the people in the private schools were doing, what
the people in the suburbs were doing, because the teachers in the inner
city, typically loved those kids. They corrected them when they needed
correcting, and they had a vested interest. Because most of the time, the
teacher and the student looked alike, and they came from the same
background. Well, integration did a job on us. This whole dream of, if I
can somehow go to school with white kids, or my kids can be with white
kids, we’re finding now that it only worked up to a point. ‘Cause now
we’re right back where we were, literally, literally the schools are
segregated, period, period, period. (MCS Board member_crm2)
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Other actors referred to the Civil Rights Movement (CRM), but they did so in
three various ways. The CRM was referred to as the key development that gave power to
the African American (Faith_crm), but also as an unfinished battle that needed to
continue to be effective (MCS Board member_crm; Table 7, MCS Board member_crm),
or as a failed movement (Table 7, MCS Board member_crm2). These three different
perspectives had the effect of actually opposing actors who were rallying around the
same civil rights ideology and yet had a different understanding of whether the CRMs
had been a success, a failure, or needed to be continued (see Table 7). This had further
implications on which field component actors were emphasizing (see Table 7).
Interestingly then, imprinting interacted with actors‟ understandings of their
positioning in the process of institutional empowerment, which, in turn, had a direct
effect on how they made sense of the various events. Furthermore, my data showed that
imprinting was much more prevalent among those who related the flaws of existing
institutional arrangements to the history of the field (MCS Board members).
Discussion and Conclusion
I introduced this work by arguing that a central concept of fields, as developed by
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), was the potential to better understand the reactions of
organizations to institutional pressures. While this view has been regularly revisited with
studies showing that organizations in the same field may exhibit more heterogeneity than
theorized by DiMaggio and Powell (e.g., D‟Aunno et al., 1991; Greenwood et al., 2010;
Kraatz & Block, 2008), I extend our understanding by examining why field members
behave in particular ways.

111

I carried out a narrative analysis of a major transformation that took place in
Shelby County as MCS and SCS initiated a merger. I looked at which of the events that
punctuated this change process triggered reactions among those affected by the
consolidation. In so doing, I am able to contribute to our understanding of how fields are
structured, and which factors are likely to create homogeneity or heterogeneity of
responses to particular events. I contribute to institutional theory in four major ways.
The Components of a Field
First, I contribute to field theory by identifying which components contour the
boundaries of a field, and stress their varying importance for field members. I did so as
I asked field members what they thought was deemed protecting. This is important
because, while boundary defining processes are amongst the most important subjects
confronting organizational theorists (Scott & Davis, 2007, p. 251), the concept of a field
still suffers from major definitional and conceptual issues (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012;
Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006; Sewell, 1992; Thornton et al., 2012). Most notably, a
sound conceptualization of fields is crucial to understand reproduction and change
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Sewell, 1992), and has key implications regarding the
comparability of organizations (Thornton et al., 2012).
My work adds to current understandings of fields by highlighting the elements
that structure them, and thus those elements over which actors are likely to struggle.
While there is a widespread argument that fields are “arenas of struggles” in which actors
compete over resources (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Brint & Karabel, 1991; Fligstein,
1991), other studies show that field members are also concerned with their power
position (Beckert, 1999; Lawrence, 1999; Lawrence et al., 2012), their identity
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(Abrahamsson et al., 2011; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Seo &
Creed, 2002), and their practices (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott et al., 2000; Tolbert &
Zucker, 1983). However, my work shows that none of these views is complete as actors
emphasize differing dimensions as they struggle over different issues.
Essentially, my data indicate that what actors are more concerned with protecting
or altering are the rules regarding agency (who the agents are and what they can and
cannot do), power (who has power and why), resources (what resources are and how they
are to be distributed), identity (how actors are categorized), practices and philosophies
(what actors ought to do, how, and why), and the very reason for the existence of the
field, that is, “what it is that we do.” By attending to all of these dimensions, rather than
focusing on one or another individually, I am able to show that the importance of field
components varies across actors. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) argue, “We expect that
actors will tend to see the moves of others from their own perspective in the field”
(p. 11). This point suggests that actors‟ view of “what is at stake” (Fligstein & McAdam,
2012) is likely to vary. However, the authors also indicate that the factors determining
such variance are still ill-understood. According to them, “dominant or incumbent actors
will have a frame of reference that encapsulates their self-serving view of the field, while
dominated or challenger actors will adopt/fashion an „oppositional‟ perspective”
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 11).
My work further disentangles the issue associated with the common view that
fields revolve around incumbents and challengers who have an “oppositional
perspective,” or who compete over scarce resources (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Brint
& Karabel, 1991). Indeed, my findings indicate that actors often do not perceive
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themselves engaged within the same arenas of struggle within a field. Rather,
disadvantaged actors are more likely to fight over resources, whereas their more
advantaged counterparts vie to protect their identity. This leads me to my second
contribution.
How Field Members Make Sense of Events
My work makes a second contribution to institutional theory by shedding light on
why actors react to institutional pressures. Most notably, I show which factors affect
actors‟ meaning-making of an event. The common definition of an event revolves around
its “exceptionality,” with Nigam and Ocasio (2010) defining events as “contextually
dramatic happenings that focus sustained attention and invite the collective definition and
redefinition of social issues,” (p. 823; see also Sewell, 1996). My work provides a
different view of events whereby a happening becomes an event only when it represents a
threat to some valued component of the field. For example, during the period of this
study, the State had been debating various new dispositions which had the potential to
radically transform the way education is delivered – essentially by developing vouchers,
charter and virtual schools. While most actors in my study acknowledged the importance
of these issues on affecting public education, these were not raised as the most important
events occurring throughout the consolidation process. Rather, actors were concerned
with those events that had the potential to alter what they considered the most important
component of the field.
Furthermore, my findings suggest that which field component actors perceived as
important depended on their understandings of their position in the field. By position,
I mean the stage at which actors are located in their process of institutional
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empowerment, a model that I developed in a previous work, and which highlights four
stages that actors follow as they draw on existing institutional rules and subsequently
alter them. Some actors understood they were located at stage four; they were
predominantly perceiving the events through the lens of identity, and were thus
concerned with those events that had the potential to alter the rules defining who the
actors were and how they were categorized. A second group of actors was particularly
reactive to those events that had the potential to affect their access to resources, and
perceived its position as a stage two. Interestingly, those who were new to the field, and
whose position was not yet defined, tended to perceive the events from the lens of “what
it is that we do,” that is, the very raison d’être of the field.
My findings thus support Abrahamsson et al.‟s (2011) view that an event has
different meanings. However, they argue that because of the variety of meanings
associated with the same event, it is impossible to generalize the relationship between
events and subsequent reactions. My work provides means to predict how actors will
react to events as I uncover a determining factor that shapes actors‟ meanings of, and
subsequently reactions to, events, namely, their position in the process of institutional
empowerment. Actors‟ understandings of their position in the field further helps to
explain when reactions to events will likely be homogenous or heterogeneous. This leads
me to my third contribution.
Actors’ Positions and Homogeneity versus Heterogeneity
The third contribution consists of expanding current debates over whether actors‟
behaviors are homogenous (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), or
conversely, heterogeneous (D‟Aunno et al., 1991; Greenwood et al., 2010; Kraatz &
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Block, 2008). Neo-institutional theory shows the extraordinary homogenization of
organizational forms and reactions to institutional pressures as organizations vie for
legitimacy. This focus on legitimacy has been criticized for its dismissal of questions of
power and interests (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Selznick, 1996). My work addresses
this shortcoming as I uncover a factor that has the potential to explain both convergence
and divergence in reactions to institutional pressures.
My work suggests that whether actors will display convergent or divergent
reactions depends on their understandings of their position in the process of institutional
empowerment. Reactions among SCS members were strikingly similar as there was
widespread understanding they were in phase four. Conversely, MCS members did not
share a common position. Some MCS actors viewed the events from the lens of resources
as they understood they were located at stage two. Other MCS members were concerned
with identity and power issues as they understood they were located at stage four.
As I uncover this factor, I also bring new insights into the social construction of
actors‟ positions, and the implications of such phenomenon on creating variance in field
members‟ behaviors and reactions. Indeed, actors‟ positions in a field are a determining
factor in institutionalization processes as they shape actors‟ meanings of what is going in
the field (Battilana, 2006; Bourdieu, 1990; Fligstein, 1997; Leblebici et al., 1991). While
actors‟ positions are often seen as dichotomies, such as incumbents and challengers
(Fligstein, 1997; Gamson, 1975; Hensmans, 2003), defenders and prospectors (FoxWolfgramm, Boal, & Hunt, 1998), or peripheral versus central actors (Eisenstadt, 1968;
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Mensal, 1960), my findings suggest that actors‟ positions
are in fact plural, dependent upon which of the four stages in the process of institutional
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empowerment actors are located at. This is important because a dichotomous view of
field members is likely to oversimplify our understanding of the process of institutional
change and its characteristic struggles. Indeed, while MCS was the challenger to existing
institutional arrangements, and was opposed to SCS, within MCS, members were also
conflicting as they had divergent views of their positions in the field. Furthermore, as my
work takes seriously the history of the field and the associated embeddedness of its
members, I am able to make a fourth contribution.
Imprinting and Meaning-Making of Events
My work makes a fourth contribution as I provide new insights into the
importance of imprinting in shaping actors‟ meanings. Stinchcombe (1965) explained
imprinting by documenting how elements prominent at their founding maintain a strong
influence in the life course of an organization. Imprinting is thus a process that occurs
during a defined “sensitive period” of time (Immelmann, 1975), and which leaves an
enduring influence, or imprint, on the organization‟s behaviors. While the concept has
received some attention (e.g., Baron & Newman, 1990; Chandler, 1977; Johnson, 2007;
Marquis & Huang, 2010), much work remains to be done in this area. Indeed, Marquis
and Tilcsik (2013) lament that “simply recognizing that history matters is of little help
unless we understand how it matters” (p. 230). My work addresses this call.
My findings are consistent with Johnson‟s (2007, p. 33) view that “imprinting
processes emerge from intersections of multiple conditions,” and with the view that
organizations are likely to be influenced by multiple “sensitive periods.” In particular,
I demonstrate how these periods are likely to shape the mental structures of its members
in various ways.
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Memphis‟ history has been punctuated by slavery, the Civil War, the abolition of
slavery, the legalization of racial segregation, civil rights struggles, and the desertion of a
significant proportion of its white population as African Americans gained access to
power in the City. All these periods were reflected in my data as MCS members made
sense of ongoing events. However, some referred to the post-Civil War era, a time during
which African American schools were endowed with fewer resources than their White
counterparts, and were thus concerned with resources. Others referred to the segregation
era when discrimination against African Americans was legally established, and were
attentive to identity issues. The CRM era was perceived from three different perspectives:
the key development that gave power to African Americans, an unfinished battle that
needed to continue to be effective, or a failed movement. These different views further
determined which field component actors were emphasizing as deemed protecting.
These periods had sweeping implications for how actors viewed the ongoing
issues, and most importantly for how they focused their attention on a particular field
component. As such, my findings address Marquis and Tilcsik‟s (2013) call for
examining the existence of multiple imprints, something they argue stands as a major
shortcoming of current research (p. 226). In addition, I show how history matters, rather
than simply showing that it matters as I stress the potential for imprints to interact with
actors‟ attention to a specific component of the field, and how this process ultimately
shapes actors‟ meanings of ongoing events.
Implications for Research and Practice
While I identified six components that contour the boundaries of a field, my
findings are limited to a specific context and an extraordinary event. As such, there may
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be other components that stand as important in other settings. However, by identifying
the components of a field, I provide a means to examine whether change has taken place,
and where it has taken place. Future research could examine whether radical change, that
is, change from one archetype to another (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988, 1993), depends
on the alteration of any single component, or a combination of components, and whether
the timing or sequence of change matters.
My findings suggest identity to be a key component in field change. Shelby
County Schools‟ members, while also concerned with other aspects of the field, were
predominantly vying to protect their identity, something that I showed led them to
attempt to radically transform the field. Further, this argument is consistent with other
works that showed how threats to organizational identity have the potential to trigger
substantial conflicts (Abrahamsson et al., 2011; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Dutton &
Dukerich, 1991). Thus, future research could examine which component of the field,
once altered, is most likely to dramatically affect the whole “configuration” (Greenwood
& Hinings, 1988).
My work has a second implication for research on institutional change. As I show
that actors‟ positions are more plural than previously theorized, future research could
examine whether homogeneity is more likely among incumbents than among challengers.
My findings suggest that incumbents were more cohesive because they had the same
understanding of their position in the process of institutional empowerment. Conversely,
MCS, the challengers to the status quo, displayed heterogeneous reactions as their
understandings of their position varied across members. Future research could examine
whether those findings generalize to other settings.
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Chapter 4
Power and Institutional Logics in Institutional Change

Institutional logics are “the socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural
symbols and material practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which
individuals and organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and
space, and reproduce their lives and experiences” (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012,
p. 2). An institutional logic such as the family, religion, state, market, profession or
corporation (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2), effects which practices and organizing
principles people deem appropriate (Washington & Ventresca, 2004). For instance,
Battilana and Dorado (2010) show that organizations‟ emphasis on either a development
or a banking logic then determined the ways in which they developed a different view of
microfinancing. Generally then, studies building on an institutional logics perspective
attend to which logic dominates within a social order, and show that radical change
proceeds through the alteration or replacement of such logic (Rao et al., 2003), or the
hybridization of various existing logics (Mars & Lounsbury, 2009; Murray, 2010).
More importantly, the institutional logics perspective is a welcome attempt at
bridging early neo-institutionalism, which was primarily characterized by its focus on the
influence of institutions on organizational behaviors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker,
1977), and recent views that tend to place agency as a key factor of institutional change
(DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire et al., 2004). Indeed, because “the institutional logics
perspective has the capacity to motivate and guide research questions at both the micro
and macro levels of analysis” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2), it further has the potential to

120

explicate how actors and institutions shape each, and thus to disentangle the longstanding
agency versus structure problem (Giddens, 1984; Heugens & Lander, 2009; Reed, 1997;
Sewell, 1992).
In addition, studies building on an institutional logics perspective increasingly
acknowledge that shifts in logics are accompanied with shifts in power relations (Mantere
& Vaara, 2008; Scott et al. 2000). For instance, Thornton and Ocasio (1999) show that a
shift from an editorial to a market logic in the higher-education publishing sector
profoundly altered executive power and succession. Greenwood et al. (2010) show how
Spanish firms are influenced by both regional state logics and family logics, and thus
provide key insights into how the blending of these various logics, located at different
levels of the social structure, generate variance in power relations. However, missing in
these studies is an explicit attention to power: How does power allow a specific logic to
become dominant? How do institutional logics shape power relations? Ultimately, the
question remains to understand which of the logics or power relations are altered first,
something that, to this date, has only been marginally considered, and albeit in the form
on an untested hypothesis (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 346).
In fact, given their shared concern for addressing the agency versus structure
problem, it is surprising that the institutional logics perspective does not more strongly
build on Clegg‟s (1989) and Lawrence‟s (2008) view of power as either episodic or
systemic. Episodic power is usually manifested across discrete periods, initiated by selfinterested actors (Clegg, 1989). By contrast, systemic power “works through routine,
ongoing practices to advantage particular groups without those groups necessarily
establishing or maintaining those practices,” thus reflecting power that is structurally
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and/or systemically embedded (Lawrence, 2008, p. 174). While Thornton et al. (2012)
regret that “the most salient critique of the institutional logics perspective is its treatment
of the concept of power” (p. 64), I contend that studies using an institutional logics
approach as well as attending to these two forms of power could be well positioned to be
mutually informative.
More precisely, studies building on institutional logics show how broad social
changes create momentum in a field as contradictions between the field dominant logic
and the broad environment become exposed (Rao et al., 2003; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).
Such insights are fundamentally missing in Clegg‟s (1989) framework as it is limited to
explicating the working of power at the intraorganizational level, and thus cannot explain
how broad social changes can affect the organization‟s power systems (top down
process), or how the actions taken by organizational members can affect higher levels
(bottom up process).
Similarly, the institutional logics literature could benefit from building on Clegg‟s
(1989) theory as it is particularly attentive to the microprocesses that support a change
program, something that is crucially lacking. Indeed, the question of how a logic becomes
dominant is still in need for clarification (Brown, Ainsworth, & Grant, 2012; Cloutier &
Langley, 2013). Furthermore, it is still unclear why certain logics are more resilient than
others (Mars & Lounsbury, 2009; Thornton et al., 2012), something that Clegg‟s (1989)
framework could explain as being directly related to the power systems in place as these
ultimately determine the actions that are deemed legitimate in a field. However, because
empirical research examining this assumption is rare (Lawrence et al., 2012), there is
much work to be done to address this question.
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Therefore, my work is an attempt to uncover the interactions between episodic
and systemic power in the production of radical change, and to understand how these
interactions further relate to existing institutional logics. I thus address two main
questions. First, when and why do actors engage in episodes of power consistent with
their logics, and, conversely, when do they depart from their logics? Second, if
institutional logics are linked to certain power structures (Greenwood et al., 2010;
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), to what extent do such structures constrain or facilitate
agency?
Building on an inductive, interpretive, case analysis of a major change in the
educational field in Shelby County, Tennessee, I address these questions and thus
contribute to institutional theory in three major ways. First, I shed light on the
microprocesses supporting the introduction of a new institutional logic. I thus broaden the
scope of institutional logics studies by showing how radical change can proceed through
the introduction of an entirely new logic rather than from the blending of various existing
logics (Batillana & Dorado, 2010), or from the winning of one of two competing logics
(Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Second I contribute to our understanding
of the role of power in institutional change by theorizing a link between institutional
logics and power. While episodic and systemic power are theorized as iteratively shaping
each other (Clegg, 1989; Lawrence, 2008), my findings provide a more nuanced view
whereby the relationship between episodic and systemic power varies depending on
whether the championing of a logic unfolds at the meso- or macro-level of a field.
Finally, I make a third contribution by showing that certain logics and their associated
power structures are more resilient than others. Most notably, my findings indicate how
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research in cultural anthropology showing how cultures vary in their tolerance to
deviance from norms (Pelto, 1968) may be helpful in shedding light on the extent to
which institutional logics and power structures vary, and how such variance may
ultimately shape actors‟ scope of agency (Sewell, 1992).
Power and Institutional Logics during Institutional Change
Institutionalists have recently responded to critics of earlier, overly deterministic,
approaches that viewed institutions as a key factor in social and organizational stability
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). While these studies focused on the effects of
institutions on organizational behaviors, current institutional analyses now tend to overemphasize institutions as effects at the expense of attention to institutions as a cause
(Hwang & Colyvas, 2011). This is problematic because understanding processes of
institutionalization and de-institutionalization requires attention to the interactive and
iterative relationship between actors and institutions (Bartlett et al., 2011; Clegg, 1989;
Giddens, 1984). As a result, the process of institutionalization is still high up on the
agenda of required institutional research (Suddaby, 2010).
Dorado (2005) indicates that a solution to bridge the early deterministic view of
institutional theory with current voluntaristic approaches lies in recognizing the
constraining as well as enabling nature of institutions, which primarily implies a view of
power as embedded in existing institutions as well as being susceptible to being utilized
by interested actors (Stinchcombe, 1968). More than two decades ago, Clegg (1989)
offered such a solution in the form of a framework that highlights the working of
different types of power in the production of organizing. The author identified three
types, or „circuits,‟ of power – the episodic circuit, the dispositional circuit, and the
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facilitative circuit, and showed how the interaction between these three forms of power
can either empower or disempower actors and institutions. This framework has been
prominently used by institutionalists, albeit in a reduced form that focuses on two forms
of power that reflect either agency or structure.
As mentioned earlier, episodic power is a manifestation of agency, and systemic
power reflects the existing social structure (Clegg, 1989). While examination of how
these two forms of power interact is crucial to understanding processes of
institutionalization (Clegg, 1989; Lawrence et al., 2012), such examinations are crucially
missing. Indeed, studies building on Clegg‟s (1989) work have been either predominantly
theoretical (Hardy, 1994; Lawrence, 2008), or exclusively focused on the working of
episodic power in change processes (Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971;
Pfeffer, 1981). Empirical studies examining systemic power are rare though (cf. Déjean
et al., 2004), as well as studies assessing Clegg‟s (1989) circuit of power (Davenport &
Leitch, 2005; Lawrence et al., 2012).
Lawrence et al.‟s (2012) study provides keys insights regarding the interaction of
episodic and systemic power in the production of radical change. These two mechanisms
not only explain how each form of power works to foster radical change, but also how
each mechanism feeds the other in a recursive fashion. Indeed, the first mechanism
identified by the authors consists of the contextualization of changes to authority. Here,
episodic power is found to be “more effective in initiating radical change when it is based
on new authority structures that depart significantly from traditional structures and are
legitimated with reference to traditional values” (Lawrence et al., 2012, p. 134). The
second mechanism, legitimation of systems changes, refers to systemic power, which, the
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authors argue, requires the support of a persuasive language from legitimate actors
(Lawrence et al., 2012, p. 134). While these findings are crucial for our understanding of
the processes lying behind institutional change, it also provides several avenues of
development.
First, the „contextualization of changes of authority‟ provides support for the
argument that institutional change most likely does not occur in a vacuum (Deephouse &
Suchman, 2008; Weber & Glynn, 2006), but rather, is either facilitated or hindered by the
very institutional order that is to be altered (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). However, this
mechanism leaves open a key question: how are institutional arrangements, by their very
nature, either facilitative or constraining? In fact, institutional orders vary in the extent to
which they allow actors to act upon them (Sewell, 1992; Thornton et al., 2012); but given
our lack of understanding of such phenomenon, this question remains pertinent (Dorado,
2005).
A second avenue of development concerns the relationship between episodic and
systemic power in contexts other than intra-organizational change (Davenport & Leitch,
2005). Examining how the mechanisms identified by Lawrence et al. (2012) apply to
inter-organizational settings, as well as to reproduction rather than change would be
particularly welcome given the dearth of studies in this area (Davenport & Leitch, 2005).
Uncovering such mechanisms could further illuminate our understanding of the dynamics
of power and changes in institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012). Indeed, while the link
between institutional logics and power is made more and more explicit as research in this
area is accumulating evidence that a shift in logics is likely to impact existing power
arrangements (Greenwood et al. 2010; Scott et al. 2000; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999),
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Thornton et al. (2012) argue that “The limits of the strong claim that power is culturally
contingent are relatively unexamined” (p. 65) across various contexts.
Institutional logics are thus fundamentally cultural (Friedland & Alford, 1991),
providing a lens through which meanings are shaped, and “organizing principles” or
“guidelines for practical action” developed (Rao et al., 2003, p. 795). Studies using an
institutional logics approach find that a field is likely organized around a dominant logic
(Washington & Ventresca, 2004). As such, radical change consists of the replacement of
the dominant logic by competing logics introduced by interested actors (Lounsbury,
2002; Thornton, 2002). Other studies find that another phenomenon underlying radical
change occurs as, rather than a shift in logics, two competing logics co-evolve either in
antinomy (Lounsbury, 2007), or even collaboratively (Reay & Hinings, 2009). Finally,
scholars have been able to show that as actors compete for their logics, such pressures for
change may ultimately result in the blending, or hybridization, of these logics (Mars &
Lounsbury, 2009; Murray, 2010).
I note that these studies tend to build on the common problematic that has been
unaddressed in institutional theory, the elaboration of the incumbent versus challenger
model (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Gamson, 1975). This is problematic in two major
ways. First, the incumbent versus challenger model may overlook the role of other actors
whose interests are shared neither by incumbents nor by challengers. If struggles take
place over two competing logics, it may be interesting to understand what happens for
those interests that are not represented by either one of these logics. Second, I contend
that moving away from the incumbent versus challenger model may help to uncover how
institutional logics become dominant, something that has been strongly called for
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(Greenwood et al., 2010; Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006). Various studies have stressed
that fields are organized around multiple logics (Dunn & Jones, 2010), and that each
logic will vie for dominance. As such, the processes and contextual factors that lead to
the dominance of a specific logic requires further explanation.
A second caveat in studies building on an institutional logics perspective lies in
their appreciation of power (Thornton et al., 2012), something that I contended earlier
could be overcome by utilizing Clegg‟s (1989) and Lawrence‟s (2008) view of power as
either episodic or systemic. Indeed, if existing power systems are more likely reflected in
the dominant logic (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), examining how episodic and systemic
power interact to sustain shifts in institutional logics may further our understanding of
how radical change occurs. In doing so, various key, yet unaddressed, questions may be
addressed, and illuminate both the mechanisms and the context supporting a change in
logics.
First, when and why do actors engage in episodes of power which are consistent
with their respective logics, and conversely, when do they need to depart from their
logics? In fact, because departures from the dominant logic are likely to be sanctioned,
how do actors overcome this obstacle? Do they engage in episodes of power that are
consistent with the competing logic, and as a corollary, inconsistent with the logic they
seek to introduce? Addressing this question may further illuminate the context within
which episodic and systemic power interact to produce change.
Second, given that institutional logics and power structures are related, to what
extent do such structures make institutional logics more or less facilitative of change?
This is particularly important because while institutional logics are fundamentally
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cultural (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Sewell, 1992), and while cultures have been shown to
vary in the extent to which they are amenable to change (Leung, Bhagat, Buchan, Erez, &
Gibson, 2005), we still know little about the cultural features of institutional logics that
make them more or less resilient to change (Thornton et al., 2012). This study aims to
address these questions.
Methods
Contextual Background
My research is based on the consolidation of two school systems, Memphis City
Schools (MCS) and Shelby County Schools (SCS), which was initiated in December
2010. These two school systems had always functioned separately since their creation in
the mid-nineteenth century. Memphis City Schools was serving students residing within
the City; SCS was providing education to children living outside of the City limits, that
is, essentially in the six cities located in the suburbs – Arlington, Bartlett, Collierville,
Germantown, Lakeland, and Millington. The two systems were governed by two
administrations, but they did share common funding, mainly from property taxes
collected throughout the County, and then redistributed to MCS and SCS on the basis of
their number of students.
This co-existence, though, was to be potentially jeopardized as the political
context radically changed in November 2010. At the mid-term elections, the Republicans
gained the majority in the Tennessee House and Senate for the first time since the end of
the Civil War. The leadership of SCS immediately began exploring a long-cherished idea
in the suburbs: the permanent separation from MCS. Shelby County Schools were indeed
interested in gaining Special School District (SSD) status, primarily as a means to
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increase their control over their schools. Memphis City Schools‟ leaders, concerned that
such a separation would potentially cut them off from the suburban property tax base,
almost immediately after the mid-term elections surrendered the charter that maintained
their existence, thus forcing a consolidation of MCS and SCS. The taxes collected in the
suburban areas were indeed crucial for the survival of MCS, a school system composed
of a student population that was 89% economically disadvantaged and 83% African
American; by contrast, SCS served a population that was 37% economically
disadvantaged, and 37% African American. Furthermore, with a growing
impoverishment in the City, the City property tax base was shrinking, making it
unsustainable for Memphis to maintain its level of educational services without the
continued financial support of the suburbs.
While the merger had been unanimously resisted by suburban leaders and
residents, the issue had also created tension across the City actors, including among MCS
board members who ultimately voted to relinquish their charter on December 22, 2010.
The charter surrender was confirmed by a referendum that took place in the City on
March 8, 2011. However, suburban leaders did not remain passive. Rather, they used
their relationships with State representatives to craft new legislation that would allow
them to create their own municipal school districts (MSD). Municipal school districts
were different from SSDs as they were still responsible for participating in the financial
support of the other schools in the County. However, they had more control over their
schools as they had their own school board, and could levy additional taxes to be used
exclusively in their district. Therefore, while the prospect of gaining a special school
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district status for SCS had vanished with MCS surrendering its charter, suburban leaders
developed other options to avoid consolidation.
The consolidation was indeed overseen by the Norris-Todd bill, a piece of
legislation that was influenced by suburban leaders (Commercial Appeal, January 28,
2011). This law essentially established that the merger between MCS and SCS would
take place on July 1, 2013. Until this point, there would exist a transition period during
which the seven members of SCS and the nine members of MCS would work together,
yet independently, in organizing the merging of the school operations. In addition,
a Transition Planning Commission (TPC) would be established to design a plan for the
merged system that would require approval from both the State Commissioner of
Education and the School Board. The TPC was composed of 21 members appointed by
MCS, SCS, the County Mayor, and State representatives. As for the School Board, the
combining of SCS and MCS was ruled unconstitutional as it no longer represented the
population of the combined system. Therefore, seven new members were added to this
now 23-member unified Board that would run the joint school system until July 1, 2013,
when it would be replaced by a Board of seven elected members. The Norris-Todd bill
also ruled that at the end of the transition period, those municipalities that did not want to
be part of the merged system could opt to create their own MSDs. Thus, with MSDs,
consolidation would take a different form than that foreseen by those who supported it,
and separation would in fact be reinforced as rather than having two school systems, the
County could potentially have as many school systems as there were cities.
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Data Collection
Data were collected between December 2010, when MCS initiated the
consolidation, until May 2013, a point at which virtually all of the preparations for the
merger on July 1, 2013, had essentially been completed. My data consisted of four main
sources. First I carried out 53 in-depth interviews with individuals actively involved in
the consolidation process: SCS and MCS members and administrators, TPC members,
political and business leaders both at the local and the state level, school principals and
teachers, parents, and members of grassroots and educational associations. Second,
I attended meetings and community gatherings organized by those actively involved in
the merger. My third source of data consisted of documents germane to the merger –
minutes of School Boards and TPC meetings, documents distributed by the various
grassroots and educational associations, and others. Finally, I followed newspaper
coverage of the merger to examine how changes in logics translated into broader changes
in the ways education was discussed.
Data Analysis
I focused in particular on identifying three patterns. First, I identified instances of
episodic power, and how these related to existing power structures. To do so, I followed
Lawrence et al.‟s (2012) approach by looking at “specific acts on the part of actors to
initiate change” (p. 115). Second, I examined whether and when changes in power
structures occurred. I also followed Lawrence et al.‟s (2012) approach to identify
systemic power by “looking for those routines and practices that affected the behavior of
organizational members” (p. 115). Consistent with an interpretive approach, I moved
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iteratively between my different data sources, and between the data and the emergent
themes (Locke, 2001; Reay, Golden-Biddle, & Germann, 2006).
As events unfolded, I observed the actors involved in the change process. Most
particularly, I identified their logics and noted what they did to influence the change
process. Initially, my research efforts focused on those actors representing MCS and
SCS. However, it soon became apparent that a third group, Stand for Children, was
gaining prominence in the process to redesign education in the region. Stand for Children
is a grassroots association with a mission “to ensure that all children, regardless of their
background, graduate from high school prepared for, and with access to, a college
education” (Stand for Children website). Stand for Children in Memphis was primarily
funded by the Gates Foundation, and was connected to a broader network of business
philanthropists such as the Hyde Family Foundations. This network was primarily
seeking to reform education in Memphis, essentially by rendering schools accountable for
their performance. I thus also studied the role of this network in the merger.
Third, I noted changes in texts (Brown et al., 2012; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005)
to identify the influence of actors on the merger. For instance, the TPC, the group in
charge of developing a plan for the merged school system, crafted both its discourses and
plan around the idea of building a “world-class system” (TPC Executive Summary). The
idea of a world-class system was also the motivation of the Hyde Family Foundations
(Hyde Foundation website, 2010). The examination of texts was essential to trace how
institutional logics evolved as it has been shown that “institutional logics are encoded in
discourses, collections of interrelated texts that provide vocabularies, specify norms,
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establish meanings, and create relations of power/knowledge” (Brown et al., 2012,
p. 299; see also Heracleous & Barrett, 2001).
Ensuring Trustworthiness
To ensure that my analyses met Lincoln and Guba‟s (1985) criteria for
trustworthiness, I worked back and forth between the data and the emerging theory. The
credibility of my findings was enhanced by four main strategies. My immersion in the
field allowed me to develop a deeply nuanced understanding of how the merger
proceeded, the emergence of particular courses of action, and opinions of different groups
of actors. The raw data and emergent findings were subjected to debriefing sessions with
those involved in the merger, and also various peers not involved in the research but who
were able to give me useful feedback on the viability of my conclusions. A fourth
strategy consisted of triangulating my findings through the use of multiple sources of data
in order to ensure the dependability and confirmability of my findings.
Competing over the Two Logics
The Two Competing Logics
The initial finding in this research indicates that, in 2010, when the consolidation
process started, MCS had a civic logic, and SCS a provincial logic. Table 8 highlights the
main elements of these two logics – governance systems, resource allocation, practices,
and organizational politics, that emerged from my data. These different logics are indeed
reflected in the governance systems of the two school systems. The MCS Board, with
seven African American and two White American members, was an almost perfect racial
representation of its 85% African American student population. Furthermore, with six
women and three men, the MCS Board was consistent with gender representation
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patterns in American educational leadership (Trinidad & Normore, 2005). The sevenmember SCS Board was entirely white, and there was only one woman. The SCS Board
was thus not at all reflective of a student population that was 40% African American, nor
of the role of women in educational leadership. The SCS chairman, David Pickler, had
maintained his position for 12 years. In sum, the SCS Board was reflective of an “old
boys network.”
Because Shelby County has pretty much hired from within, you have people that
have worked through the system, and so are less likely to throw their former
colleagues under the bus. In Memphis City, you have too many people that have
been recruited from too many other places. So there‟s not that internal loyalty,
which, I mean, Shelby County is too much of a good old boys network. (TPC
member)
Taylor (2000) describes an “old boys network” as an informal, exclusive system of
mutual assistance and friendship, where “recruitment typically derives from interpersonal
transactions or relationships with members rather than merit” (p. 872). Consistent with
this view, an influential member of the suburban community indicated: “We became
good enough friends, that when he got ready to run for School Board, I supported him to
run, then when he ran for mayor, I supported him. So, we‟re just friends.” Another
suburban actor had a more critical view of these power relations and argued, about a
School Board member that, “He has a friend up there [in the legislatures], and I
understand that that friend is on his payroll.”
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Table 8
Institutional Logics in Shelby County’s Educational Field
The suburbs’

The City’s

provincial logic

civic logic

The educational
reformers’ business logic

Governance

Power to members of
the network

One man, one vote

Power to the best
performers

Resource
allocation

Per pupil +
Endowments to
individual schools
through Parent
Teacher Associations

Per pupil + Additional
funds to most
disadvantaged
students

Per pupil + Driven by
competitive processes and
market segments

Practices

Neighborhood schools

Equal education

Investment

Organizational
politics

No unions
Least government
intervention

Strong influence of
unions
Business and public
service are separated

Influence of unions limited
to schools run by the Board
Businesses as key funders
have a say in educational
issues

These two different logics were also consistent with the ways in which power was
used to influence the merger issue, that is, the ways in which episodic power played
a role in shaping the change process. However, my data show that the relationship
between episodic and systemic power was differently developed depending on whether
episodic power was enacted inter- or intra-organizationally, and at the meso- or macrofield levels. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) define meso-level social orders as those
within which “actors are attuned to and interact with knowledge of one another on the
basis of shared (which is not to say consensual) understandings about the purposes of the
field, relationships to others in the field (including who has power and why), and the
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rules governing legitimate action in the field” (p. 9). Interactions between two or more
meso-level fields generally occur within a higher-order, political, social, or economic
field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012).
Intra-Organizational Agency at the Meso-Level
When MCS and SCS members tried to influence their peers and constituents, their
actions were consistently shaped, not surprisingly, by their respective logics. For
instance, the MCS Board designed a presentation to be used both during their meetings
and during public information meetings to inform Memphis citizens about the risks
associated with not consolidating the two school systems (Special School District
Presentation, November 18, 2010). This presentation focused exclusively on highlighting
the effects on resource allocation if SCS were to become a SSD. Another presentation
designed in December 2010 by Martavius Jones, the MCS School Board member who
brought the resolution to surrender the MCS charter, pointed to the fact that Memphians,
given their demographic representation in the County, had the power and the legitimacy
to decide upon how educational issues were dealt with in the whole County: “Memphis is
still part of Shelby County. We have not seceded. As a matter of fact, Memphians are
more than 70% of Shelby County‟s residents.”
The December 20, 2010 MCS School Board meeting was to settle upon whether
MCS should relinquish its charter, and thus consolidate with SCS. This meeting allowed
both Board members and City constituents to elaborate on their position regarding
whether to consolidate. Concerns for equal distribution of resources and for democratic
power, two key elements of the civic logic, were predominant in their discourses. In fact,
even those MCS members who opposed consolidation tried to influence their peers and
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constituents with arguments consistent with this logic. For instance, Keith Williams,
President of the Memphis Education Association, the union representing teachers in
Memphis, was opposed to consolidating if that meant lack of collaboration with all the
actors impacted by this change, namely, both City and County residents (MCS Minutes,
December 20, 2010). Jeff Warren, an MCS Board member, opposed consolidation on
similar grounds, arguing that “[I]n my mind, the way you get people to do things is you
get to know them, and you try to work with them, you don‟t force it down their throats”
(MCS Minutes, December 20, 2010). However, Patrice Robinson, another Board
member, argued that a decision of such magnitude should be placed upon the hands of the
citizens, that is, the Board should pass a resolution to relinquish its charter in order to let
the citizens decide upon the future of MCS through a referendum:
In our democratic society… I believe this is an opportunity, the law gives us
remedy here and it allows us to allow the citizens to make this decision. I think
this decision should be vetted in the community. I believe the community ought to
have an opportunity to talk about it. (MCS Minutes, December 20, 2010)
As regards SCS, their actions and discourse aimed at influencing their peers and
constituents were consistent with their provincial logic, one fundamentally based on local
communities, the protection of such communities, and the network of relationships within
them. For instance, a presentation from the City of Germantown was made to the
residents of Germantown to show them how they would be impacted by the
consolidation. The presentation was introduced as follows: “Germantown is a safe,
family friendly city which is a community of residential neighborhoods,” and residents
would strongly voice their concern for coming, with the consolidation, under the
influence of the “bad City schools” where people were “killing each other” (State
representative; Suburban political leader; TPC member). Furthermore, opposition was not
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particularly well received within the SCS Board. A meeting held on January 27, 2010, by
the SCS Board was to discuss a resolution to oppose MCS charter surrender, an action
that was only symbolic as it had no effect on the process initiated by MCS. During this
meeting, Diane George, the only woman on the Board, could not get her peers to engage
in a conversation about this resolution.
Mr. Wissman: “We are to let people know that this is more than David Pickler vs.
Memphis City Schools. This is the Shelby County School Board adopting a
resolution as a Board that we are in opposition to the surrender of the charter….”
Ms. George: “With all due respect [….] I haven‟t even had a conversation with
any of you all, how we‟re going to do this or be a part of this. I mean…”
[….]
Mr. Reaves: “Ms. George, are you against the charter surrender?”
Ms. George: “ I want to understand it…”
Mr. Reaves: “I am just asking the question: Are you against the charter
surrender?”
Ms. George: “Are you against it?”
Mr. Reaves: “Absolutely! 100% and I don‟t need to have any more conversation
about it.”
Ms. George: “I… you know… I want to do what‟s right for all children of Shelby
County.”
Mr. Reaves: “Yes or No?”
Ms. George: “I want to know…”
Mr. Reaves: “Yes or No? Are you against it?”
Ms. George: “I‟m not answering your question.”
Mr. Reaves: “OK. Then, I think I know where you stand.”
Ms. George: “Well, no! That‟s not fair at all and that‟s sort of hostile in my
opinion on trying to push me into… to read my mind. You can‟t read my mind.”
(SCS Minutes, January 27, 2010)
Inter-Organizational Agency at the Macro-Level
The interactions between MCS and SCS occurred at a more macro-level of the
field, that is, the “arena of struggles” (Bourdieu, 1990) essentially took place within the
legal framework where each group used its power to influence the change process.
Interestingly, these macro-level conflicts revealed a different relationship between actors‟
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agencies and their logics than that observed at the meso-level. Essentially, while MCS
was promoting democratic processes as a means to settle the issue, it was primarily
through denying suburbanites the ability to vote during the charter surrender referendum
that they were able to achieve the goal of consolidating the two school systems.
Similarly, while SCS‟ logic fundamentally revolved around local control, SCS
leaders were able to circumvent their opponent‟s actions by resorting to their
relationships with State representative, and obtaining their intervention in the process.
The disconnect between SCS members‟ beliefs and their actions was pointed out by
various informants:
I believe our legislators have unjustly inserted themselves into the democratic
process, in which our community and its members should have control over its
future. […] So, it is interesting to me that many of those who ascribe to less big
government, and, less federal insertion into state and local politics, choose to then
do exactly what they claim to hate. (TPC member)
While those struggles between MCS and SCS were taking place, other interested
parties emerged, keen to insert their own views of how education should be developed in
the region. In this context, a business logic gained prominence. I elaborate on this process
in the next section.
Introducing the Third Logic
The Context
Shelby County Schools and MCS were engaged in actions and counter-actions
aimed at achieving their competing goals, which opened spaces for a business logic to
insert itself in the process. In fact, I mentioned earlier the extent to which Shelby County
was rather resilient to change. The SCS Board had been led by the same Chairman for
12 years. The City of Memphis had also had only two Mayors in the 20 years since 1991.
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In such a context, an initiative that compromised the status quo was argued by some
prominent activists to be something existing power holders needed to oppose.
A Memphis business leader, speaking of efforts to promote new leaders in Memphis,
argued:
Back when I and some friends were trying to help get young people elected to
different positions and running campaigns and raising money for them, it was
very threatening to the entire political apparatus in the city. They felt like there
were these new, young revolutionaries coming to take them all down, which we
never articulated anything like that, but they just felt like, “They‟re coming to
change the system, and the system doesn‟t need to be changed right now.”
Therefore, while various organizations were seeking to reform the educational system in
Memphis, such reforms were often opposed on a principle.
These reforms were primarily concerned with improving academic achievement
in those areas that needed it the most, hence in urban schools where, as mentioned earlier,
the level of poverty had become a real hindrance for educational progress, and thus for
the economic development of the City. Most notably, these reforms sought to put an end
to a “culture of mediocrity” that had developed around the idea that poor students could
not perform as well as their wealthier counterparts.
We have determined that some of the children in our community either cannot or
will not learn, and we have said we‟re okay with that. And for me, that‟s not
something that we can continue, and what I hope is that we create an
infrastructure that does not allow for mediocrity. And, we push the district into
understanding that every child needs to be provided a rigorous education; that if
I wanna choose to live in North Memphis, I should have high quality educational
opportunities from birth for my child, and that same right should be given to
people who live in Germantown, or Frayser, or Smoke City, or New Chicago. So
it becomes a community culture and an expectation that we would have high
quality schools. (Educational reformer)
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These reforms were promoted by business philanthropists, such as the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation, the Broad Foundation and the Walton Family Foundation at
the national level, and the Hyde Family Foundations and the Poplar Foundation at the
local level. As such, the reforms were primarily grounded on a business approach of
performance, one whereby student performance could be assessed with a universal
instrument, and those involved in producing those results – teachers and principals, and
individual schools – should be held accountable for such results.
Teachers and principals, under this view, were to receive a salary commensurate
with their ability to improve students‟ achievement. Similarly, schools were to either
provide adequate performance or cease to exist, a view that could be established through
developing charter schools. Charter schools, contrary to traditional schools, were indeed
expected to show results or they would lose their right to exercise their activities.
A charter was granted to a charter management organization that showed its ability to
provide novel educational methods to improve academic achievement. Initially the
charter could only be granted by the School Board. However, new legislation in
Tennessee allowed charter management organizations to appeal to the State when the
charter was denied by the School Board. In addition, charter schools were subject to only
some of the rules that applied to traditional public schools, thus providing them with
more flexibility to elaborate on novel educational approaches.
A key aspect of those initiatives revolved around developing grassroots efforts
through organizations such as Stand for Children and other educational associations, as
well as influencing educational policies by lobbying for certain candidates at the local,
state, and federal levels to ensure this approach of education would gain political and
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regulative support. For instance, Governor Haslam, a fervent proponent of charter
schools, was endorsed by the Hyde Foundation and Stand for Children (Educational
reformers).
Gov. Bill Haslam has announced that Tennessee will use a portion of its federal
Race to the Top money to help spur the creation of 40 charter schools in the
state‟s two largest cities [Memphis and Nashville]. The Republican governor
announced at a meeting at the LEAD Academy charter school in Nashville on
Tuesday that the $10 million in state money will be combined with $20 million
raised from private donors. The outside money is being raised from both in-state
philanthropic groups like the Hyde and Ingram foundations and from national
groups like the Walton Family Foundation. (Knoxville News, March 15, 2011)
As a result of the ongoing consolidation, and the opposition that it generated
between City and suburban actors, this group of educational reformers was able to
establish its business logic as that which would determine the ways in which education
was to be delivered. I note though that the push from MCS members to consolidate the
two school systems was initially perceived as an obstacle to the continuation of the
reform movement. However, as the turmoil was growing, and attention was focused on
the various conflicts between MCS and SCS, the situation ultimately offered an
opportunity for the group of reformers not only to accelerate their projects, but also to
expand them beyond the City limits.
Because the media were so focused on the schools, this is a real moment for us to
lift up some of the educational issues that need to be talked about, in terms of
student achievement across Shelby County, how we‟re, you know, effective
teaching, all this stuff that we think are priorities; this is a real moment for us to,
not even, not just to talk about the consolidation, but to lift up education.
(Educational reformer)
In the midst of such conflicts, the acceleration of the reform movement was
almost unseen. It was only later that the organizations associated with the reform
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movement were identified as having a major influence in the definition of the new school
system.
Stand for Children is funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. They
have no money of their own. Their due is only five dollars, and they have less
than a hundred members, but they get millions of dollars to promote, in my
opinion, an agenda that is for business, capitalists, outsourcing, privatizing,
charterizing public education. (Memphis educational leader)
An informant summarized the scenario unfolding in Shelby County, whereby as
MCS and SCS were fighting against each other a third group was gaining power, as
follows: “With wealth and influence driving a particular agenda, that, oftentimes, can
supersede opposing opinions” (Memphis business leader). I elaborate on the
microprocesses that allowed for such a radical change.
Microprocess 1: Building on a Dispersed Coalition
The reform movement was able to work “under the radar” (Reay & Hinings,
2009, p. 632) because it essentially built on a dispersed coalition. This coalition consisted
of business philanthropists, political leaders both at the local, state, and federal levels,
and grassroots and educational associations.
The governor, he put the Achievement School District in place, and all these folks
here locally who I‟m talking to you about, they have relationships with the
governor and the Commissioner of Education. So, it all sort of works in tandem.
There are different levers of power both locally and statewide, and people have a
way of making sure that their voice is heard at all those different levels. (Memphis
business leader)
[The Hyde Family Foundations are] very plugged in to state and local educational
initiatives. The executive director of the Hyde Family Foundations sits on the
state board of education. [….] Josh Edelman, from the Gates Foundation, he‟s not
one that‟s pulling strings in public, but he‟s pulling a lot of strings behind the
scenes. (TPC member)
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Microprocess 2: Introducing the Business Logic in the Governance Structures
The influence of this group of reformers was pronounced as they groomed
candidates who supported their goals in elections to various governance structures that
were empowered to shape the consolidation process. In this vein, Stand for Children
lobbied for Kenya Bradshaw, the Executive Director of Stand for Children, Daniel Kiel,
a law professor at the University of Memphis, and Reginald Green, a professor in
educational leadership at the University of Memphis, to seats on the TPC. They also
endorsed seven individuals, four of whom were elected on August 2, 2012, to be part of
the 7-member Board that would oversee the merged system. These actions were crucial
as the TPC was in charge of developing a plan for the merged system, and the School
Board would be responsible for implementing it.
More crucially, the influence of the reform movement was reinforced as they were
actively involved with the consulting firm, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), which
was hired to help the TPC design the plan for the merged system.
We did play a leading role in raising the private philanthropic support to provide
the Boston Consulting Group to the Transition Planning Commission and have
stepped up in a similar way with the district around the implementation of the
plan. (Educational reformer)
The BCG was notorious for pushing a business view of education. In fact, a complaint
was recently filed by a collective of parents in Philadelphia concerned with the future of
public education in their district.
Recently, Philadelphia school parents and the local chapter of the NAACP filed
a complaint with the City Ethics Board alleging that a major Foundation and the
Boston Consulting Group had engaged in lobbying the School District of
Philadelphia around major policy issues such as school closings and charter
expansion. The complaint centered around the fact that the [William Penn]
Foundation contracted with the Boston Consulting Group around a set of
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“deliverables” without the School District being a party to the contract. The
Foundation also solicited donors to specifically pay the Boston Consulting Group
at least $2.7 million for their work, but funneled the money through a separate
agency to hide the identities of the donors. As detailed in our complaint, the BCGWilliam Penn Foundation contract explicitly stipulated that BCG‟s work would
promote charter expansion, management networks, identify 60 top candidates for
school closure and impact labor negotiations. The issue isn‟t just a local one. On
a national level, a number of education observers and public interest advocates
have raised serious concerns about the role of “philanthropic” investments into
education reform. From the Broad Foundation to the Waltons and Gates
Foundations – what we‟re seeing across the country is an unprecedented level of
private money shaping public policy under the guise of philanthropy. Too often
that agenda has centered around a radical dismantling of public education,
increased privatization, and disruptive reform that has sent many districts
spiraling into chaos and sustained turmoil. (Parents United for Public Education,
Philadelphia, December 6, 2012)
Interestingly, exactly the same process with similar actors occurred in Shelby County as
the contract with the BCG had not been disclosed to the public, and their compensation
was also funneled through the Shelby County Education Foundation. A Memphis resident
indicated:
BCG has been hired by the TPC to do some kind of work, but once again, we
don‟t really a hundred percent know who‟s paying them. We know that it‟s
mainly the Hyde Family Foundations. We know that it‟s a little bit of Gates. We
know that it‟s some of Staley Cates‟ foundation, so Poplar Foundation. And while
the contracts, which we also haven‟t seen the contracts this time around. They
were public when it was TPC. While we have to assume that the contracts would
be similar, and that they would say something like, “Even though these other
people are paying us, we‟re working for you.” Ok, because they would want to be
clear that there‟s not a conflict of interest, that just because they‟re receiving the
money from these people, that that doesn‟t mean that they‟re taking their input
and their ideas about what should happen. That really, they‟re gonna do what the
district says they‟re supposed to be doing, ok? And, it‟s not that I think that‟s not
happening, but I think everybody understands where these private funders stand,
and that there‟s a certain expectation. Even though there‟s not an outright conflict
of interest, there‟s a certain expectation that some of what they want is gonna
happen. (Memphis resident)
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Microprocess 3: Remaining Neutral in the Ongoing Conflict
The discretion with which the group of reformers acted throughout the process
was also manifest in their position on ongoing conflicts involving SCS and MCS actors.
In fact, none of the actors belonging to this group ever took a public stance, whether it
was on the consolidation referendum that took place in the City, or on whether the
suburban cities should form MSDs. Rather, they pursued their main goal which was to
see the reform movement implemented. An informant indicated, “We chose not to take
sides on what should be the vote for consolidation.” Another one said:
We were a little surprised when the School Board decided to surrender its charter.
And while we weren‟t public about whether we were for it or against it, we really
felt we had a great road map in place for our community to really move academic
achievement for the children that needed it the most. (Educational reformer)
Interestingly, Mark Luttrell, Mayor of Shelby County, had various roles within
this process, and depending on which role he was representing, his position varied. For
instance, when he acted as a member of the TPC, Luttrell promoted neutrality, and asked
to “put the politics aside” (Board Meeting, June 26, 2012; TPC Town Hall Meeting July
10, 2012). The term “politics” points to the conflicts between two or more groups or
positions (Westwood & Clegg, 2003). However, when acting as Mayor of Shelby
County, Luttrell did pick a side when he used his veto to nullify a referendum initiated by
the County Commission (Commercial Appeal, August 23, 2012). This referendum was
a key obstacle to the actions taken by the suburban cities as they were seeking to create
their own school systems.
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Microprocess 4: Introducing New Practices
In May 2013, the transition from two school systems to a merged system had not
been settled. However, the domination of a business logic had already been established,
as it was manifest in the governance structure and the practices that, as voted upon by the
Board, would replace the existing ones. Changes in how the schools would be governed
had sweeping implications for the allocation of resources, as well as the organizational
politics. I note though that this shift in institutional logics would only affect those schools
that would be consolidated, and thus essentially those schools that were formerly run by
MCS, not the schools in the suburban areas that would become MSDs.
Governance structure. A model for the merged school system, recommended by
the TPC and called “multiple achievement paths,” was voted upon by the Board, that
would most notably distribute power across more actors, and consequently decrease the
power vested in the Board. Indeed, under this scenario, any school or group of schools
which would be able to demonstrate a certain level of academic achievement could apply
to become a charter school. As mentioned earlier, when not approved by the Board, the
charter could now be obtained directly from the State.
In addition, more authority over schools would be taken away from the School
Board as the lowest performing schools would be run by the State under the umbrella of
the Achievement School District, a system that was implemented to “turn the bottom
5 percent of schools into high-achieving ones (top 25 percent) within five years”
(Fordham Institute, April 23, 2013). Regarding changes in the way public education was
governed, State Representative Mike Stewart reported that:
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“People who are interested in education should very carefully scrutinize the
charter school bill because it goes to the very core of how our state education
system is funded and who controls it,” said Stewart, who dislikes the idea of
charter schools opening up under the umbrella of the state‟s achievement school
district instead of through local boards of education. “Right now, we have local
authorities that control most of what happens in our local schools,” Stewart said,
“and the charter bill dramatically changes the structure of control in Tennessee,
and we all have to look at that very carefully.” (TNReport, March 9, 2011)
Resource allocation. This new governance structure had direct implications on
how resources would be allocated. Indeed, as the funding basis consisted of allocating
money to each school based on the number of students it housed, the School Board would
have control over less funds as these were now shared by the Board with their traditional
public schools, the charter management organizations with their charter schools, and the
State with its Achievement School District. Furthermore, while conflict was unfolding
over whether MSDs should be forced to purchase the school buildings located in the
suburbs, much less discussion took place about charter schools using existing school
buildings. Some actors even theorized a relationship between the closing of failing
schools, another recommendation of the TPC, and the expansion of charter schools –
a theory that was shared by parents in Philadelphia.
One of their proposals is to close twenty-one schools. Can you imagine? […]
That, to me, is just a perfect formula to create charters. They would give them
those schools, the building, and the children. That promotes folks who would own
the schools. And when public education is turned over to philanthropic ownership,
it‟s over in this community. When they can control public education, it‟s no
longer public. (Memphis educational leader)
Practices. The practices associated with how public education was embraced in
the schools also changed. Indeed, schools would now be in competition for resources and
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students, often in ways that some educational actors did not feel to be fair. For instance,
charter schools could choose which students to accept, and which ones to deny or expel.
They come to Northside for example, they take our brightest students, and they
entice them and coerce them to go here because it‟s good, and I mean I don‟t
blame a parent thinking “I can get my child to be at the top of its game.” But you
take them, so you get to cherry pick the best and the brightest. When registration
ends at Memphis City Schools, we have to take whoever comes in the door.
(Memphis teacher)
As for the schools run by the State through the Achievement School District, they
were offering a financial incentive to attract the highest performing teachers, something
that MCS and SCS could not do: “Starting now, the state will fund $7,000 signing
bonuses for every new Level 5 teacher that joins an Achievement School!” (Achievement
School District, May 14, 2013).
I note that the competitive nature that would characterize public education was
consistent with the mission of one of the main actors in this reformers‟ group:
The Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation‟s mission is to dramatically transform
urban K-12 public education through better governance, management, labor
relations and competition. […] Competition among American schools is healthy.
(Broad Foundation website, 2013)
Organizational politics. A key difference between SCS and MCS consisted in
their approach of labor relations, most notably as MCS teachers and other employees
were unionized, and SCS employees were not (see Table 8). With the increase of charter
schools and the Achievement School District, the bargaining power of the Memphis
union would dramatically diminish as it would be limited to those schools directly
managed by the Board.
Furthermore, the increased financial involvement of businesses in education
would necessarily foster different relationships between businesses and public education,
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something that was strongly criticized by various individuals, both among MCS and SCS
actors.
[Stand for Children] promoted candidates who would, you know,… If I were
a politician, I wouldn‟t take money from certain organizations, because I know
with that, strings come attached, and I don‟t want to be beholden to anyone for my
actions or my deeds. (Memphis teacher)
Discussion and Conclusion
I introduced this work by suggesting that as work on episodic and systemic power
and the institutional logics literature share the same concern for disentangling the
longstanding agency-structure problem, conversations between these two streams of
research could enrich our understanding of radical change. Therefore, I aimed at
examining the interactions between episodic and systemic power in the working of
radical change, and how these interactions relate to actors‟ logics.
My work sheds light on the interplay between episodic and systemic power in
radical change, and how this interaction relates to actors institutional logics. First, my
findings show that institutional logics provide the basis for systemic power, which in turn
determines which actions actors can elaborate upon to influence other actors‟ behaviors.
The civic logic implied a view of democratic power, providing agency on the basis of
“one man, one vote.” The provincial logic created a view that power was to be shared by
members of an exclusive “old boys network,” with interactions based on friendship and
influence. Under a business logic, power was made to relate to organizational
performance, thus providing more “autonomy,” more agency, to its best performing
members.
Interestingly, I found that the relationship between episodic and systemic power,
and by extension institutional logics, was dependent upon whether power was utilized to
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influence in-group members, or whether it was utilized to protect the group‟s institutional
logic. In the first case, episodes of power were consistent with the group‟s institutional
logic. However, as MCS and SCS both tried to establish their respective logic as the
dominant one, the competition took place at a higher-level, and more precisely within the
legal framework overseeing the working of public education at the State level. In this
case, neither MCS nor SCS were constrained by their institutional logics. For instance,
MCS was able to get City and Suburban schools to consolidate not only by unilaterally
relinquishing its charter, but also by engineering a referendum exclusively for City
residents, thus denying suburban residents the possibility of engaging in the democratic
process. Similarly, it was through government intervention, something opposed to its
logic, that SCS was able to find a way out of this consolidation as suburban leaders were
able to influence the creation of new legislation that would allow them to become
municipal school districts.
Furthermore, I show how a third logic, unrepresented by the main groups engaged
in the most public struggles, was able to become established as the dominant logic. Most
notably, I explicate the microprocesses underpinning the introduction of a new
institutional logic, and the context within which those microprocesses unfolded. Actors
promoting a business logic were able to seize the opportunity to introduce their logic as
the public was occupied following the actions and counter-actions of MCS and SCS. This
is particularly consistent with the view that change may occur “under the radar” (Reay &
Hinings, 2009, p. 632). The first microprocess supporting the introduction of a business
logic consisted of the building of a dispersed coalition. This process essentially supported
the covertness of this change process. I note though that while coalition-building has been
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widely argued to be crucial in realizing institutional change (Maguire et al., 2004; Seo &
Creed, 2002), my findings complement this view by showing that when a field is
undergoing tensions, this might open spaces for introducing a new logic. However, my
findings suggest that covert episodic power building on a dispersed coalition may be an
effective strategy to achieve this goal.
In fact, the second microprocess utilized to establish the business logic was
consistent with this covert approach. Here, actors introduced individuals championing the
business logic in the governance structures that were influential in the change process,
most notably the School Board and the committee in charge of designing the plan for the
merged system. Various studies have stressed that radical change can occur through the
hybridization of two or more institutional logics (Mars & Lounsbury, 2009; Murray,
2010; Rao & Hirsch, 2003). While my work shows how an entirely new logic became
dominant, some form of hybridization occurred at this stage. Indeed, most of the
individuals selected to integrate these governance structures were both enjoying a high
status in the community – provincial logic, and concerned with equal education – civic
logic. However, they were most notable for their remaining neutral throughout the
process. Indeed, the third microprocesses consisted of maintaining neutrality in the
battles involving MCS and SCS, which further sustained the discretion within which the
new logic was being introduced. Finally, the business logic became dominant by
establishing new practices reflected in a new language, whereby public education was
now to be viewed as an “investment” that should “pay huge dividends,” and schools
within this public system were to enter competition.
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This work makes three major contributions. First, I show how a new logic is
introduced, and identify key mechanisms that allowed an institutional logic to become
dominant, thus addressing calls for this type of work (Brown et al., 2012; Cloutier &
Langley, 2013). Akin to Lawrence et al.‟s (2012) findings that changes in governance
structures are essential to sustain radical change, my data show that the rapid shift to
a business logic was possible as champions of this logic gained access to existing
governance structures. This is important because a shift in logic without a change in
governance may not be as effective, and may even be unsustainable over time. For
instance, Knights and McCabe (1999) showed how Total Quality Management practices
were implemented in a distorted form as the organization that adopted such practices
maintained its hierarchical structure, something contrary to the very idea of Total Quality
Management.
I further show how “institutional logics cascade across different kinds of practices
in an organization,” something that remains ill-understood (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 141).
As the logic shifted from a civic view to a business approach of education, practices were
fundamentally altered. Essentially, as a new system of power was established, it also
changed the definition of who the actors were – the School Board, charter management
organizations, the State, how they were to behave – striving for performance; how they
were to be evaluated – return on investment; how they were to relate to each other – as
competitors; and how they were to be rewarded or sanctioned – agency is given on the
basis of achieved performance.
I make a second contribution as I theorize a link between institutional logics and
power. My findings suggest that episodic and systemic power interact differently whether
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episodic power is enacted at the intra-organizational meso-level or at the interorganizational macro-level. I thus address Thornton et al.‟s (2012) concerns for
examining institutional logics at different levels of analysis, and for clarifying the role of
power in these processes. I found that, at the intra-organizational meso-level, episodic
power is consistent with actors‟ institutional logic and the power relations it establishes.
At the inter-organizational macro-level though, the working of power takes
a Machiavellian view whereby moral questions are external to power: strategies are
neither good nor bad, they have to be effective (Clegg, 1989; Machiavelli, 1958).
Thus my data casts doubt on the extent to which actors are embedded in a system
of beliefs that constrain their ability to think of alternatives (Seo & Creed, 2002; Zucker,
1977). In fact, my findings show that as long as the purpose is to protect their logic,
actors can transcend their own belief systems and engage in power episodes that radically
diverge from such beliefs and from legitimate practices. However, my findings indicate
that though instances of power were not legitimate at the meso-level, they were in
another institutional order. I thus respond to Thornton et al.‟s (2012) question: “How can
individuals and organizations seek to change institutional arrangements when the means
and ends of their interest and agency are constrained by their prior and current
experiences within the context of institutional orders?” (pp. 105-6). I also address
Cloutier and Langley‟s (2013) criticism that “current conceptualizations of institutional
logics have lost their „moral‟ element, thus withholding an important mechanism for
deepening our understanding of institutional processes” (p. 2).
I further respond to Thornton et al.‟s (2012, p. 65) call to explicate the role of
power in shifting institutional logics, and do so by showing how power is “culturally
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contingent.” My third contribution is thus to show how certain logics and their associated
power structures may be more resilient to change than others. As institutional logics
(Friedland & Alford, 1991) and power (Bourdieu, 1984, 1990) are fundamentally
cultural, and as cultures vary in the extent to which they tolerate deviance from social
norms (Gelfand et al., 2011), it is not surprising that institutional logics and their
associated power structures vary in the extent to which they encourage or dampen
agency. Yet, understanding why some logics are more amenable to change than others
remains an empirical question (Thornton et al., 2012).
My data suggest that institutional logics shape power structures in a way that
provides actors with different scopes for agency. I noted, for instance, how conflicting
positions were tolerated as MCS members had to decide upon surrendering their charter.
In fact, while MCS members were in opposition on this issue, their arguments were still
consistent with the idea of protecting the civic logic. The conflict was settled through the
democratic process with five members voting for the surrender of the charter and four
voting against it. Conversely, SCS Board members showed less tolerance when their only
female member asked to discuss a resolution aimed at showing that SCS was opposed to
consolidation. And although this resolution could have no effect on MCS‟ actions to
consolidate, this resolution was voted upon unanimously by the seven SCS Board
members, including by the woman who still had received no explanation as to why SCS
should oppose consolidation.
Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) show that some logics may be more resilient to
change, and explain this phenomenon by stressing the role of identity in fostering
resistance to change. More specifically, they show how a “stronger identity” can make
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“mobilization and resistance easier” (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007, p. 814). I propose to
build on existing frameworks in cultural anthropology to provide a more testable way of
assessing identity, and to link identity to culture, a key foundation of both institutional
logics and power. Cultural anthropologists have long identified cultures based on their
tolerance of deviant behaviors (Gelfand et al., 2011; Pelto, 1968). Thus, cultures are
either “tight – have strong norms and a low tolerance of deviant behavior” or “loose –
have weak norms and a high tolerance of deviant behavior” (Gelfand et al., 2011,
p. 1100). My findings indicate that institutional logics also vary in the extent to which
they tolerate deviance from norms, and as a result, in the extent to which they increase or
decrease actors‟ scope of agency. In so doing, I not only address Sewell‟s (1992) untested
assumption that institutional logics have varying degrees of agency; I also respond to
Thornton et al.‟s (2012) call to address the claim that power is culturally contingent.
Limitations and Future Research
I note that my findings are limited to a specific context whereby first, the field
was traditionally resilient to change, and second the two communities engaged in the
field struggles had been historically divided along racial, political, social, cultural and
philosophical lines. This situation created an environment rather hostile to newcomers
who were likely to be viewed as threats to the status quo, and may explain the necessity
to elaborate on covert agency. Future research could examine the relationship between
the intensity of field struggles and the level of covertness required for agency to be
effective.

157

Furthermore, while my findings shed light on the relationship between episodic
and systemic power at the intra-organizational meso-level, and at the inter-organizational
macro-level, future research could examine those mechanisms at the inter-organizational
meso-level, that is, as actors from one organization attempt to influence members of
another, potentially competing, organization.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

I introduced this work by highlighting the potential for institutional theory to
better explain the complexity of organizational and social behaviors. Organizational
theorists have indeed become increasingly interested in how institutions shape behaviors,
and how actors create new rules or alter existing ones. A main research focus of
institutionalists relates to those processes that underpin institutionalization or deinstitutionalization of norms and rules, or more generally, how institutional orders are
created, altered, or maintained (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).
However, one of the thorniest issues in institutional theory concerns the problem
of agency versus structure (Giddens, 1979; Heugens & Lander, 2009; Reed, 1997;
Sewell, 1992). Most notably, early neo-institutionalists focused their attention on
highlighting the constraining effects of institutions on behaviors, documenting how
organizational forms and behaviors become homogeneous under the pressure of
normative, cultural-cognitive and/or regulative structures (Scott, 1995). Critics soon
suggested that such a view was limited to exposing one of the two major causal
mechanisms of institutionalization processes, namely the top-down effects of institutions
on actors (Powell, 1991). The field, with the institutional entrepreneurship turn
(DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire et al., 2004), therefore switched to examination of the second
key mechanism, namely, the role of actors in shaping institutions. In other words, while
institutions were treated as independent variables by early neo-institutionalists, later
approaches would examine institutions as dependent variables. Various authors have
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recently indicated that both approaches are incomplete as they fail to disentangle how
agency and structure interrelate, and how this interaction ultimately produces change
(Kaghan & Lounsbury, 2011; Kraatz, 2011; Meyer, 2006; Willmott, 2011).
A second major caveat in current institutional analyses lies in their lack of
theorization of variables that are key to explaining processes of institutionalization or deinstitutionalization. For instance, when resources are argued to be crucial in the
production of radical change, it is only rarely that the ways resources become resources is
explained (e.g., Baker & Nelson, 2005; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). Similarly, power is
more often assumed than explained (Kaghan & Lounsbury, 2011; Levy & Egan, 2003;
Willmott, 2011). Finally, the concept of fields is still fuzzy (Thornton et al., 2012), which
casts doubts on inferences about variance in field members‟ reactions, or about whether
change has taken place in a field.
Together, my studies address these two main issues, and thus current calls for
voicing more attention to the black box of institutional theory to provide further insight
into the process of institutionalization (Clegg, 1989a; Suddaby, 2010; Zucker, 1991).
Most specifically, Suddaby and colleagues (2010) note: “Actors may well be influential
elements of institutional agency, but we must also develop an understanding of how
institutional pressures might affect how these actors and their actorhood are socially
constructed” (p. 1238). My research project not only revives “old institutionalism”
concerns for issues of power and interest, but it also “hark[s]back to basic concerns about
the production of social order and social change” (Stryker, 2002, p. 169).
More specifically, the first study (Chapter 2) shows how resources and rules
interact to produce change. Here, I offer a four-step model of institutional empowerment
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that highlights a specific sequence through which actors, in the first two steps, are
primarily concerned with gaining resources and alter existing rules as they gain access to
those resources; in the two last steps, actors are concerned with altering existing rules
which, once realized, affect the very definition of resources, namely which resources are
deemed valuable, and how they are to be allocated in the field. This model is thus crucial
to understanding how radical change unfolds, and how resources and rules have a specific
and separate role in this process. Indeed, this model is consistent with a social
construction approach of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) as it both stresses the
importance of rules in shaping actors‟ views of the world – here how resources are
defined, and the ways in which actors are able to act upon the definition of resources.
I further examine how actors‟ understandings of reality shape their reactions to
institutional pressures. The second study (Chapter 3) is indeed concerned with
uncovering what in the ways fields are structured shapes actors‟ behaviors. This is
particularly important because current conceptualizations of fields offer competing views
of what it means to be a member of a field. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explain that as
actors become members of a field, they share common structures of meanings and thus
tend to display homogeneity in the ways they behave and react to institutional pressures
(see also Scott & Meyer, 1983). However, more recent studies show that field members
display more heterogeneity than theorized by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), and thus
casts doubts on the relationship between field membership and members‟ behaviors.
In this chapter, I uncover two key factors that help to reconcile these two
divergent positions. First, I show that field members are concerned with protecting six
main elements that contour the boundaries of a field – resources, power, identity, agency,
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practices and philosophies, and the very purpose of the field. However, depending on
how they understand their position in the field, actors tend to protect one of these
elements more than others. More importantly, actors‟ understandings of events and
institutional pressures affecting their field are based on the field element they emphasize.
The data show that this factor is at the core of homogeneity or heterogeneity in actors‟
reactions as when actors shared the same understanding of their position in the field, they
tended to display homogeneous reactions, whereas, conversely, when they had a different
understanding of their position in the field, their reactions tended to be heterogeneous. In
addition, such understanding was also related to the ways in which actors stressed a
particular period of the organization‟s history to help their understanding of ongoing
events. Therefore, the second factor shaping actors‟ reactions consists of imprinting, or
the processes through which the organization is enduringly influenced by the
environmental elements that shaped its founding (Stinchcombe, 1965). This finding is
particularly important to show how history matters (Jones & Khanna, 2006; Marquis &
Tilcsik, 2013), that is, how history shapes actors‟ understandings of their environment,
and by extension, the ways in which they are likely to react to changes in their field.
Finally, the third study (Chapter 4) disentangles an understudied, yet crucial,
phenomenon whereby power, in its manifestations in agency and structure, produces
change (Lawrence et al., 2012). More precisely, this paper sought to uncover the
interactions between episodic and systemic power in the production of radical change,
and how these interactions relate to existing institutional logics. Such examination is
particularly important for two main reasons. First, while the interaction between episodic
and systemic power is essential to understanding how radical change unfolds (Clegg,
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1989; Lawrence et al., 2012), empirical work examining this assumption has been very
limited (Lawrence et al., 2012). In addition, because these interactions between episodic
and systemic power have been developed to explain how radical change unfolds within
organizations, we still have little understanding of how episodic and systemic power
interact in the shifting of institutional logics. This is particularly problematic because
institutional logics are increasingly shown to be linked to power relations, and yet, no
work, to the best of my knowledge, has attended to the interactions between episodic and
systemic power and the relationship between these interactions and existing institutional
logics.
My work helps to address this problem primarily by showing that a specific
institutional logic is likely to be associated with a specific power structure, which, in turn,
will determine what actors can and cannot do, that is, which episodes of power they can
build upon to alter existing institutional arrangements. However, my study further shows
that this relationship only holds at the intra-organizational level as, when two
organizations vie for their respective logics, the conflict occurs in another, higher-level,
sphere of the institutional order. In this case, actors build on another system of power,
one that is not necessarily consistent with their logic. In fact, when power is used within
the organization, it is consistent with actors‟ logics; but when it is utilized to protect
actors‟ logics, this relationship does not necessarily hold anymore. In the latter case,
power takes on a Machiavellian view whereby there are no good or bad strategies, only
effective ones. This work is particularly important because it uncovers how the
interaction between episodic and systemic power varies depending on the context within
which the interaction unfolds.
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